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Abstract 
An autobiographical memory framework for the study of regret is contrasted with 
traditional decision-making approaches to regret.  Based on the autobiographical 
memory framework a memory-based distinction is introduced between regrets for 
specific and general events.  Across 6 studies the distinction is applied to issues 
related to the temporal pattern of regret and to survey data showing that long term 
inaction regrets tend to concern experiences from early adulthood.  Studies 1 and 2 
examined the temporal distribution of experienced regrets within the context of the 
“reminiscence bump” phenomenon from autobiographical memory research.  
Participants regretted proportionally more experiences from early adulthood than 
from elsewhere in the lifespan, but this pattern obtained for general regrets only: 
specific regrets were more randomly distributed and tended to concern more recent 
events.  General regrets were more likely to concern inactions than actions, whereas 
specific regrets were as likely to concern actions as inactions.  Consistent with regret 
surveys, the most frequently reported regrets concerned family, intimate 
relationships (including marriage and parenting), education, work, character and self-
actualisation. These findings were interpreted with reference to life scripts. Studies 3 
and 4 assessed the contribution of the life script to the temporal distribution of 
imagined future regrets.  Young adults imagined and dated experiences they 
anticipated either themselves (Studies 3 and 4a), a peer (Study 4b) or an average 
person (Study 4c) might regret in life.  A preminiscence bump peaking in decade 
three was found for general regrets.  Across Studies 3 and 4 imagined regrets 
focussed on similar experiences, were described in predominantly general terms and 
were overwhelmingly associated with inaction.  The experienced regrets of young 
adults (Study 3) were similar in content to the regrets described by older adults about 
 2 
the same period (Studies 1 and 2).  The results are interpreted as evidence that a 
culturally timetabled script deems some events more important and regret-worthy 
than others.  Study 5 examined regret‟s relationship with other emotions. Specific 
regrets more often evoked hot and moral emotions, while general regrets more often 
evoked wistful emotions, and neither type was more strongly associated with despair 
emotions.  Study 5 also considered a distinction between self- and other-focussed 
regrets. Self-actualisation and other-focussed regrets were statistically 
indistinguishable and both were more likely than self-achievement regrets to evoke 
moral emotions such as guilt, remorse, and shame.   Finally, Study 6 showed that 
general regrets had a broader impact than did specific regrets insofar as they affected 
more domains and produced more consequences.  Across all of the studies in the 
thesis the domains of family, intimate relationships, character, education, work and 
self-development are the main source of real and imagined regrets.  It is argued that 
the representation of event knowledge in autobiographical memory combined with 
culturally determined scripts together shape what people regret in life.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.0 Defining regret: decision outcome and autobiographical memory 
 Regret signals a failure to reconcile present reality with past expectations, 
goals or desires.  It is the feeling evoked by the realisation that things have not 
turned out as wished and it may occur in response to explicit expectations or 
something unexpected, but whether regret stems from contemplating a life of 
unfulfilled aspirations or having just inadvertently hurt someone‟s feelings, at its 
heart is the thought that things could, would, or should have been better otherwise. 
This thought may also include a wish that events could be undone (the cutting 
remark we wish could be taken back) but wishing that events could be undone is not 
necessary for regret: a woman may genuinely regret marrying her husband without 
regretting having the children produced by the marriage.  Because regret involves 
comparing what is with what might have been, it has been described as a 
„counterfactual‟ emotion (Bell, 1982; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982a), as the „emotional offspring‟ of counterfactual thinking (Roese, 
2005), or more evocatively as „the persistence of the possible‟ (Landman, 1993). In 
section 1.3 the role of counterfactual thinking in the study of regret will be 
considered more specifically, but it is introduced here simply to underscore an aspect 
of regret research that has literally defined the field. 
Regret researchers have defined regret as “a more or less painful cognitive 
and emotional state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses, 
transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes” (Landman, 1993; p. 36), or more 
specifically as “a comparison-based emotion of self-blame, experienced when people 
realise or imagine that their present situation would have been better had they 
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decided differently in the past” (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007, p. 6).  These latter 
authors also describe regret as “the prototypical decision related emotion” (p. 15). 
Both definitions emphasise the evaluation of outcomes brought about in one 
way or another by personal decisions, but neither explicitly mentions memory or 
remembering. This omission is indicative of an approach to regret that has its roots 
in judgement and decision-making (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; see 
Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002 and Zeelenberg, 1999 for reviews of this field), and 
has tended to see regret only as the product of a judgement.  Although this view is 
changing and researchers are recognising now that regret also results from a process 
of judging and reasoning (Connolly & Reb, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), what 
remains absent from conceptualisations of experienced regret is that it is also an act 
of remembrance insofar as it is requires, to a greater or lesser degree, turning one‟s 
attention to past events.   Memory is both the medium through which regrets are 
experienced and what they are made of.  This fact has been largely overlooked by 
regret researchers, who either bypass memory completely or treat it as an auxiliary 
function supporting more interesting reasoning processes.  Memory researchers on 
the other hand have shown little direct interest in regret as a construct with unique 
mnemonic characteristics, although this also seems to be changing (see Beike & 
Krone, 2008;  Beike, Markman & Karadogan, 2009).   
The importance of remembering to regret is apparent in the following 
lexicographical definitions:  “to remember, think of (something lost), with distress or 
longing.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1991), or similarly: “to remember with a 
sense of loss or feeling of having done wrong; to wish otherwise” (The Chambers 
Dictionary, 1998).   The position adopted throughout this thesis is that regret is a 
process of remembering and reasoning, the products of which are types of memories 
 5 
ranging from vivid recollections upon which counterfactual thoughts are constructed, 
to abstract acknowledgements that things would be better had past events been 
otherwise. 
Autobiographical memory combines personally remembered experiences and 
knowledge about the self.  One influential model of autobiographical memory 
describes autobiographical memories as “primarily records of success or failure in 
goal attainment” (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; p. 266).  Given that regret is 
strongly associated with past choices and lost opportunities (Roese & Summerville, 
2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), and has been operationally defined as 
“unfulfilled or unattainable intentions or goals” (Lecci, Okun & Karoly, 1994; p. 
731) or “unattained goals” (Jokisaari, 2003), it could be argued that stripped bare, 
regret is a particular way of remembering failed or unfulfilled goals.  The archive of 
most personal histories will contain one or two records of regret, and because regret 
anchors our current cognitive- affective state to past choices, to missed opportunities 
and unfulfilled goals, it reminds us not only who we are, but also who we might have 
been had we followed different paths. In this broad sense regret and autobiographical 
memory inextricably bind behaviour and selfhood, and just as the main function of 
AM is to „ground‟ the self in reality by monitoring discrepancies between past and 
current goals (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) regret has the potential to „ground‟ 
people dysfunctionally to lost possible selves (King & Hicks, 2007).   
So regret is not just about what people do, it is also about who they are and 
how they remember themselves.  This alone would justify a memory-based approach 
to regret, but there are many areas of autobiographical memory research that would 
also lend themselves to interpretation from a regret perspective.  Generally speaking, 
the study of emotion in autobiographical memory concerns the relative influences of 
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variables related to valence and intensity (for an overview see Levine & Pizzaro, 
2004), and yet much autobiographical memory research concerns experiences easily 
accommodated by regret. Memories for transitional educational experiences 
(Pillemer, Picariello, Law & Reichman, 1996), first-time romantic episodes 
(Robinson, 1992b), „benchmark events‟ (Elnick, Margrett, Fitzgerald & Labouvie-
Vief, 1999), or self-defining memories (Singer & Salovey, 1993; Singer, Rexhaj & 
Baddeley, 2008) could all involve regret.  Viewing regret from a memory 
perspective requires a slight shift of emphasis, but the way regret has traditionally 
been conceptualised has not encouraged such a shift. 
The core contention of this thesis is that models of autobiographical thought 
for past and future events can explain patterns of regret across the lifespan. As the 
Introduction reviews both the regret and autobiographical memory literatures, it 
comprises two main parts, each with two main sub-sections.  The review of the 
regret literature begins in Section 1.0 with a summary of current knowledge about 
the demographics of regret; who it affects, in which areas of life, and with what 
psychological and physical consequences.  Sections 1.2 to 1.4 trace the development 
of regret research from the decision making literature to its current status as a 
research topic within mainstream social and cognitive psychology. The review of the 
autobiographical memory literature begins in Section 1.5 with a summary of research 
related to the structural, phenomenological and temporal properties of the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base. Section 1.7 summarises research related 
to emotion and autobiographical memory.  
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1.1 What we know about regret 
 Despite a proliferation of research interest in regret over recent years (see 
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007) and notwithstanding the definitions already provided, it 
is often very difficult to know what regret is precisely or how it differs from a cluster 
of closely related emotions.  Regret has been reliably distinguished from 
disappointment on the basis that regret implicates one‟s own role in bringing about 
the undesired outcome, whereas disappointment arises when circumstances fail to 
meet our expectations (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead & van der Pligt, 1998), but 
the distinction between regret and emotions such as remorse, guilt and shame 
remains unclear, as these emotions are often grouped together (Shaver, Schwartz, 
Kirson & O‟Connor, 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987).   These associations are 
considered empirically in Chapter 5, but it is helpful at this point to briefly clarify 
some key differences and similarities, because regret encompasses a variety of 
cognitive and affective states and is often expressed by proxy.  Shimanoff (1984) for 
instance found that out of the twenty most commonly mentioned emotions in 
everyday conversations, regret was second only to love; but she lists at least two 
terms (guilt and sorry) used by her participants as proxies for regret.  Sabini and 
Silver (2005) have questioned whether regret is a discrete emotion at all, arguing that 
regret requires only the acknowledgement that some aspect of a situation is 
regrettable.  The emotional colouration of that cognition is determined by whichever 
emotion(s) dominate at the time.  
With regard to guilt and shame, regret is generally considered to be the 
broader notion (Landman, 1993; Thalberg, 1963) and tends to have stronger 
associations with guilt than with shame (Smith, Webster, Parrot & Eyre, 2002; 
Tangney, 1995; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen & 
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Reinderman, 1998), and this relationship may be mediated by self-blame (Mandel & 
Dhami, 2005).  Regret is a complex, secondary emotion (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 
1989) whereas guilt and shame are often seen as basic emotions (Izard, 1977).  Guilt 
and shame are socially determined “self-conscious” emotions evoked when one‟s 
behaviour is judged against social or moral norms (Ausubel, 1955; Tangney & 
Fischer, 1995) but regret, although self-focussed (Mandel, 2003), is not in itself 
socially determined.   Regret has also been shown to focus on harm done to the self, 
while guilt more often involves transgressions against others (Berndsen, van der 
Pligt, Doosje & Manstead, 2004; Mandel, 2003).  Although shame also focuses on 
the self, it is concerned with how the self is judged by others and is more 
characterological than is regret, because shame arises from a global evaluation of the 
self as bad (Tangney, 1992).   
The distinction between regret and remorse is particularly ambiguous and 
researchers often use the terms interchangeably (Brehaut et al., 2003; Connolly et al., 
1997; Roese & Summerville, 2006; Smith et al., 2002).  The lexicon does little to 
help, defining remorse as a feeling of “compunction, deep regret, (emphasis added) 
for a sin or wrong committed” (OED, 1991).  But regret is generally assumed to be 
the broader notion (Landman, 1993; Thalberg, 1963) and remorse has a stronger 
moral dimension: the sadness of regret comes from comparing a past behaviour with 
some current standard, but the sadness of remorse acknowledges that a past 
behaviour was morally wrong (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989). In the legal and 
criminological literatures remorse is most often associated with specific actions that 
cause harm to others, and Proeve and Howell (2006) cite studies showing that a 
sincere expression of remorse may have a huge impact on sentencing decisions.  The 
orientation in regret may be towards the self, another, or a state of the world, 
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whereas remorse is “an awakened sense of the reality of another” (Gaita, 1991, p. 
50) and is orientated towards that harmed other (Cordner, 2007; Dillman, 1999).   
 
1.1.1 Who experiences regret, what do people regret and why? 
 Landman (1993) cites surveys showing that between 35% and 97% of people 
acknowledge having experienced regret.  Men and women think regret-related 
counterfactual thoughts with equal frequency (Landman & Manis, 1992), although 
sex differences have been found:  women are more likely than men to report family 
and relationship regrets (Jokisaari, 2004) and within the domain of romantic 
relationships men are more likely than women to regret not having had more partners 
(Roese, Pennington, Janicki, Li & Kenrick, 2006).  Regret is found in samples of 
young and old participants (Wrosch & Heckhausen 2002), in cross-cultural studies of 
American, Chinese, Japanese and Russian samples (Gilovich, Wang, Regan & 
Nishina, 2003) and in studies carried out independently in Turkey (Toktas, 2002), 
France (Bonnefon & Zhang, 2008), Finland (Jokisaari, 2003; 2004), Germany 
(Timmer, Westerhof  & Dietmann-Kohli, 2005; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002) and 
the U.K. (Feeney, Gardiner, Johnston, Jones & McElvoy, 2005).  So although it is 
impossible to say categorically that regret is universal, most regret researchers 
assume it to be so.   
  Many people claim not to have experienced regret, but as Gilovich and 
Medvec (1995) point out it is difficult to accept such claims at face value: a life full 
of decisions and choices that did not bring at least some encounter with regret hardly 
seems plausible. It seems more likely that people distance themselves from regret 
because it is an acknowledgement that one has made mistakes and it has implications 
for the character by association with moral emotions like guilt, shame and remorse.  
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The perception of regret as something potentially harmful is exemplified by books 
aimed at helping people to „overcome‟ life regrets (Freeman & De Wolf, 1989), 
although this view is changing amongst researchers, who increasingly adopt a more 
functional approach and treat regret as a resource (Epstude & Roese, 2008; King & 
Hicks, 2007; Roese, 2005). A recent survey even shows that relative to other 
negative emotions regret (along with guilt) is positively regarded as a bringer of 
insight (Saffrey, Summerville & Roese, 2008).   
 The most comprehensive account of what people regret in life comes from a 
meta-analysis of eleven regret-ranking studies carried out between 1989 and 2003 by 
Roese and Summerville (2005), who found that the most frequently regretted life 
domains were education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure.  These 
findings come from surveys and experimental studies involving both sexes, all age 
groups, and different methods of eliciting regret.  Some studies asked people directly 
what they regretted in life (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Jokisaari, 2003) or which of 
life‟s activities they most regretted not having pursued (Wrosch & Heckhausen, 
2002), while others asked people to say how they would do things differently if they 
could live life over again (DeGenoa, 1992; Hattiangadi, Medvec & Gilovich, 1995; 
Kinnier & Metha, 1989; Landman & Manis, 1992; Landman, Vanderwater, Stewart 
& Malley, 1995).  Lecci, Okun and Karoly, (1994) asked people about their 
unfulfilled goals, which were seen as proxies for regret.  
On the basis of these findings Roese and Summerville (2005) proposed that 
the most frequently regretted areas of life are those that are seen as offering greater 
opportunity for future corrective action.  According to this opportunity principle, 
people feel regret when they think there is still something that can be done about the 
regrettable situation, but when no such opportunity exists, they either engage in 
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dissonance reducing thoughts or re-construe their regrets. Roese and Summerville 
bolster their argument with evidence from a number of sources and they test it 
directly using the regrets of college students.  The authors first created a domain 
ranking from the students‟ regrets (Study 2a) and then presented the lists of life 
domains from the student rankings and the meta-analysis to a different sample of 
students (Study 2b), who selected one domain perceived to be high in opportunity 
and one domain perceived to be low in opportunity. Opportunity was defined in 
terms of how easily or not the students felt able to change that area of life. They then 
recalled a regret from each of the selected domains (one high, one low opportunity) 
and rated it for intensity and importance.  The results offered support for the 
opportunity principle by showing that domains rated high in opportunity were also 
those domains ranked highest in the student and meta-analysis rankings.  Also, high 
opportunity domains contained more intense regrets and were rated as more 
important than low opportunity domains.   
Beike, Markman and Karadogan (2009) challenge the basic premise of the 
opportunity principle and argue that regret stems not from realising that an 
opportunity is still viable, but from recognising that it is irredeemably lost.  They 
point to the fact that education, the most regretted life domain in Roese and 
Summerville‟s (2005) meta-analysis, would not represent a source of future 
opportunity for many of the participants surveyed, some of whom were elderly 
adults. This point is especially apt given that the regrets for missed educational 
opportunities reported by Hattiangadi et al. (1995) came from an intellectually gifted 
cohort with an average age of 74yrs, all with above average IQs (140) and 70% of 
whom were university graduates.  Moreover, the practical value of education, as 
Roese (2005) himself points out, comes from its potential as a gateway to success 
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and happiness in many other walks of life, since it enhances one‟s earning potential.  
This seems an unlikely explanation for why older adults in particular would regret 
missed educational opportunities and it is more likely that many such regrets simply 
reflect the realisation that life would have been better with more education. 
Other types of regret are also difficult to explain using the future opportunity 
principle.  People often regret not having expressed their feelings to dead loved ones 
or romantic partners, or else they lament „not being there‟ for people.  Such regrets 
do seem to represent irredeemably lost opportunities and they are unlikely to be 
ameliorated by dissonance reduction or re-construal. The realisation that they cannot 
be resolved only compounds the regret.  The problem may be to do with how an 
opportunity is construed, whether it calls for external changes in circumstances, or 
some internal change in attitude. So while it is true that we cannot resurrect the dead 
to tell them we love them, paradoxically, such regrets may offer more opportunity 
not less, because all they require is a change of heart, and this can occur even on 
one‟s deathbed.   
Examples could be found for and against both arguments and it is probably 
the case that opportunities differ qualitatively across domains and situations and so 
engender more or less tractable regrets. However, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 there may be other cultural or moral explanations for why some 
domains are more frequently regretted than others. 
 
1.1.2 The impact of regret 
 Whatever the content or cause of regrets they have many adverse 
psychological and physical consequences.  Lecci, et al. (1994) examined the 
influence of life regrets as predictors of psychological adjustment in a sample of 18 
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to 59 year olds, who evaluated their regrets and current goals on dimensions such as 
importance, impact, control, investment (time and effort), disappointment and 
distress, and completed self-reported measures of psychological wellbeing.  People 
who listed having more goals also reported more regrets, and having more regrets 
reduced the perceived importance of current goals.  People who reported more 
regrets also scored higher on measures of depression, and while number of reported 
regrets was not associated with lower life satisfaction in the sample overall, it was 
negatively correlated with life satisfaction amongst the older adults.  People who 
reported having invested a lot of time and energy in their regrettably failed goals also 
scored lower on measures of life satisfaction.   Overall, having regrets for unfulfilled 
goals was shown to negatively affect psychological wellbeing. 
Similar findings are reported by Jokisaari (2003) for a Finnish sample of 18 
to 82 year olds.  Participants appraised their regrets in terms of importance, 
consequences (how much impact the regrets had) and changeableness, and then 
provided ratings on several health-related measures including life satisfaction, 
physical symptoms (headaches, colds, coughs, skin problems, backaches and so on), 
depressive symptoms, and general negative affect (nervousness, anxiety, 
unhappiness).  Regardless of age, people who rated their regrets as having a high 
impact on their lives scored lower on measures of life satisfaction and reported more 
physical health symptoms. In a subsequent study Jokisaari (2004) found that impact 
differed across life domains: regrets of education and work were negatively 
associated with measures of life satisfaction, while regrets related to the self were 
negatively associated with scores on a depression inventory.  
McKee, Wilson, Chung, Hinchliff, Goudie, Elford and Mitchell (2005) 
surveyed older adults living in residential and nursing homes to see whether their 
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physical and psychological wellbeing were adversely affected by increased thinking 
about the past (reminiscence) and life regrets.  All of the residents reported some 
degree of reminiscence, though fewer than half reported having regrets.  However, 
those who did have regrets were found to be poorer in social wellbeing, had lower 
morale, and experienced less positive affect than those who reported having no 
regrets. 
  One criticism of such studies is their reliance on self-reported measures of 
wellbeing.  Wrosch, Bauer, Miller and Lupien (2007) addressed this issue by using 
more direct biological markers of physical health, such as salivary cortisol levels 
(Study 1) and cold symptoms and sleep patterns (Study 2).  The hormone cortisol is 
associated with stress and reduced immune response and so is a reliable and non-
invasive way of gauging how psychological factors influence physical wellbeing.   
In their first study Wrosch et al. (2007) also assessed people for 12 acute 
physical symptoms (including headaches, shortness of breath, chest and back pains) 
as well as for chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancer, diabetes, lung disease 
etc.  People who experienced intense regret secreted more cortisol and reported more 
acute physical symptoms than did those who experienced less intense regret.  
Overall, regret had a negative impact on physical and mental health.  Data from the 
second study confirmed the impact of regret on physical health, as people who 
reported high levels of regret intensity at baseline were reliably more likely to 
develop cold symptoms than those whose baseline measures of regret were less 
intense.  Wrosch et al. (2007) also tested a writing intervention in their second study 
designed to encourage people to think constructively about their regrets.  Writing 
about the regrets of other people, describing external contributing factors beyond 
their control, and identifying the importance and positive contribution to their own 
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lives of current and future goals had beneficial effects on those in the experimental 
(intervention) group.  Relative to participants in a control group, who simply wrote 
about daily activities and intentions, the intervention group showed significantly 
lower levels of despair-related emotions as well as improved sleep patterns. 
Because of the correlational nature of the studies described above any causal 
conclusions must be tentative at best, as it remains unclear just how regret, memory 
and subjective wellbeing interact.  Nevertheless, these studies show some of the 
negative physical and mental phenomena associated with regret.  The study by 
Wrosch et al. (2007) also suggests at least one way of countering these effects, but 
others have found that people also have natural ways of counteracting the negative 
impact of regret.  Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) found that older participants 
reported lower levels of regret intensity when they also reported having less control 
over regrettable events, possibly because they felt less responsible for their regretted 
experiences.  The opposite pattern was observed in younger adults, who reported 
lower regret intensity the more they attributed internal control towards the regretted 
experiences.  Wrosch and Heckhausen suggest that by attributing low internal 
control over their regrets older adults deactivate them, whereas attributing high 
internal control gives younger adults the feeling that they can do something about 
their regrets.  
Age differences in dealing with life regrets were examined by Torges, 
Stewart and Nolen-Hoeksema (2008), who looked at the impact of unresolved 
regrets on the process of bereavement in young and old adults.  Relative to the 
younger group, older adults were more likely to have resolved their regrets 6 months 
post-bereavement.  They also scored lower on measures of depressive symptoms and 
rumination and had higher levels of wellbeing than younger adults 
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Wrosch, Bauer and Scheier (2005) suggest that naturally adaptive, self-
regulating factors protect older people from regret.  Younger people, they argue, 
have plenty of opportunities ahead of them to redeem their regrets, whereas older 
people face diminishing opportunities to undo their regrets and so disengage from 
them, a claim with strong echoes of Roese and Summerville‟s (2005) „opportunity 
breeds regret‟ principle.  In the first of two studies Wrosch et al. (2005) examined 
this hypothesis by comparing two age groups (18 –35yrs and 55-89 yrs) on measures 
of regret intensity, perceived opportunities to undo regrets, degree of disengagement 
from regrets, and on measures of quality of life (depressive symptoms and physical  
health).  The results showed that compared with younger participants the older group 
perceived fewer opportunities to undo their regrets and reported more disengagement 
from their regrets.  Moreover, older adults who reported high levels of regret 
intensity scored higher on depressive symptoms and poor physical health than their 
peers who reported low regret intensity.  In the younger group, regret intensity was 
not strongly associated with wellbeing.  These results were replicated in a second 
study, which also showed that among older adults, having future goals reliably 
predicted reduced levels of regret intensity and higher levels of life satisfaction, 
which as Beike, Markman and Karadogan (2009) point out, is at odds with Roese 
and Summerville‟s (2005) opportunity principle.   
Stewart and Vanderwater (1999) showed that regret-inspired life changes 
also bring contentment.   Women in midlife who had acknowledged their regrets and 
then implemented corrective behaviour (returning to education or starting a career) 
were higher in life satisfaction than women who reported regrets but did not actively 
engage in corrective behaviour.   Torges, Stewart, and Miner-Rubino (2005) found 
that women who reported having no regrets scored higher on measures of life 
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satisfaction than those who did report regrets, but among those who reported regrets, 
higher levels of wellbeing were found in women who had either come to terms with 
their regret or had at least „put the best face on them‟.  Low levels of wellbeing were 
reported in those who had not managed to resolve their regrets in either way.   
King and Hicks (2007) advocate a pragmatic approach to regret, which in 
their view is inevitable and so should be embraced as an opportunity for personal 
growth instead of being avoided at all cost.  Mistakes and lost opportunities present 
people with important information about themselves, in particular about the “lost 
possible selves” they might have been.  King and Raspin (2004) for example 
analysed the narratives of divorced women for references to failed goals and lost 
possible selves (i.e., the potential selves they envisaged when entering marriage).  
Women who tended to dwell on their lost possible selves reported lower subjective 
wellbeing than did women whose failed goals and lost possible selves were less 
salient in their narratives. The authors suggest that letting go of failed goals and the 
possible selves attached to them allows people to move on and develop their 
potential by embracing their revised visions of who they may become. 
 
1.2 Regret and decision making 
 Many regret researchers emphasise that regret is not just about bad things that 
happen but about bad things that people bring about through their own choices 
(Roese & Summerville, 2005; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; Zeelenberg, van dijk, 
Manstead, & van der Pligt, 1998). Regret was incorporated into some early models 
of choice as it became clear that not only do people experience regret when their 
decisions lead to suboptimal outcomes, but they factor this knowledge into their 
decision about the future.  In fact, much early regret research focussed on 
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prospective (anticipated) as opposed to retrospective (experienced) regret in an 
attempt to explain why people violate axioms of rational choice by making decisions 
that are inconsistent with a rational assessment of the odds.  It became apparent to 
some (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Sugden, 1985) that in conditions of 
uncertainty people make choices that are less to do with maximising utilities than 
they are to do with avoiding bad feelings such as regret or self-recrimination.  The 
incorporation of „irrational‟ affect into rational models of choice marked an 
important point of growth for both decision making and regret research (Zeelenberg, 
1999).  
 
1.2.1 Anticipated regret 
 Numerous experimental manipulations have tested the assumption that 
people make choices aimed at avoiding or minimizing regret, many of which exploit 
the specific role of feedback about chosen and foregone options.  Simonson (1992) 
had students imagine themselves to be consumers in purchase scenarios involving 
choices between safe or risky options. In one study they chose either to buy items 
currently on sale (safe option), or to wait to see whether better bargains were 
available at a later date (risky option), and in a second study they chose between a 
known brand (safe option) or a cheaper, lesser known brand (risky option).  The 
principal manipulation in both scenarios was the expectation (or not) of receiving 
feedback about the non-chosen option, a prime intended to increase the salience of 
anticipated regret. The manipulation worked in both cases: participants primed to 
anticipate regret (feedback group) were more likely than the control (no feedback) 
group to go with the safe options (buy from current sale items/choose named brand). 
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In both cases participants justified their decisions in terms of responsibility and self-
blame. 
In gambling experiments involving real monetary reward Josephs, Larrick, 
Steele and Nisbett (1992) looked at how people who were either high or low in self 
esteem made decisions in the face of anticipated negative feedback about their 
decision outcomes. If feedback about bad decisions is self-implicating, they argued, 
then it should appear more threatening to individuals who perceive themselves as 
having fewer self-protecting resources.  Participants chose between certain wins or 
speculative gambles (a certain $10 versus a 50% chance of $20) in the face of 
different feedback manipulations: in Experiment 1 everybody expected feedback on 
their chosen option; in Experiment 2 only half of participants did, and in Experiment 
3 everyone expected feedback about their chosen option, but half of participants also 
expected feedback about the option they had passed up.  The results of Experiment 1 
confirmed that low self-esteem (LSE) individuals sought to protect themselves from 
self-implicating negative feedback, as they were significantly more likely to choose 
the safe (certain) option. High self-esteem individuals (HSE) on the other hand 
appeared less threatened by the implications of a bad decision and were 50% more 
likely than LSE participants to go for the risky option.  
The manipulation in Experiment 2 did not influence the behaviour of HSE 
individuals, who were as likely to choose safe as risky options regardless of whether 
or not they expected feedback.  By contrast, LSE individuals who did not expect 
feedback about their choices (and therefore perceived no threat) became just as risk-
seeking as HSE individuals.  The results of Experiment 3 showed that LSE 
individuals who anticipated feedback only on their chosen option did not differ 
significantly from HSE individuals in the same condition; but where feedback about 
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the foregone option was expected, LSE individuals were significantly more likely 
than HSE individuals to choose the safe option.  All three experiments highlight how 
bad choices can be seen as self-implicating, but the third experiment shows how the 
perceived threat of regret is increased when knowledge about foregone options is 
available. 
This point was illustrated by Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt and de Vries 
(1996) in three hypothetical gambling experiments which also manipulated feedback 
about foregone alternatives.  In each of three conditions participants could choose a 
risky or safe gamble and in all three conditions they expected to receive feedback 
about their chosen option. In two conditions however there was the possibility of 
also receiving feedback about the option they had passed up, so people in the risky 
condition who chose a safe gamble received feedback on both options, and similarly, 
people in the safe condition who chose a risky gamble received feedback on both 
options.  Only in the latter two conditions was regret likely, since participants 
learned what they would have won had they chosen differently.  Participants also 
gave reasons justifying their choices. As predicted,  people‟s choices indicated that 
they were avoiding potential regret, because people in the risky condition chose the 
risky option (thereby avoiding feedback about the foregone safe option) and people 
in the safe condition chose the safe option (thereby avoiding feedback about the 
foregone risky option).  Examination of the participants‟ protocols also showed that 
anticipation of regret was mentioned frequently in their justifications for their 
choices. 
Scenario studies show the influence of anticipated regret on people‟s 
gambling choices (Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov, 1999;  Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004) 
their negotiation strategies (Larrick & Boles, 1995), their decisions about medical 
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treatments (Ritov & Baron, 1995), and their investment behaviour in situations 
where foregone opportunities might be seized by a third party (Hoelzl & 
Loewenstein, 2005).  Behavioural studies also support this scenario data. For 
example, Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) conducted a series of studies in which students 
were given lottery tickets and then asked if they would be prepared to exchange them 
for new ones plus a small monetary bonus.  Despite an expressed belief that their 
tickets had very little chance of winning, the majority of participants were reluctant 
to exchange them nonetheless, because of the regret they anticipated feeling if the 
original ticket turned out to be a winner.  A recent account shows how this 
phenomenon might be explained by people‟s reluctance to „tempt fate‟ (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2007; 2008).   
In health and medical contexts the prospect of regret has been shown to bias 
people‟s judgement in decisions concerning both real (Asch et al., 1994; Meszaros et 
al., 1996; Ziarnowsky, Brewer & Weber, 2008) and hypothetical vaccinations (Baron 
& Ritov, 1994; Connolly & Reb, 2005; Ritov & Baron, 1990).  The increasing 
involvement of patients in medical decision making is seen as a major source of 
potential regret (Brehaut et al., 2003) and the anticipation of regret is recognised as 
something likely to shape treatment choices.  Brodensen, Sutton, Goff, Hodgson and 
Thomas (2004) asked people with a family history of colorectal cancer to anticipate 
the emotions that might follow from their decisions to undergo genetic screening or 
not.  Screening establishes an individual‟s degree of risk and can determine the 
subsequent management and surveillance of the risk, so testing positive, although an 
unpleasant outcome, has potential health benefits, as well as implications for the 
decisions of other family members.  The results of the survey showed that people 
anticipated feeling more regret and guilt from not having genetic screening (and 
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therefore not knowing whether they were at risk or not) than from being screened 
and subsequently testing positive.   
Medical practitioners make consequential decisions with much potential for 
regret, remorse, guilt (Le Coz & Tassy, 2006) or regret-related feelings of „chagrin‟ 
(Feinstein, 1985), and some medical decisions may involve choosing an „acceptable‟ 
level of regret (Djubegovic, Hozo and McMasters, 1999).   
In other domains research shows that anticipated regret may also have a 
positive influence on attitudes and behaviour.  Anticipated regret can make people 
engage in safer sex (Richard, de Vries & van der Pligt, 1998) and can strengthen 
their intentions to implement health-related behaviours (Abraham & Sheeran, 
2003;2004), possibly because it creates an association between the intention and 
potential for negative affect should that intention remain unfulfilled (Sheeran & 
Orbell, 1999).  In short, people are regret-averse and their decisions reflect this, 
although under certain circumstances their curiosity for outcome knowledge can 
override this aversion (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007). 
 
1.2.2 The effect of regret on subsequent choice 
Behaviour is influenced as much by experienced regret as it is by the 
prospect of regret.  Indeed, researchers who take a functional view of regret argue 
that one of its primary functions is preparatory, in that it helps people to learn from 
past mistakes and modify future behaviour (Roese, 1994; 2005).  
 Decisions that lead to regret make people regret-averse when faced with the 
same decisions again (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997), and measures of regret taken 
after a bad experience with a service provider (a taxi company or a restaurant) can 
predict the likelihood that a person will subsequently switch providers (Zeelenberg 
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& Pieters, 1999).  Creyer and Ross (1999) found that scores on their regret 
experience measure reliably predicted the extent to which participants‟ subsequent 
choices were regret-minimizing, while Tsiros and Mittal (2000) showed that 
experiences of regret have an indirect negative effect on consumer repurchases.   
The phenomenon of inaction inertia (Tykocinksy, Pittman & Tuttle, 1995; 
Tycocinsky & Pittman, 1998) is another example of how regret can spill over from 
one choice into a subsequent choice.  People who forego an attractive opportunity 
are more likely to also forego a subsequent, less valuable but still objectively 
attractive opportunity, perhaps because the opportunity cues a memory of the 
previous experience of regret and triggers an aversive response (see also Arkes, 
Kung & Hutzel, 2002; Butler & Highhouse, 2000).   
 
1.2.3 Regret and responsibility 
 The decision making framework necessarily associates regret with personal 
responsibility and some degree of self-blame (see Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002), 
and the dimension of self agency was found to be one of the main features that 
distinguished regret (along with guilt and shame), from the related emotion of 
disappointment  (Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989).  Zeelenberg, van Dijk, 
Manstead & van der Pligt (1998) found regret and disappointment to differ 
significantly on many other dimensions, but most strongly in terms of action 
tendencies (what an emotion makes people want to do) and emotivational goals 
(what the emotion makes a person want).  Regret more than disappointment was 
associated with the action tendency to „kick oneself‟ and „correct the mistake‟, and 
with the emotivational goal of wanting to undo the event and get a second chance.  
This focus on the agent‟s own behaviour as the source of regret but not 
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disappointment was illustrated in a separate study (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der 
Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen & Reinderman, 1998) where people were asked what 
they would change about either an experience of regret or one of disappointment.  
People were more likely to undo some aspect of their own behaviour for regret, but 
some aspect of the situation for disappointment.  Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead & 
van der Pligt (1998) concluded that regret and disappointment differ fundamentally 
in that regret comes from realising that we have made bad choices whereas 
disappointment arises when expectations are frustrated by events beyond our control.   
The centrality of responsibility to regret is a contested issue (see the 
exchange between Connolly, Ordonez, & Coughlan, 1997; Ordonez & Connolly, 
2000; Zeelenberg Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000).  Landman (1993) suggests 
that responsibility may distinguish different states of regret but is not a defining 
feature of it, a view reflected in many philosophical attempts to draw distinctions 
between simple regret, agent-regret, guilt, and remorse (Baron, 1988; Rorty, 1980; 
Thalberg, 1963; Williams, 1976).  A rather extreme (and potentially regrettable) 
position is taken by Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007), who consider responsibility to be 
a precondition of regret and have declared this unambiguously: “No choice, no 
regret” (p. 15).   
 
1. 3  Decisions and regret as a counterfactual emotion 
 In Section 1.0 regret was described as a counterfactual emotion and the work 
reviewed on decision regret shows how the availability of knowledge about desirable 
foregone options can determine people‟s choices and their responses to post-decision 
outcomes, as they compare what they have with what they might have had.  The 
pervasive tendency to think about things that are „contrary-to-the fact‟ (Chisholme, 
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1946) is a widely studied topic that has had a strong influence on the direction of 
regret research.   
Counterfactual thinking involves mental simulations of alternative outcomes 
to reality (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and counterfactual thoughts are typically 
framed in „if only‟ propositions.  These comparisons are directional (Markman et al., 
1993), so imagining a more favourable outcome (an upwards counterfactual) 
produces experiences of disappointment and regret (Bell, 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998) as well as 
guilt and shame (Mandel, 2003; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994), whereas a 
downwards counterfactual where a worse outcome is imagined produces relief or 
rejoicing (Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Stratham, Richman & Sherman, 1990; Guttentag & 
Ferrel, 2004; Landman, 1987; Loomes & Sugden, 1982).  Counterfactuals are more 
spontaneously evoked by negative than by positive outcomes (Boniger, Gleicher & 
Stratham, 1994; Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Landman, 1987; Roese & Hur, 1997) though this is not always the case 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman & McMullen, 1993; Roese & Olson, 1993a,b; Roese 
& Olson, 1995).  
Through their association with causal reasoning (Wells & Gavanski, 1989) 
and problem solving (Roese, 1994, 1997) reality-improving upward counterfactuals 
can help people to learn from their mistakes and modify future behaviour (Markman 
et al., 1993; Roese, 1994; Roese, Hur & Pennington, 1999), but they can also be 
dysfunctional if people make the wrong causal inferences and draw the wrong 
conclusions about how to improve future behaviour (Sherman & McConnell, 1995).  
According to norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) counterfactuals are 
spontaneously and automatically evoked by surprising events, as the imagination 
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attempts to reinstate normality by mutating the highly available alternatives brought 
to mind by the evoking event itself.  Counterfactual thoughts may also involve 
elaborative, self-initiated reflections about once possible lives (Kahneman, 1995) or 
once possible selves (King & Hicks, 2007), but whether automatic or elaborative 
they tend to concern only events that were once deemed possible.  Unlike „free form‟ 
fantasies, counterfactual thoughts adhere to natural laws (Seelau, Seelau, Wells & 
Windschitl, 1995) and people tend not to mentally undo events by mutating the laws 
of gravity, causation, or time.  Indeed, the counterfactual imagination is thought to 
be a rational faculty operating in relatively predictable ways (Byrne, 2005), 
gravitating naturally towards some features of a situation more than others.   
Counterfactual statements such as „If only I‟d gone to university I‟d have a 
better job by now‟ imply a causal relationship between a university education and 
successful employment, and counterfactual causal reasoning is quick and 
spontaneous following unexpected events (Hassin, Burgh & Uleman, 2002) and has 
been manipulated in numerous scenarios (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; N‟gabala & 
Branscombe, 1995; Roese & Olson, 1996; Wells & Gavanski, 1989; Wells, Taylor & 
Turtle, 1987). Counterfactual causal attributions are often made even when two 
events are not causally linked: when faced with two tosses of a coin that lead to a 
loss of money, people tend to undo the second toss and ascribe more blame to the 
person tossing the second coin (Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990).   
In scenarios where a sequence of events prevents a character from arriving 
home in time to save his dying wife, people tend to undo an event perceived to be 
controllable (stopping at a bar on the way home) more than they undo an 
uncontrollable event, such as a flock of sheep blocking the road (Girotto, Legrenzi & 
Rizzo, 1991).  When the character is delayed by a series of events that are all 
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controllable, people tend to undo those events deemed to be socially unacceptable 
(stopping for a hamburger) more readily than socially acceptable events, such as 
stopping to visit family (McCloy & Byrne, 2002).   
Exceptional events are more readily mutated than routine events (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1982; Miller & McFarland, 1986; Wells et al., 1987) and people who 
have suffered traumatic injury may focus on atypical aspects of the circumstances in 
which they were injured (Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman &  Ellard, 1996).  Events 
that are easily imagined otherwise might appear unnecessary and lead people to think 
that they ought not to have happened (Miller & Turnbull, 1990). 
 
1.3.1 Agency and counterfactual thinking 
 Of central importance to this thesis is the relationship between regret and 
agency, and much of the work on the nature of that relationship comes from 
counterfactual thinking research dealing explicitly with the role played by agency in 
determining the affective response to decision outcomes.   This work will now be 
considered.  
 The emotional consequences of counterfactual thoughts are gauged by an 
entirely subjective yardstick and may sometimes seem counterintuitive: an Olympic 
athlete for example may experience more regret after winning a silver medal than the 
athlete who wins the bronze.  Although a silver medal is objectively better than a 
bronze, the desired outcome (a gold medal) seems relatively closer to the silver 
medallist than it does to the bronze medallist (Medvec, Madey & Gilovich, 1995). 
The ease with which such alternatives come to mind amplifies the affective response 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and it is at this point, where objectively similar 
outcomes produce (or are expected to produce) very different emotional responses, 
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that the overlap between counterfactual thinking and regret research is most 
apparent.  Kahneman and Tversky (1982) have illustrated this „emotional 
amplification‟ effect in many frequently cited scenarios studies.  They showed for 
example that someone who misses a flight by five minutes is expected to feel more 
upset than someone missing the same flight by thirty minutes, because of the relative 
ease with which each scenario can be reversed.   With regard to counterfactual 
thinking and regret, one of Kahneman and Tversky‟s most influential studies 
concerns the role of agency in determining an individual‟s affective response to a 
bad outcome.   
In a frequently cited and replicated study, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
presented a scenario involving two investors, George and Paul, who, for different 
reasons, find themselves $1200 worse off than they could have been.  George misses 
the opportunity as a consequence of his actions (buying new stock when he would 
have profited from sticking with existing stock) while Paul misses out through 
inaction (by holding on to his original stock when buying new stock was the 
profitable option).  Although the outcome is the same for both men, when asked to 
estimate who would feel more regret, 92% of people opted for George, the actor.   
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) explain this attribution of greater regret for the actor 
as being due to the relative ease with which the alternatives can be imagined.  In 
their view a state of inaction is the norm or default setting and so an action deviates 
from normality.  It is easier therefore to imagine George reversing the action and 
restoring normality than it is to imagine undoing Paul‟s situation from inaction to 
action.   
  This „action effect‟ has been replicated many times and for both negative 
and positive outcomes in many cases using modifications of Kahneman and 
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Tversky‟s (1982) switch/stay scenario (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Connolly,Ordonez & 
Coughlan,1997; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Gleicher, Kost, Baker, Stratham, Richman & 
Sherman, 1990; Landman, 1987; Zeelenberg, van Dijk & Manstead, 1998).  It has 
also been shown to be sensitive to a number of manipulations and can depend on 
such things as whether an action is consistent with a person‟s personal orientation  
(Seta, McElroy & Seta, 2001) ,whether information about prior (Zeelenberg, van der 
Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002) or alternative (Ritov & Baron, 1995) outcomes is 
available to the decision-maker, whether an outcome is seen as reversible 
(Abendroth & Diehl, 2006), and whether the decisions being judged are presented in 
a within- or between-subjects design (N‟gbala & Branscombe, 1997; Zhang, Walsh 
& Bonnefon, 2005).  The action effect continues to be explored in scenario studies 
(Byrne & McEleney, 2000; Feeney & Handley, 2006; Walsh & Byrne, 2007; 
Zeelenberg, van der Bos, van Dijk & Pieters, 2002).   By locating regret within a 
decision-making framework and emphasising the role of counterfactuals, Kahneman 
and Tversky‟s (1982) vignette studies shaped the way subsequent regret research 
was conducted, even when researchers adopted a different tack and moved away 
from laboratory studies and into the field to examine people‟s actual 
autobiographical regrets.   
 
1.3.2 Agency and autobiographical regrets 
 The action effect found in experimental studies using scenarios appeared to 
Gilovich and Medvec (1994) to be at odds with anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
people tend to regret things they haven‟t done more than things they have done.  
Indeed, existing survey data already indirectly supported this intuition.  Kinnear and 
Metha (1989) for example surveyed people in three age groups (20s, 35-55yrs, and 
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65+) about their major regrets by asking them to think about what they would do 
(emphasis added) differently if they had their lives to live over again.   Although the 
action-inaction distinction was not part of the survey, the framing of this question 
appears to assume inaction as the default for life regrets.  This assumption is even 
more apparent in the items respondents were asked to select from, which included 
statements such as “I would have been more assertive”; “I would have taken care of 
my health more” (p. 184).   In a „life revision‟ survey DeGenoa (1992) reflects 
similar assumptions; respondents were presented with a list of 35 activities (such as 
being with friends, working, and developing spirituality) and asked to indicate how 
much time they would spend on each one if they had their lives to live over again, 
the implication being that people would feel they had not done enough of these 
activities the first time round.   
Gilovich and Medvec (1994) tested their intuitions in two telephone surveys 
and an interview-survey study.   In their first study they assessed the prevalence of 
both types of regret by asking people whether they most regretted things they had 
done but wished they hadn‟t (actions) or things they hadn‟t done but wished they had 
(inactions).  In the second study they asked people to recall their greatest regret of 
action and their greatest regret of inaction and then to decide which they regretted 
most.  The results showed that more people regretted inactions than actions (Study 1) 
and more regret was attributed to inaction than to action regrets (Study 2).   A 
subsequent study combining face-to-face interviews and questionnaires also found 
inaction regrets to predominate.   
This temporal pattern (the inaction effect; Zeelenberg, van der Bos, van Dijk 
& Pieters, 2002) is a robust finding in studies involving autobiographical regrets.  It 
has been demonstrated in the general population (Feeney et al., 2005; Feldman, 
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Miyamoto & Loftus, 1999), among the intellectually gifted (Hattiangadi et al., 
1995), and in several cultures (Bonnefon, & Zhang, 2008; Gilovich et al., 2003; 
Jokissari, 2003; Timmer et al., 2005). 
 
1.4  Regret’s temporal pattern: Gilovich and Medvec’s (1995) account 
 One comprehensive account of the inaction effect is Gilovich and Medvec‟s 
(1995) elaboration of their earlier position (Gilovich & Medvec,1994), which 
proposes that several psychological and motivational factors operate over time to 
make people feel better about their regrettable actions and worse about their 
regrettable inactions.  The first factor assumed to mitigate the pain of regrettable 
actions more than regrettable inactions is people‟s tendency to engage in 
compensatory behaviours following actions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994).  The 
second factor concerns the tendency to seek silver linings and reduce cognitive 
dissonance.   Gilovich, Medvec and Chen, (1995) argued that because regrettable 
actions are more painful in the short term they motivate pain-reducing cognitions 
more quickly. Furthermore, they argued that dissonance reduction is greater for 
actions than for inactions because emotional amplification is greater for actions than 
inactions (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and is more closely associated with 
responsibility than is inaction.  They demonstrated this in an experiment which used 
a „stay/switch‟ format from a well known game show (the “Monty Hall” problem).   
Three prizes of different value are concealed in three boxes; there are two „moderate‟ 
prizes and one „grand‟ prize.  Participants first choose one of the three boxes, the 
content of which is unknown.  The experimenter then opens one of the two 
remaining boxes to reveal a moderate prize.  The tension of the game rests on 
whether the grand prize lies in the box participants have chosen, or in the third 
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unopened box.  Participants are given the choice of switching to the third unknown 
box (action) or staying with their original choice (inaction).  The experimental 
manipulation ensures that participants never get the grand prize, so the issue is 
whether the bad outcome (not getting the grand prize) is achieved through action 
(switching) or inaction (staying).  Dissonance reduction in this study was 
operationalised as the amount of post-decision rationalisation participants engaged 
in, and it was measured by asking them to say how much they would be willing to 
sell their moderate prize for.  Those who had obtained the prize by switching (action) 
ascribed greater value to it than those who had obtained the same prize by staying 
(inaction).  That is, participants compensated for their loss by inflating the value of 
the obtained outcome, and faced with a suboptimal outcome, rationalized it by 
saying, „it wasn‟t so bad actually‟.  
These factors ensure that action regrets are more quickly dealt with than 
inaction regrets.  At the same time Gilovich and Medvec (1995) propose that three 
factors also ensure that regrettable inactions become more painful over time.  The 
first factor is an increase in subjective confidence with increasing distance from an 
event, as shown in studies by Gilovich, Kerr and Medvec (1993) in which students‟ 
judgements of both prospective and retrospective confidence were mediated by 
whether an event was due to occur (or had occurred) in the near or distant future.  In 
a study of retrospective confidence college alumni and current undergraduates were 
asked to estimate the impact on various aspects of their lives of an increased 
workload during a typical semester.  Alumni, who had been out of college on 
average for three and a half years, were significantly more confident than current 
undergraduates that they could have taken the extra workload in their stride.  
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) suggest that this increase in subjective confidence 
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makes distant failures to act appear inexplicable, as people overestimate their 
capacity at the time.  A related factor cited by Gilovich and Medvec (1995) is the 
differential recall of compelling over inhibitory features of the antecedent 
circumstances; compelling forces are more salient in memory than are restraining 
forces.   
Things we regret not doing also seem to represent a blank canvas of 
possibilities for what „might have been‟ whereas the immutable fact of a regrettable 
action leaves the imagination fewer degrees of freedom.  Finally, because incomplete 
tasks are better remembered (the “Zeigarnik effect”, Zeigarnik, 1935), the open-
ended nature of inaction regrets means they are more frequently rehearsed and given 
preferential status in memory. 
These claims are supported empirically. Savitsky, Medvec and Gilovich 
(1997) tested for the Zeigarnik effect by measuring the frequency of recall and 
availability (ease of retrieval) of action and inaction regrets.  Inaction regrets were 
found to be more often the focus of rumination, more easily recalled, and more likely 
to be perceived as unfinished business.  Rajagopal, Raju and Unnava (2005) found 
reduced accessibility for action regrets over time, which they suggest might account 
for the temporal pattern of inaction regrets.  They also found that the consequences 
of inaction regrets were broader (affecting more domains) and deeper (more 
consequences) than action regrets and that inaction regrets were more frequently 
thought about.  
 Gilovich and Medvec (1994, Study 4) reconciled the survey data with the 
experimental literature by demonstrating that regrets change over time.  They 
presented people with two scenario studies involving students who find themselves 
in a bad situation; one due to action and the other due to inaction. When asked which 
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of the two characters (actor/non-actor) would feel most regret in both the short- and 
long-term, participants judged that the actor would feel most regret in the short term, 
but that the person who had failed to act would feel more regret in the long term.  
This finding was consolidated in a final interview study in which people were asked 
to think of both a short-term regret (from the previous week) or a long-term regret 
(from their entire lives) and say which they regretted more.  Whereas short-term 
regrets were as likely to be attributed to actions as inactions, regrets from across the 
lifespan were overwhelmingly attributed to inactions.   
 
1.4.1 Summary and evaluation 
 The work reviewed thus far offers compelling reasons for treating regret as a 
decision-making variable: it shows that the anticipation of regret influences people‟s 
choices, that experiences of regret are factored into subsequent behaviour, that 
people can readily identify sources of regret in scenarios involving the decisions of 
other people, and that people often express their autobiographical regrets in terms of 
bad decisions. There can be little doubt that regret is inherent in decision making,  
but it does not necessarily follow that all regrets come from decisions or that all 
decisions are made with potential regret in mind, and it is surely overstating the case 
to say, as Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) have done, „no choice no regret‟.  Much of 
the research on decision regret draws on situations (hypothetical or real) where 
choices and their outcomes are relatively clear, whereas many of life‟s choices are 
neither clear, straightforward, nor even conscious choices as such, something 
reflected in Connolly and Reb‟s (2005) operational definition of a decision as 
anything from an extensively deliberated choice to a choice involving little or no 
conscious thought.  
 35 
A point often overlooked in the decision-making approach to regret is that 
much regrettable behaviour is driven by what Lowenstein (1996) calls „visceral 
factors‟ such as hunger, sexual drives, moods, emotions, addictions or physical pain. 
In the grip of such states people often have no control over their behaviour and 
Lowenstein argues that decision theorists have not adequately dealt with “decisions 
occurring at the hot end of the continuum defined by the intensity of visceral factors” 
(Lowenstein, 1996, p. 274). The same criticism could be made of regret researchers.   
So while it may be true in a purely deterministic sense that a person is the sum of 
every choice they ever made, more realistic distinctions are needed. People often 
express regrets in characterological terms („I regret being indecisive‟) and so it might 
be necessary to distinguish such regrets from decision regrets in the same way that 
shame has been distinguished from guilt on the basis that the person feeling guilt 
wishes to undo aspects of their behaviour, whereas people feeling shame are more 
inclined to wish to undo aspects of who they are (Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 
1994).  In this sense it might be valid to speak of indecision or apathy regret. 
According to Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) the average person makes a 
couple of thousand decisions in the course of a day, from choosing breakfast to 
choosing careers.  Some of these decisions doubtless contribute to subsequent regret, 
but many are automatic, barely enter consciousness, or are quickly forgotten if they 
do, particularly decisions that do not involve other people (White, 1982).  Someone 
who regrets becoming obese may not be aware of the 200 or so food-related 
decisions they overlooked every day, many of which were opportunities to say „no‟ 
(Wansink & Sobal, 2007). An important factor missing from the decision-making 
framework is that what remains to be regretted is determined largely by what can be 
remembered or reasoned about the past.  Someone who has recently left school with 
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poor grades may be able to recall many instances when they wasted opportunities to 
improve their performance, but by the time that same person reaches retirement, they 
may only remember that they missed those opportunities.  The thesis being advanced 
is that a fuller understanding of regret requires that such factors be taken into 
account, so in order to understand how different regrets are remembered, 
consideration will now be given to the recollective and reasoning processes of AM 
that shape what we end up regretting.  
 
1.5 Regret as autobiographical memory 
 Technical definitions of autobiographical memory abound in the literature 
(see Brewer‟s comprehensive summary, 1986;1996) but for the purpose of this thesis 
a working definition is adopted from Conway and Rubin (1993), who define 
autobiographical memory simply as „memory for the events of one‟s life‟, which 
includes memory for personally experienced events and knowledge about the self.  
Most current models of autobiographical memory are reconstructive (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Norman & Koutstaal, 
1998), which is to say that memories are not viewed as discrete units or literal 
records retrieved from a store, but rather as transitory “patterns of activation” 
derived from an underlying knowledge base and brought into consciousness during 
retrieval processes mediated by a central executive system (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). 
 Rubin (1996) suggests that definitions should be allowed to emerge from the 
„natural cleavages‟ found by researchers, and Robinson (1992) uses two such 
cleavages to reduce the complexity of autobiographical memory phenomena to two 
broad dimensions of contrast.  A structural dimension spans a continuum from 
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highly specific to very abstract general events, while the phenomenological 
dimension distinguishes what we remember from what we simply know about 
ourselves (Tulving, 1985).  These distinctions overlap and intersect at many points 
and are frequently used interchangeably, but the approach taken here is to 
acknowledge the existence of a fuzzy boundary and proceed with this in mind.  The 
structural distinction occupies the greater part of the following literature review, as it 
is central to the distinction that will be made in this thesis between regrets for 
specific and general events.   However, the phenomenological distinction also makes 
some important contributions, which will be considered in the General Discussion, 
so it is also briefly reviewed. 
 
1.5.1 The structural distinction 
 Early attempts to establish how knowledge might be structured in memory 
came out of computational models based on the idea that experience is organised 
according to scripts (Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 1977), which are mental 
representations of stereotyped action sequences for everyday situations such as 
eating in a restaurant.  A script has slots for the props, actors and actions found in a 
restaurant situation and it specifies how these slots are filled and the causal sequence 
in which events occur. In Schank and Abelson‟s (1977) model scripts were thought 
to be discrete structures acquired episodically: people were assumed to have 
hundreds of personal and situational scripts to cover the activities of daily life.   A 
drawback of this strictly episodic model however was its inability to accommodate 
generic scripts for situations which could not logically derive from a single discrete 
experience. Bower, Black and Turner (1979) highlighted this flaw in an experiment 
that showed how people can erroneously „remember‟ an action sequence simply 
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because it is implied by an underlying script.  Such „script confusion‟ prompted 
Schank (1982) to develop a more dynamic, reconstructive view of memory with a 
hierarchically structured knowledge base acquired through the “successive 
abstraction” of scripts from repeated exposure to events of a similar nature. Other 
computational models posited similar organisational structures and processes 
(Koldoner, 1983a,b) but these accounts were never empirically tested and so most of 
what has been discovered about the organisation and structure of autobiographical 
memory comes from asking people questions designed to probe the structure and 
organisation indirectly. 
Linton (1986) explored the content and structure of her own autobiographical 
memory in a diary study lasting six years, during which time she recorded and 
subsequently tried to recall hundreds of events from her life. One of her key findings 
was that her own autobiographical knowledge was hierarchically organised at 
different levels of abstraction, from the most general level of emotional valence 
(mood tone), which simply designates experiences as good or bad, to the highly 
specific fine-grained perceptual details that constitute the elements of discrete 
episodes. In between these extremes are more or less general levels of thematically 
related and temporally extended experience. 
Barsalou (1988) abstracted a comparable hierarchy from the autobiographical 
memories of college students asked to recall events from their summer break.  Three 
distinct categories of experience emerged from the student‟s descriptions: extended 
events (a holiday abroad), summarised events of repeated experiences (watching a lot 
of television) and specific events (going to the theatre).  An unexpected outcome of 
this analysis was the discovery that summarised events accounted for about a third of 
all descriptions provided, whereas specific events made up only about a fifth of all 
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responses.  On the basis of computational models Barsalou (1988) had expected 
autobiographical memory to be structured around specific events, so he re-ran the 
study using a more directed method involving precise definitions of specific and 
summarised events and explicit instructions to provide only specific events.  
Participants were also reminded of the definitions if it was noted that they were not 
providing specific events.  Despite the precise definitions and experimenter 
intervention and guidance, there was an almost irresistible tendency to describe 
summarised and extended events.   
In a subsequent study Barsalou‟s (1988) students recalled events from their 
summer break in response to cues they had provided two weeks earlier, after which 
they designated each event as specific or summarised according to definitions 
provided.  Again summarised events made up the majority (60%) of the descriptions 
supplied. These findings suggested a major organising role in autobiographical 
memory for general events, which Barsalou (1988) confirmed by analysing the 
events in his studies in terms of organising clusters.  He found a clearly hierarchical 
structure which he described as partonomic, meaning that events at one level are part 
of events at higher levels (as opposed to being merely similar too them in a 
categorical sense).   At the most abstract level of Barsalou‟s (1988) hierarchy are 
extended event time lines, which are structures representing discrete, temporally 
extended chapters describing the major life events such as school, work, and 
relationships.  Within these chapters are extended events such as „law school‟ 
(school), „working as a law clerk‟(work), and „first marriage‟(relationships).   
Extended event time lines can and do run parallel and the extended events within 
them are chronologically ordered.  Being at law school can overlap with working as 
a law clerk and being married.  Within extended events are repeated or summarised 
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events.  Although Barsalou‟s (1988) model stops at the general event level, specific 
events would be part of these extended events.   
Although Linton (1986) and Barsalou (1988) use idiosyncratic terms and 
describe slightly different structures, they both identify a hierarchical template that 
was confirmed in Conway and Rubin‟s (1993) review of the literature, which 
concluded that autobiographical knowledge could be represented at three broad 
levels of specificity; lifetime periods, general events, and event-specific knowledge.  
The most abstract and inclusive category of knowledge represents lifetime periods, 
which are similar in character to Barslaou‟s (1988) extended event time lines, 
Linton‟s (1986) extendures, Schooler and Herrmann‟s (1992) periods, and 
McAdams‟ (1985) chapters.  These chapter-like divisions contain knowledge of 
events spanning months or years and as Barsalou (1988) notes are organised around 
themes such as education, work or relationships, which may overlap („When I 
worked at X‟ overlaps with „When I was married to Y‟). Lifetime periods may also 
be related by what Barsalou (1988) describes as the logic of goal attainment, which 
means that an extended event can be partitioned into the sequential stages of a goal; 
a lifetime period representing an academic career might be represented as a sequence 
beginning with the undergraduate years, the doctoral period, post-doctoral research, 
lectureships and ending with a professorial chair.  Goal attainment in one lifetime 
period can also facilitate goal attainment in another; securing one‟s first lectureship 
might enable one to put down a deposit on a house for example.  A lifetime period 
might also encapsulate an attitude deemed important to the development of the self, 
such as a particular period remembered as being „a difficult time‟ (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  Lifetime periods are known to be superior cues, facilitating 
quick access to specific events in the autobiographical memory knowledge base 
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(Brown, Shevell & Rips, 1986; Conway & Bekerian, 1987). Barsalou (1988) 
observed that many of his participants used these extended events to structure their 
descriptions, sketching out a sequence of extended events which were subsequently 
returned to and fleshed out in detail.  He considered this level of event knowledge to 
be an efficient way of summarising a person‟s history, something that has been 
confirmed by narrative models of autobiographical memory (Bluck & Habermas, 
2000). 
The next category contains thematically linked general events spanning 
periods from days to months.  Events at this level may represent composite 
memories abstracted from many related experiences, described as categoric (“Times 
I have fallen downstairs”; Williams & Dritschel, 1992) or summarised (“late night 
parties”; Barsalou, 1988) events.  Extended events might feature self-contained 
personal histories (“holiday with Jenny”; Conway & Bekerian, 1987) which 
Schooler and Herrmann (1992) call episodes and which Linton (1986) refers to as 
both episodes and events.  Another type of general event is made up of multiple 
superimposed instances of a single episode which Neisser (1981) termed repisodes.  
These repeated experiences have become amalgamated into one representation that 
might „stand for‟ a certain type of experience and might be remembered as a discrete 
event. General events are highly accessible, as Barsalou (1988) discovered, and this 
has led Reiser, Black and Abelson (1985) and (Conway, 1992) to suggest that they 
represents a basic level category of knowledge, which is considered to be the optimal 
level at which concept knowledge can be represented  (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, 
Johnson, Boyes-Braem, 1976 ).  Categories at the basic level are neither too abstract 
nor too detailed to be functionally useful.  
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The most concrete level of the hierarchy contains varying degrees of detailed 
event-specific knowledge spanning from minutes to hours, though usually referring 
to experiences occurring within the space of a single day.  Events at this level have 
been called details (Linton, 1986; Tulving, 1972), moments (Schooler & Herrmann, 
1992) or phenomenological records (Conway, 1992).  What characterises events at 
this level is that they are typically accompanied by imagery and other perceptual 
details (Brewer, 1986; 1996; Rubin, 1996) and although such events do not usually 
make effective retrieval cues under normal circumstances (Conway & Bekerian, 
1987; Reiser et al., 1985) they may be vividly remembered when they concern 
exceptionally shocking (Brown & Kulik, 1977) or personally important (Pillemer, 
1998; Rubin & Kozin, 1984) events. 
Neisser (1988) describes the organisation of autobiographical knowledge in 
similar terms to Barsalou (1988), though he chooses the ecologically derived term 
„nested‟ to describe how one event can be nested within another.  Whatever the 
terminology, there is consensus that autobiographical memory is structured such that 
larger events contain smaller events at all levels of the hierarchy.   
 The distinction between specific and general events has applications beyond 
its theoretically important role as an organising dimension in autobiographical 
memory .  Event specificity is central to word-cue studies that require participants to 
describe a discrete event that can be pinpointed in time and space (Crovitz & 
Schiffman, 1974), and this method has been particularly useful in assessing whether 
amnesic patients can recall remote specific events (see Kopelman, 1992 for a 
review). The specific-general dimension is integral to AM questionnaires used for 
clinical examination (Borrini, Dall‟ora, Della Sala, Marinelli & Spinnler, 1989; 
Kopelman, Wilson & Baddeley, 1989) and the distinction is used extensively to 
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study the phenomenon of overgeneral memory, which is the observation that certain 
people suffering from affective disorders have difficulty in retrieving specific events 
(Williams, 1996; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins & Dalgleish, 
2007; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1992).  Often the 
distinction is applied post hoc to memories produced without constraints and it is a 
central feature of studies examining the characteristics of self-defining memories 
(Singer, Rexhaj, & Baddeley, 2007; Singer & Salovey, 1993).   
 
1.5.2 The phenomenological distinction 
In a landmark study of autobiographical memory Tulving (1972) introduced a 
distinction between memory for personally experienced events, which he called 
episodic memory, and memory for factual knowledge, which he called semantic 
memory.  The original distinction rested on the nature of the information associated 
with each type of memory.  Episodic memory (considered synonymous with 
autobiographical memory) was described as processing “information about 
temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial relations among these 
events” (p. 385) and semantic memory as processing “information about meanings of 
words, concepts, and classification of concepts” (p. 402).   Subsequent revisions 
(Tulving, 1985a) associated the two types of memory with unique states of 
consciousness.  Episodic memory came to be defined by the recollective experience 
and its accompanying state of autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness, which 
“allows an individual to become aware of his or her own identity and existence in 
subjective time that extends from the past through the present to the future” (p. 388).  
Recollection by this definition is remembering in the everyday sense of mentally re-
living past events.  Semantic memory on the other hand does not involve self-
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recollection or mental time travel; it is temporally bound to the present and it 
processes decontextualised abstract knowledge.  Semantic recall is accompanied by 
noetic or (knowing) consciousness which gives rise to a feeling of familiarity or 
knowing. 
In support of this distinction Tulving (1985b) devised what became known as 
the “remember/know” (RK) paradigm, which is a method for experimentally 
measuring a person‟s conscious state at the time of retrieving a memory.  
Participants are asked to indicate whether they remember some previously presented 
stimulus item, or whether they simply know it to have been previously presented “on 
some other basis” (Tulving, 1985b, p. 8).  A remember response indicates that the 
person retains some episodic information about their encounter with the item (its 
physical appearance, some feature of the room, or what they were thinking for 
example), whereas a know response indicates that they recognise the item without 
having any conscious recollection of their encounter with it.  Gardiner (1988) 
formally operationalised the RK definitions and this basic paradigm has been widely 
tested on a number of variables (see Gardiner & Java, 1991; Gardiner, Ramponi & 
Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Rajaparam, 1993; and Gardiner, 2001) and there is 
strong evidence that the two systems are dissociable. The episodic-semantic 
distinction has made a huge contribution to the understanding of human memory and 
consciousness, and the autonoetic experience in particular is thought to be the 
capacity that distinguishes humans from animals (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  
But the distinction has been challenged (see Tulving, 2002) and there is considerable 
debate surrounding the nature of episodic memories and the recollective experience 
(see Hoerl & McCormack, 2001). One challenge to the distinction is the observation 
that „false memories‟ for events that have never happened are often accompanied by 
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the recollective experience and are often rich in episodic detail (Conway et al., 
1996).   
 
1.6 Changes over time: summarisation and semanticisation   
  The organisation of the autobiographical memory knowledge base and the 
episodic-semantic distinction both imply a change over time in the way events are 
represented, shifting from specific to general with temporal distance.  Tulving 
(1985b, Experiment 2) found a decrease in episodic but not semantic retrieval after a 
period of only seven days between encoding and retrieval.  The summarisation of 
individual episodes gives way to abstract schemas (Bartlett, 1932) or scripts 
(Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 1977).  Linton (1982) described how her own 
memories became semanticised as details of specific episodes gave way to generic 
memories.  After many years of attending board meetings in a distant town she was 
unable to recall any specific meeting, but she retained much semantic knowledge 
about the meetings in general and could describe the committee members and predict 
their interactions.  
 Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, and Cohen (1997) found that over 
periods of weeks, psychology undergraduates shifted from predominantly episodic 
remembering to predominantly semantic knowing as they recalled the content of 
introductory lectures and research methods classes.   
Developmental research also supports these findings.  Nelson (1978) found 
evidence that children as young as four rely on generalised scripts for routine 
situations such as eating lunch, using these scripts to structure their knowledge of 
sequence and roles in different mealtime situations (at a day care center, at home, at 
McDonalds).  Nelson also observed that scripted knowledge evolves over time: 
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children new to a day care center produced far fewer scripted propositions when 
describing events such as eating lunch, than they did when tested three months later.  
Hudson and Nelson (1986, Study 1) asked 3- and 5- year old children to 
describe two events (a snack at day camp or dinner at home) in response to either a 
general (“What happens when you have a snack at camp?”) or specific (“What 
happened when you had a snack at camp yesterday?”) question.  Children of both 
ages provided more information in response to the general question than to the 
specific one and appeared to have difficulty in providing episodic details.  Hudson 
and Nelson (1986, Study 2) compared the general and specific memories of 3-, 5-, 
and 7- year olds and found that repeated exposure to a particular type of experience 
(such as a trip to the zoo) led to a gradual reduction in the amount of episodic detail 
and a greater reliance on the general scripted structure.  Nelson and Gruendel (1981) 
showed that children readily summarise two similar events, and similar 
summarisation has been experimentally produced in studies of adults: Watkins and 
Kerkar (1985) showed that the recall of a twice presented item produced generic 
memories that were independent of either individual event. 
 
1.6.1 Temporal gradients and impairments of autobiographical memory 
 The studies cited in the previous section provide evidence of how the 
structure of autobiographical knowledge changes from specific to general over time 
in children and healthy adults, but much has also been learned from clinical studies 
describing impairments of autobiographical memory, and numerous cases are 
reported of patients whose recall of remote episodic memories is impaired but who 
have relatively spared recall of remote semantic knowledge.  A particularly dramatic 
case of this temporally graded amnesia is described by Tulving, Schacter, 
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McLachlan and Moscovitch  (1988) whose patient K.C. suffered dense amnesia after 
an accident which left him unable to recall a single episode from his entire life, even 
personally meaningful events such as his brother‟s death from drowning.   Yet K.C. 
retained personal semantic knowledge from his remote past and could say which 
school he had attended, who he had worked for, and that his family had owned a 
summer cottage which he had visited on many occasions, though he could not recall 
a single instance of having been there.  Another remarkable aspect of K.C.‟s 
condition was that he could also not imagine specific future events. 
 Equally dramatic is a case reported by Butters and Cermak (1986) of an 
eminent and widely published scientist (P.Z.), who only 3 years prior to the onset of 
alcohol-related amnesia had written his autobiography.  When P.Z.‟s memory for 
autobiographical events was tested using stimuli from both his academic and 
autobiographical writings, he showed severe loss of episodic memories for events in 
his recent past (including his autobiography) with relatively spared recall for 
semantic knowledge from early adulthood, including scientific definitions previously 
known to him.  Many other cases of temporally graded amnesia are documented (see 
also reviews by Kapur, 1999; Wheeler & McMillan, 2001) and Conway and 
Fthenaki (2000) review several studies which show extensive preservation of remote 
events at the level of lifetime periods and general events but very poor retention of 
specific events.    Cermak (1984) proposed that episodes become de-contextualised 
over time and result in a semanticised remote past that we „know‟, and an episodic 
recent past that we remember.   
In non-clinical populations temporal gradients have also been observed:  
Piolino, Desgranges, Benali and Eustache (2002) used a sophisticated questionnaire 
to examine temporal changes in the episodic-semantic components of 
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autobiographical memory in a sample of 40 to 79 year olds.  They found less stable 
recall over time for specific (episodic) events, than for general (semantic) events and 
overall recall for specific episodes was poorer than for general semantic events in the 
remote past.  Pillemer, Goldsmith, Panter, and White (1988) found similar temporal 
patterns in a study of college alumni from three different age periods (2, 12, and 22 
years since graduation), who freely recalled important events from their first year in 
college.  A principal finding was that the proportion of specific events decreased 
over time, with significantly fewer specific events reported by the older alumni. 
That distant events are more generally represented in memory appeals to 
common sense, but this idea is also central to Trope and Liberman‟s (2003) theory of 
temporal construal, which draws analogies with visual perception to describe how 
detail fades as distance from an object increases, while the general form becomes 
more prominent.  By this account remote events are represented schematically, 
whereas temporally near events are more concretely represented.  Temporal 
construal will be recruited as an explanatory variable in subsequent chapters of the 
thesis, but for now the focus moves from the influence of the phenomenological and 
structural properties of autobiographical memory to a consideration of the equally 
important role of emotion. 
 
1.7 Emotion and autobiographical memory 
Reviews suggest a complex relationship between emotion and memory 
(Christianson & Safer, 1996; Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Schooler & Eich, 2000).  
Emotion is strongly associated with the progress or obstruction of goals (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Singer & Salovey, 1993) and is central to autobiographical 
experience, but it plays a very limited role in organising autobiographical 
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knowledge.  Specific memories take longer to retrieve in response to affect cues than 
they do to activity and object cues (Robinson, 1976) or lifetime periods (Conway & 
Bekerian, 1987), and although Linton (1986) placed valence at the top of her 
hierarchy, she found emotion labels themselves to be very poor memory cues, as 
others have also found (Beike, Adams & Wirth-Beaumont, 2007; Reiser, Black & 
Abelson, 1985).   
 Emotion does make some events more memorable than others, but again the 
relationship is not straightforward.  Diary studies of everyday events show either 
enhanced recall of emotional over nonemotional events (Brewer, 1988; Wagenaar, 
1986) or no difference (Linton, 1982; White, 1982). Research in the domains of 
eyewitness memory (Christianson, 1992), „flashbulb memories‟ (Brown & Kulik, 
1977; Conway, 1995) and memory for traumatic personal events (Christianson & 
Safer, 1996; Schooler & Eich, 2000) shows that certain types of emotionally 
arousing events can leave vivid and enduring memories. On the other hand, 
emotional arousal can also impair eyewitness memory (Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, 
1989), personally traumatic events can be completely forgotten (see Schooler & 
Eich, 2000) and vividly recalled flashbulb memories can acquire many 
reconstruction errors over time (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; see Conway, 1995 for a 
review).  
 
1.7.1 Remembering negative events 
Of interest to an autobiographical memory approach to regret is how negative 
events are remembered and the evidence suggests that they are not remembered well:  
Linton (1982) noted that fewer than 13% of the memories she recalled were of 
specific negative episodes, and even events she described as “world-shaking” evaded 
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recall.  People are inclined to recall pleasant more than unpleasant events (Brewer, 
1988; Ehrlichman & Halpern 1988; Matlin & Stang, 1978; Thompson, Skowronski, 
Larsen & Betz, 1996), and according toWalker, Skowronski and Thompson (2003) 
this effect is not due to searching biases, as it is observed for involuntary memories 
(Berntsen, 1996), nor is it a general retrospective bias, as it is also found in diary 
studies (Thompson et al., 1996).  While many studies exist showing the opposite 
effect, with superior recall of negative events (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy, 1989; 
Bless, Hamilton & Mackie, 1992; Bluck & Li, 2001), and while negative events may 
dominate many other aspects of cognition (see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer 
& Vohs, 2001), the overall view is that negative events are poorly retained, and one 
explanation for this suggests that negative affect actually fades faster than does 
positive affect.    
Diary and experimental studies show a general decrease in emotional 
intensity over time (Brewer, 1988; Holmes, 1970; Linton, 1975; Matlin & Stang, 
1978; Robinson, 1980; Taylor, 1991; Thompson et al., 1996; Wagenaar, 1986; 
Walker, Vogl & Thompson, 1997; Walker, et al., 2003), but there is good evidence 
showing this decrease to be greater for negative events.  Cason (1932) first recorded 
this effect for events rated retrospectively at intervals of one and three weeks from 
the time they were experienced. Ratings of affect decreased across retention 
intervals, but more sharply for negative events. Holmes (1970) replicated these 
findings in a diary study designed to rule out possible retrospective biases.  Students 
recorded pleasant and unpleasant events every day, rating each event on an affect 
scale.  A week later they were shown their diary entries (but not the affect ratings) 
and asked to rate how they currently felt about the events described.   As predicted, 
ratings were lower after a week, with a sharper drop in the ratings of unpleasant 
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events.   Building on those earlier studies Walker, et al. (1997) replicated these 
effects over retention intervals of 3 months, 1 year, and 4.5 years also using a diary 
method, so it appears to be a robust phenomenon (see also Walker, Skowronski, 
Gibbons, Vogl & Thompson;2003).  Holmes (1970) speculated that the greater 
decrease in negative affect over time occurs because the „tension‟ created by an 
event is resolved, either because the unpleasantness naturally diminishes in the 
absence of any dire consequences that were expected to emanate from it, or because 
it elicits remediative action.  A related but more elaborate explanation offered by 
Walker et al. (1997) recruits Taylor‟s (1991) mobilize- minimize hypothesis, 
according to which negative events evoke the rapid mobilization of affect-
dampening resources at both the micro (physiological, affective, cognitive) and 
macro (social) levels of the organism.  These responses serve to minimize the long 
term impact of negative events.   
 
1.7.2 Regret and the fading affect bias 
It will be clear that the temporal pattern of regret presents a challenge to the 
fading affect bias, since regret is an example of negative events that resist fading.  
This point is picked up in a recent study by Beike and Krone (2008), who use 
thought suppression manipulations and measures of recollective experience to show 
that action regrets resist the fading affect bias more than do inaction regrets over a 
period of two weeks. Unfortunately, because their study looks at a very short period 
and employs a sample with an average age of 19 years, it is difficult to extrapolate 
their findings to longer time periods.  Moreover, their methodology assumes that all 
regrets can be equated with other types of negative event and their use of measures 
of subjective recollection assumes that all regrets concern discrete episodes.  
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A simpler explanation for why regret appears to resist the fading affect bias is 
that not all regrets are comparable to the kind of negative events studied by 
autobiographical memory researchers.  Regret is tied to past events, but those events 
need not be negative because regret is also experienced for the consequences of 
events that began positively.  Many people who later regret not having made the 
most of their education may well have rejoiced on the day they left school, and while 
the awareness of misspent time may be negatively experienced, the time itself was 
not.  Similarly, one‟s wedding day may remain a happy memory long after its 
unhappy consequences come to be regretted, so while some regrets may indeed 
involve subjectively recollected discrete negative events (a particularly vivid 
argument, walking out of an exam), others are more like reasoned evaluations. 
Participants in regret studies are typically not asked to recall an episode in which 
they felt regret: they are typically asked to recall something they regret, which may 
amount to the same thing if regret follows very soon after the event, but the temporal 
pattern of regret suggests that this is not often the case, since many of life‟s long 
term regrets appear to concern more general experiences („Not making the most of 
education‟).   Before considering the implications of a distinction between regrets for 
discrete and extended experiences it is worth considering how such a structural 
distinction might influence the way negative events are remembered. 
 
1.7.3 Remembering emotional events differently 
The fading affect bias described above and the minimize-mobilize 
explanation for how it occurs suggest one way in which autobiographical memory 
deals with unpleasant memories, but another way of rendering unpleasant memories 
less troublesome is to represent them more abstractly.  According to the Conway and 
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Pleydell-Pearce (2000) model of AM this is precisely what the protective 
mechanisms within the „self memory system‟ (SMS) do when emotionally charged 
memories threaten to disrupt currently active goals.  In this model AMs can be 
accessed by either direct or generative retrieval: direct retrieval occurs when a 
memory „pops‟ into mind in response to some internal or external cue, as in Proust‟s 
(1913/1957) celebrated depiction of how the taste of a petit Madeleine cake dipped 
in tea instantly transports the adult narrator back to his childhood afternoons spent 
with his aunt.  Generative retrieval by contrast is an effortful top-down search 
through the autobiographical memory knowledge base, beginning at the general 
event level and continuing through the autobiographical memory hierarchy until 
relevant event-specific knowledge has been located.  Emotionally arousing memories 
interfere with this process and so the SMS inhibits the arousal features of the 
incoming memory by truncating the search at the general event level.  Evidence in 
support of this inhibitory mechanism has been provided in experimental studies 
(Phillipot, Schaeffer & Herbette, 2003), and the notion of a truncated search at the 
general event level has recently been recruited to account for the phenomenon of 
overgeneral memory (see Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins & 
Dalgleish, 2007 for a review).  
Other lines of evidence also suggest that emotional events are represented 
more abstractly over time. Levine, (1997) suggests that emotions are fleeting 
phenomena which cannot be recalled (i.e., re-experienced) and so are always 
remembered as reconstructions with greater or lesser degrees of phenomenological 
detail, and Robinson and Clore (2002a,b) have shown that within time frames as 
short as weeks the recall of emotional information shifts from detailed episodic to 
more general semantic representations. Negative events in particular are recalled 
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with less contextual detail (D‟Argembeau, Comblain & Van der Linden, 2003; 
Destun & Kuiper, 1999).  Nigro and Neisser (1983) showed that people can also 
remember events from more or less abstract perspectives: a “field” perspective 
entails seeing oneself as a participant in the scene, whereas an “observer” 
perspective means seeing the event as if looking from the outside.  Robinson and 
Swanson (1992) found that events viewed from a field perspective were rated higher 
on affect than were events viewed from an observer perspective and they suggest 
that observer perspectives are used to recall the context of emotional events (goals, 
attitudes), whereas a field perspective accesses „arousal records‟.  Adopting an 
observer perspective can thus serve to inhibit emotional arousal and allow difficult 
experiences to be remembered. Self-distanced perspectives allow people to process 
negative events in a reflective manner, focussing on explanations for why the events 
occurred, whereas adopting a self-immersed perspective and focussing on what 
actually happened is likely to lead to a more ruminative processing of negative 
events (Kross, Ayduk & Mischel, 2005). An objective third person perspective might 
also help people to distance themselves from unflattering aspects of their personal 
history (Libby & Eibach, 2002). 
  
1.8 The temporal pattern of regret re-considered 
The autobiographical memory literature reviewed has highlighted several 
memory-based factors that have implications for interpretations of regret‟s temporal 
pattern.  First of all, memories for unpleasant events are forgotten more rapidly than 
memories for pleasant events and negative events may trigger dampening 
mechanisms that minimize their long term impact.  Protective mechanisms within 
autobiographical memory may also lead to negative experiences being represented in 
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more general terms, and people remembering negative experiences or negative views 
of themselves may adopt detached observer perspectives.  These factors, taken 
together with the observation that events become more general over time, suggest a 
possibility not considered in current accounts of regret‟s temporal pattern: that the 
pattern might be mediated by the mnemonic structure of regret.  This possibility is 
implicit in an observation made by Gilovich and Medvec (1995) that the regret 
descriptions in their earlier work (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994) differed in their 
specificity, as rated by independent judges.  Action regrets were rated as more likely 
to involve „„decisions made at a specific point in time”, and inaction regrets as more 
likely to result from „„an accumulated, unfocused pattern of inaction” (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1994, p. 381). The implications of this observation, which appears in a 
footnote, can be developed to produce some interesting predictions.  Gilovich and 
Medvec (1995) appear to suggest that action regrets are based on specific memories, 
while inaction regrets are based on general memories.   
One possible interpretation of regret‟s temporal pattern then is that inaction 
regrets become more salient over time because they are, by definition, more general 
than action regrets, something reflected in Gilovich and Medvec‟s (1994) footnote 
observation.  This supposition is consistent with the autobiographical memory 
literature reviewed and leads to at least two broad predictions.  First, the 
autobiographical memory literature shows that events become more general over 
time, so if inaction regrets tend to be more general in nature they might be expected 
to concern more distant events; and if action regrets are indeed like specific negative 
events, then they would be expected to concern comparatively recent events.  
Moreover, autobiographical memory research suggests that specific negative events 
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are more likely to be forgotten over time, which would also imply that overall regrets 
for specific negative events would be fewer in number.    
Regrets have been classified according to their content (Roese & 
Summerville, 2005), their affective profiles (Kahneman, 1995) and according to 
whether they concern action or inactions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), but as far as 
can be ascertained, they have yet to be distinguished according to their mnemonic 
structure.  The novel contribution of this thesis is to introduce precisely such a 
distinction between regrets for specific and general events, and in Chapter 2 it will 
be argued that viewing regrets in this way makes possible the argument that the 
temporal profile of inaction regrets is explained by their general representation in 
memory. 
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Chapter 2: Regret and the reminiscence bump 
 
2.0 Chapter Overview 
The present chapter reports two studies testing the claim that regret‟s 
temporal pattern can be accounted for by models of autobiographical memory.  This 
claim is examined in the context of an autobiographical memory phenomenon 
known as the reminiscence bump (Rubin,Wetzler & Nebes, 1986), with particular 
emphasis on an account of the „bump‟ based on life scripts, which makes explicit 
claims about the temporal pattern of negative events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002, 2004; 
Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  
 
2.1  Memory across the lifespan: the reminiscence bump 
Researchers wishing to identify patterns of remembering across the lifespan 
typically use a word cue method first devised by Galton (1879) and formalised by 
Crovitz & Schiffman (1974).  The technique requires participants to retrieve, 
describe, and date memories associated with words that are presented to them.  
Researchers plot these dated events across the lifespan and the resulting frequency 
histograms represent patterns of remembering as a function of time ago from the 
present.  The reminiscence bump is a feature of such distributions and it describes a 
disproportionate clustering of memories retrieved from the period of adolescence and 
early adulthood (typically spanning the years from age 10 to 30).  The bump first 
came to light when Rubin et al. (1986) combined their own data with re-analysed 
data from three existing word-cue studies (Fitzgerald & Lawrence, 1984; Franklin & 
Holding, 1977; Zola-Morgan, Cohen & Squire, 1983) and found a reliable increase 
in memories reported from the period spanning 10 to 30 years of age.  The bump was 
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only observed for adults over the age of 30; for adults under 30 the number of 
memories recalled decreased linearly as a function of time, as would be predicted by 
the monotonically decreasing forgetting function first observed by Ebbinghaus 
(1885/1964).  These age related differences led Rubin et al. (1986) to suggest that the 
systematic deviation from the forgetting function could be explained by a sampling 
bias based on reminiscence.  Reminiscence is the process of reflecting on one‟s past 
and it is assumed to begin in midlife. The term has other meanings and associations 
but Rubin et al. (1986) intend it to mean simply “an increase in memories above 
what would be expected by a monotonically decreasing retention function” (p. 208).  
 
2.1.1 Replications of the reminiscence bump and some variations 
Hyland and Ackerman (1988) replicated Rubin et al.‟s (1986) findings in 
older adults, but found less reliable distributions for middle-aged adults.  The bump 
was found to be robust in healthy 70 year olds (Rubin & Schulkind, 1997b), in 
people suffering from Alzheimer‟s dementia and depression (Fromholt, Larsen & 
Larsen, 1995) and in patients who had undergone temporal lobectomies as treatment 
for epilepsy (Buchanan, Tranel & Adolphs, 2006).  The bump is observed for 
memories involving people‟s most vivid (Fitzgerald, 1988), most important (Rubin 
& Schulkind, 1997c; Fromholt & Larsen, 1991, 1992) and most significant life 
events (Elnick, Margrett, Fitzgerald & Labouvie-Vief, 1999) and is strong even 
when participants report their memories in narrative form (Fitzgerald, 1988).  People 
would include events from the bump period in a book about their lives (Fitzgerald, 
1996) and an analysis of 49 eminent psychologists‟ autobiographies suggests that in 
fact they do (Mackavey, Malley & Stewart, 1991).  According to a cognitive 
scientist‟s reading of Proust‟s (1913/1957) classic of remembering, most of the 
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remembered episodes in the narrator‟s life are derived from the period of early 
adulthood (Delacour, 2001). 
These sources of evidence represent a small sample from a large database 
supporting the robustness of the reminiscence effect, but there have also been some 
ambiguous findings.  Howes and Katz (1992) and Rabbit and Winthorpe (1988) 
failed to replicate the bump using a manipulation designed to elicit memories from 
specified periods of the lifespan, while Jansari and Parkin (1996) found that 
manipulating access to recent events significantly influenced sampling: young adults 
free to recall events from any period in their lives (Study 1) tended to recall recent 
events, but when asked not to recall events from the most recent two and a half 
years, they tended to retrieve memories from between the ages of 5 and 15 years.  
This was the first evidence of a bump for adults under the age of 40.  Blocking 
recency had no effect on older adults though: they selected remote memories 
regardless of the manipulation.   
 The reminiscence bump is a robust phenomenon observed in healthy adults 
and in clinical populations (Zola-Morgan et al., 1983).  In structure if not in content 
it is similar across cultures (Conway, Wang, Hanyu & Haque, 2005), but perhaps 
even more remarkable than its universality in the real world is that the reminiscence 
bump can also be found when dating methodologies are applied to people‟s dreams 
(Grenier et al., 2005). 
 
2.1.2 Explaining the reminiscence bump 
 Several attempts have been made to explain the bump.  Jansari and Parkin 
(1996; Study 2) tested for the possibility that the bump might result from a sampling 
bias due to a spreading activation effect, whereby an initial bias towards sampling 
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early memories could lead to people becoming „locked in‟ to early periods because 
of highly available associated memories from the same period.  To test this 
hypothesis Jansari and Parkin applied a manipulation designed to prevent such a 
sampling bias. They divided participants‟ lives into two periods (early adulthood and 
midlife) and had them retrieve two memories from each period, either in forward or 
reverse temporal order (most distant to most recent period, or most recent to most 
distant). Response latencies showed that memories from early life were more 
accessible than memories from midlife, regardless of the order of retrieval. Early 
memories tended to concern events described as first-time experiences, but did not 
differ qualitatively from midlife memories on measures of vividness, importance, or 
pleasantness.   Since the restrictive sampling manipulation did not reduce the 
advantage of earlier memories, Jansari and Parkin concluded that the bump must 
have some other explanation.  
 Rubin and Schulkind (1997c) used a similar manipulation to bias retrieval 
towards childhood memories, but this had no overall effect on the bump.  Neither did 
they find reliable differences between memories from inside and outside the bump 
on measures of importance, narrative significance, novelty, distinctiveness, 
emotionality and vividness.  The authors concluded that bump memories are neither 
qualitatively different from memories from other parts of the lifespan, nor are they a 
product of experimental instructions: they are simply more plentiful. 
Rubin, Rahal and Poon (1998) consider three mutually compatible 
interpretations.  The first two accounts are broadly cognitive and are based on the 
idea that adulthood is a period of rapid change and therefore a time when novel 
experiences are most frequently encountered.  Processing, comprehending, and 
integrating these novel experiences into existing knowledge structures incurs greater 
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cognitive investment and therefore makes them more memorable.  Coupled to this is 
the fact that the bump period is a time of rapid cognitive growth, which gives way to 
cognitive decline with ageing.  These factors are assumed to contribute to the relative 
salience of events from this period.  
 A second account draws on theories of identity formation (Erikson, 1950) 
and theories of social contact (Carstensen, 1992, 1995) which recognise this period 
as one of self-development and information seeking. Early adulthood is assumed to 
be more memorable because there is so much going on in young adult lives, so 
events from these years become embedded in both internal and external networks 
and knowledge schemas. 
Rubin et al.‟s (1998) third account is more speculative and draws together the 
previous two accounts to suggest that the combined effect of enhanced cognitive 
function and personal and social identity consolidation would be to contribute to 
greater genetic fitness.  Since the bump years represent the peak of adulthood in 
terms of fecundity, mate selection, and social cohesion, and since our ancestors 
probably lived shorter lives than is common now, there might have been greater 
selection pressure on enhanced cognitive function for this period, where memory 
would have had greater utility than in later years.   
However, the most persuasive interpretations of the bump are those that 
centre on narrative and identity processes.  People evidently view the bump years as 
formative and important, as a period that represents their „era‟ (Sehulster, 1996) and 
which contains many „first time‟ experiences (Jansari & Parkin, 1996) and vivid 
memories that shape the self-narrative (Fitzgerald,1988).  Early adulthood is a period 
when experiences in the domains of family, relationships, education and work are 
seen as central and formative (Elnick et al., 1999) and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 
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(2000) attribute the importance of the bump period to its being a time when people 
are most actively engaged in constructing a cohesive self-schema, establishing social 
networks and formulating their goals in life. That this period is then followed by 
relative stability further enhances its salience and importance when viewed in 
retrospect.  
 
2.2 The life script account 
The life script account of the bump (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002, 2004; Rubin & 
Berntsen, 2003) may be viewed as an elaboration of the narrative and self accounts, 
but with an emphasis on typical rather than actual lives.  This account extends and 
revises Rubin et al.‟s (1998) proposal and is of particular relevance to the present 
work because it makes explicit claims about the distribution of negative events.  In 
essence, this account proposes that the preferential recall of events from the period of 
early adulthood arises because retrieval processes are guided by life scripts, which 
are culturally determined timetables for key transitional events such as finishing 
education, establishing career paths, starting a family and so on.  In an examination 
of the literature Rubin and Berntsen (2003) found that seven of eleven scripted life 
events were judged to be located in the bump period.  These socially important, often 
celebrated, and frequently talked about events are generally perceived as positive and 
they provide temporal markers to cue memory retrieval. Conversely, the script 
account argues that negative events, which are idiosyncratic, unlikely to have 
scripted time slots, and are less talked about due to social censure, do not enjoy the 
same selective retrieval.  For these reasons life scripts are assumed to predict a bump 
for positive but not negative events.   
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In support of this claim Berntsen and Rubin (2002) used survey data from 
over 1200 respondents asked to date their happiest, saddest, most traumatic and most 
important memories.  Clear bumps were found for happy and important memories, 
whereas bumps were either absent or less pronounced for sad and traumatic 
memories.  In a subsequent survey Rubin and Berntsen (2003, Study 1) had 
respondents provide dates for positive (most proud and most in love) as well as 
negative (most afraid, most angry) events, as well as their most important events, 
which they then designated as being either positive or negative.  The Berntsen and 
Rubin (2002) findings of a bump for positive but not for negative events were 
replicated.  Rubin and Berntsen (2003, Study 2) then tested their script claim directly 
by having undergraduates provide estimates of when in the life of a typical 70 year 
old he/she would most likely experience the emotionally charged events described in 
the previous studies.  The authors hypothesised that a match between the distribution 
of real and imagined events would indicate the presence of a culturally shared script 
for the chronology of such events, and such a script could be assumed to be guiding 
the retrieval of remembered events. The results of the study supported this 
hypothesis and were subsequently replicated (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004).  The life 
script account has been supported and extended by other researchers and it appears 
to be gaining acceptance as a plausible explanation for the reminiscence bump 
phenomenon (Collins, Pillemer, Ivecic & Gooze, 2007; Gluck & Bluck, 2007; 
Thomsen & Berntsen, 2008). 
With regard to regret, the claim that negative events do not show a bump is 
paradoxical given that the meta-analysis by Roese and Summerville (2005) finds that 
experiences concerning education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and leisure 
are most frequently regretted.  These are experiences associated with early 
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adulthood, which is a time of important choices in these domains. Since regret is a 
negative emotion associated with negative memories, an analysis of regret 
distributions across time should reasonably be expected to show a bump.  However, 
the point was made in the previous chapter that not all regrets concern discrete 
negative events: many concern temporally extended or summarised events, or once 
positive events that have had unhappy endings. Whereas a specific regrettable 
argument is, in principle, precisely dateable, a general regret for arguing too much 
stems from many episodes extended over time.  For dating purposes then it becomes 
necessary to distinguish specific regrets, which can be traced to a unique point in 
time, from general regrets, which cannot.  It is reasonable to speculate that these two 
types of regret may have different temporal profiles, and this is the argument that 
will be advanced in the studies to follow.     
 
Predictions 
 Four testable predictions emerge when regrets are treated as types of 
autobiographical memories.  First, as has been noted, word cue investigations of the 
reminiscence bump invariably involve the retrieval of specific events, so the failure 
of life script studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) to 
find a bump for negative events should be replicated for specific regrets.  
For several reasons it is valid to assume that general regrets will not be 
randomly distributed over time. First, general regrets often include summarised or 
repeated experiences, such as not spending time with loved ones.  As described in 
the previous chapter, summarisation requires the passage of time and so the 
regrettable patterns of behaviour that produce such regrets may only become 
apparent after much time has elapsed. Second, it is likely that many general regrets 
 65 
may involve positive events which have gone wrong.  These positive events are often 
scripted to occur relatively early in life, and scripts may facilitate the retrieval of 
regretted incidents or outcomes. Finally, because summarisation requires the passing 
of time, and because the consequences of events may only become clear years after 
the events themselves, a degree of reasoning or self-explanation may be required to 
determine which aspects of life one regrets.   Such regrets are likely to involve the 
kind of elaborative counterfactuals described by Kahneman (1995), which are 
general in nature and can be expected to rely heavily on schematic, script-like 
information. Furthermore, people recall extended periods by moving sequentially 
from the most distant to the most recent events (Barsalou, 1988) and forward 
temporal ordering facilitates searches within the autobiographical memory  
knowledge base (Anderson & Conway, 1993). Thus, people seeking causal 
explanations for life‟s regrettable consequences might be expected to focus on the 
formative experiences of early adulthood, which has been shown to be an important 
period for long-term goal formulation and self consolidation (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000). For all of these reasons, a second prediction is that a reminiscence 
bump will be observed for general regrets.   
Because events become more general over time, a third prediction is that 
people will report more general than specific regrets concerning events from the 
distant past. On the other hand, because specific memories for sad (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2002) and important negative events (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) show 
evidence of a recency curve, it is expected that people will report more specific than 
general recent regrets. Finally, building on the assumption laid out in the previous 
chapter that one structural dimension underlies the distinction between action-
inaction and specific and general regrets, a significant overlap between the two is 
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predicted. There are two parts to the fourth prediction. First, because more recent 
than distant specific regrets are expected and because regrets for action tend to be 
relatively short-lived (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995), it is predicted that specific regrets 
are likely to concern actions. In addition, because more distant than recent general 
regrets are expected, and because regrets for inaction tend to be persistent (Gilovich 
& Medvec, 1995), it is predicted that general regrets will predominantly concern 
inaction.  
In Study 1, these predictions were tested using a cued recall procedure in 
which 75 senior adults were asked to describe and date up to five regrets for either 
specific or general experiences, which were then examined for content, coded along 
the action-inaction dimension, and plotted across the lifespan. Study 2 uses a free 
recall procedure and the addition of a sample of people in their 40s, making it 
possible to generalise these findings to a younger sample.    
The use of cued recall in Study 1 was an attempt to overcome problems 
encountered by Davison (2005), who asked respondents to freely recall regrets for 
experiences which they themselves had to designate as specific or general in nature.  
That study produced many completion errors (involving only specific regrets) 
whereby respondents either answered both a specific and general question for a 
single regret, or designated regrets as specific when the descriptions made explicit 
reference to summarised and multiple experiences, or described lifetime periods.  
Consequently, Davison (2005) had all of the specific regrets independently 
recategorised, resulting in a total of 58 regrets being reclassified as general. In the 
present study it was hoped that restricting respondents‟ choice would remove this 
source of error. 
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2.3 Study 1:  specific and general regrets across the lifespan of people in 
their sixties 
 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
An opportunity sample of residents from the counties of Durham, Cleveland 
and Tyne and Wear, and from diverse demographic backgrounds participated.  
Eighty six out of approximately 400 questionnaires were returned completed, 9 of 
which were excluded because the respondents were in their 70s and the questionnaire 
design did not accommodate this age group.  This left a sample of 75 participants (36 
in the specific group and 39 in the general group), with 45 females and 27 males 
ranging in age from 60 to 69 years (M = 65 years, SD = 2.9 years). Three 
participants did not indicate their gender.  The educational level of the sample was 
high.  Twenty five  respondents  had completed secondary school, 15 had gone on to 
advanced secondary level, 21  were university graduates or had reached a vocational 
equivalent, while 7 had progressed to various levels of postgraduate study. Five 
respondents did not supply this information, and 2 reported having had no education.  
Respondents received questionnaires by post, through contacts who had access to 
diverse social networks (including groups for the elderly, church groups, political 
clubs, small businesses etc), via students to their family members, or in person from 
the first author.  Responses were by post. 
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Design, Materials and Procedure 
The study employed a between subjects design in which participants 
provided details concerning their autobiographical regrets for either specific or 
general experiences. All materials used in this study, including questionnaires and 
instructions to coders are presented in Appendix A.    
Respondents received a questionnaire contained in a stamped, self-addressed 
envelope.  On the cover sheet of the questionnaire respondents were informed that 
the purpose of the study was to examine the content and chronology of life regrets. 
Regret was defined as concerning experiences that people wished had turned out 
differently, whether they were things they had done or failed to do, bad decisions, 
unfulfilled ambitions or something else. Respondents were assured that their age, 
sex, and level of education were the only personal identity details required.  Consent 
was indicated by ticking a box.   
There were two versions of the questionnaire; one designed to elicit specific 
regrets and the other to elicit general regrets.  Each version contained a separate 
sheet with spaces for regret descriptions.  Respondents were instructed to look back 
on their lives so far and the things they regretted and then to use the spaces provided 
to describe, in no more than one sentence, each regretted experience.  A maximum of 
five regrets was stipulated, but it was made clear that fewer than five was acceptable. 
Respondents who received the specific questionnaire were told that each regrettable 
experience should concern something which involved them personally and happened 
on a particular day in a particular place. They were told that it didn‟t matter whether 
the feeling of regret followed immediately or later, but that it was important that they 
could say when the regretted experience happened.  Respondents in the general 
regret group were told that their regrets should concern experiences which were 
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general in nature, meaning experiences that did not happen on a particular day in a 
particular place, but for which they could provide an estimate of the decade of life to 
which the experience belonged.  For both types of regret the rest of the questionnaire 
comprised separate question sheets for each individual regret.  For specific regrets 
respondents dated the regrets by giving their age at the time of the regretted 
experience.  Because general regrets have diffuse temporal origins, respondents in 
this group first indicated when they had become conscious of feeling regret and then 
estimated the decade to which the source experience belonged. 
 
2.3.2 Results 
In this and all subsequent studies in this thesis, planned contrasts are used 
where directional differences are predicted; otherwise Tukey HSD and Bonferroni 
post-hoc correction are used where appropriate.  In all ANOVAs, the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction is reported where sphericity assumptions are violated.  Pearson‟s 
product moment correlation coefficient (r) is used as a measure of effect size, as 
recommended by Field (2005). The formula for calculating r is presented in 
Appendix C.  The effect size for all ANOVAs is partial eta squared (ηp
2
).  In tables 
reported in the body of the text, lower case „n‟ denotes the number of observations 
(regrets) and upper case N denotes the sample size for the analysis. Tables of 
summary and descriptive statistics not included in the body of the text, as well as 
unreported ANOVAs, are presented in the Appendix B.  
 
Data coding 
It became apparent from participants‟ responses that many regrets were 
wrongly categorised, despite the cueing constraint.  Whereas Davison (2005) found 
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that only specific regrets were wrongly categorised, the errors in the present study 
concerned specific regrets describing general experiences (“Not learning to play the 
violin”; “Didn‟t work hard for a year after qualifying”) as well as general regrets 
referring to specific episodic events (“Taking a decision that started a chain of 
events”; “An incident in an English literature class at school”).  Two independent, 
hypothesis-blind judges recategorised the entire pool of items.  They were instructed 
to code as specific any description which could reasonably be said to concern an 
event or decision that occurred in the space of a single day, and to code as general 
any event that was non-specific according to the previous definition. The judges 
were instructed not to second guess respondents‟ thoughts but to establish what 
could be plausibly inferred from the information provided.  Inter-rater reliability was 
good (kappa = 0.71) and differences were resolved by a third independent judge.  In 
total, 56 specific and 19 general regrets were recategorised.  For the purpose of 
comparison, both the original and recategorised data were analysed and are presented 
in that order. In both analyses regret type is a between-subjects variable and decade 
and agency are within-subjects variables.   
 
Analysis of the original responses. 
The study produced 240 regrets, 108 of which were specific and 132 general.  
Because many respondents had only lived through half of the seventh decade, an 
adjustment (see Appendix C) adapted from Berntsen and Rubin (2002) was 
calculated to give an estimate of how many regrets respondents would have 
produced had they all completed the questionnaire on the eve of their seventieth 
birthday.  When applied to the original (miscategorised) regrets the adjustment 
resulted in a total of 115 specific and 138 general regrets.  Tables of descriptive 
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statistics for both the original and recategorised regrets can be found in Appendix B.  
The distributions are graphically represented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2  A preliminary 
analysis of the original dataset showed that men (M = 3.64, SD = 1.29) produced 
marginally more regrets on average than did women (M = 3.15, SD = 1.06); F (1, 
59) = 3.74, MSE = 1.32, p = .06, but level of education did not contribute 
significantly to the number of regrets produced; F (4, 59) = .78, MSE = 1.32, p >.05, 
and there was no interaction between sex and level of education, F (3, 59) = . 1.74, 
MSE = 1.32, p >.05. 
Figure 2.1 shows that for the original data there is a clear bump for general 
regrets which peaks in decade 3, decreasing sharply over decades 4 and 5, before 
rising slightly in decade 6 and finally tailing away in the 7
th
 decade.  The distribution 
of specific regrets by contrast is bi-modal, with the peak in decade 3 matched by that 
in decade 6.  The bump decades (2 and 3) contain 54% of all general regrets, 
whereas the same decades account for only 35% of specific regrets, which is only 
marginally more than the proportion of regrets in the 6
th
 and 7
th
 decades for that 
group.   
Within each group the proportion of each participant‟s total number of 
regrets that were in each decade was calculated. These proportions were then entered 
into single-sample t tests to compare both group distributions against chance.  
Because of the small number of regrets in the first decade, it was excluded from this 
and subsequent analyses, though this decade remained in the pool of items used to 
calculate proportions.   
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Figure 2.1 Study 1: original responses. Proportion of regrets as a function of 
time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets.  Error bars represent 
the standard error of the mean.   
 
With chance set at .0166 (1/6) only decades 3 (M = .23. SD = .24), 6 (M = 
.19. SD = .24), and 7 (M = .21. SD = .20) within specific regrets had means above 
this value, but none of these were significant (see Appendix B).  Within general 
regrets the only decades containing proportions greater than would be expected by 
chance were decades 2(M =.27, SD = .23); t(38) = 2.76, p < .01, r = .41, and 3 (M 
=.27, SD = .27); t(38) = 2.72, p < .02, r =.40. The only other decades that differed 
significantly from chance, were 5 and 7, both of which contained significantly lower 
than chance proportions (see Appendix B). Within general regrets a comparison was 
made between the individual bump decades and the adjacent decade 4 (M =.15, SD = 
.19). Although higher proportions were found in decades 2, t(38) = 2.24, p > .05, r = 
.34, and decade 3, t(38) = 2.14, p >.05, r =.33, these did not reach significance 
following Tukey HSD correction.  However, combining the bump decade 
proportions and comparing them with the combined proportions of decades 4 and 5 
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showed that the bump decades (M = .54, SD = .29) had significantly higher 
proportions than the adjacent two decades (M = .22, SD = .22); t(38) = 4.5, p < .001, 
r =.59. 
Planned contrasts were carried out to compare the relative proportions of 
specific and general regrets within the bump decades.  In decade 2 there were 
significantly higher proportions of general (M =.27, SD = .23) than specific (M =.11, 
SD = .16) regrets, t(73) = 3.50, p < .005, r = .38, but although the proportion of 
general regrets in decade 3 (M =.27, SD = .27) was greater than the proportion of 
specific regrets in that decade (M =.23, SD = .24), the difference did not reach 
significance; t(73) = .92, p > .05, r = .10.  Within decade 7 the proportion of specific 
(M = .19, SD = .24) regrets was significantly higher than the proportion of general 
regrets (M = .11, SD = .12); t(73) = 2.03, p = .05,  r =.27.  
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
 The fourth prediction in this study was that because the memory-based 
distinction is assumed to underlie the distinction between action and inaction regrets 
there should be a significant overlap between the two.  To test this prediction two 
hypothesis-blind judges, (neither of whom had been involved in the earlier 
specific/general recategorisation), coded regrets according to whether they were 
attributed to action, “Leaving a teaching post” (32%); inaction, “Not expressing love 
and gratitude to parents” (40%); both action and inaction, “Joining the navy instead 
of going to university”(6%); or neither action nor inaction, “Being betrayed by a 
friend” (22%).  The judges reached initial agreement on 74% of their designations 
(kappa = 0.62) and differences were resolved through discussion between the raters.  
Proportions were calculated for the number of each participant‟s regrets (all those 
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coded as action, inaction, both or neither) that fell into each of the four categories: 
specific action, ; general action; specific inaction; and general inaction.   
The proportions of specific and general action and inaction regrets were 
entered into a 2 (type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) mixed model 
ANOVA.  Regret type was a between subjects factor and agency was a within 
subjects factor.  The analysis produced no main effects of regret type, F (1, 74) = 
.011, p >.05, or agency, F (1, 74) = 1.40, p >.05, but there was a significant two way 
interaction between regret type and agency, F (1, 74) = 4.60, MSE = .07, p <.05, ηp
2
 
= .06.   Planned comparisons of the means involved in this interaction showed some 
overlap between the two dimensions.  General regrets were significantly more likely 
to be due to inaction (M = .45, SD = .29) than to action (M = .24, SD = .30); t(38) = 
2.28, p < .05,  r =.35, and although specific regrets were more likely to be due to 
action (M = .39, SD = .29) than inaction (M = .35, SD = .32) the difference did not 
reach significance; t(35) = .69, p > .05, r =.11.  
 
Analysis of regret content   
 A system of content coding derived from respondents‟ descriptions produced 
eight life domains, four of which (education, work, relationships and self-
actualisation) were further divided to produce 15 sub-categories.  There was good 
inter-rater reliability (kappa = 0.78) with coders initially reaching agreement on 80% 
of domains.  Differences were resolved after discussion with, and moderation by, the 
researcher.  Using regrets as the units of analysis the main domains were ranked in 
descending order as follows:  Family, “Not getting to know my parents properly” 
(27%); Work, “Joining a consultancy” (13%); Intimate relationships “Marrying the 
wrong person for the wrong reason” (12%); Education, “Leaving school too early, 
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without taking A levels” (11%); Self-Development, “Not learning a second 
language” (9%); and Character, “Not being more outgoing” (6%).   
Unsurprisingly, the majority of education regrets (93%) fell in the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 
decades, as did 50% of intimate relationship regrets, and 49% of work regrets.  The 
majority of self-development (76%) and character (57%) regrets also tended to 
cluster in the bump and approximately a quarter of family regrets were in the bump. 
 
Summary of the results for the original responses   
As predicted, distant regrets were more likely to be general, while recent 
regrets were more likely to be specific than general.  A bump was found for general 
regrets in decades 2 and 3 which is greater than would be expected by chance, 
whereas the same bump for specific regrets was not greater than would be expected 
by chance.  Moreover the specific regret distribution is bi-modal and has higher 
proportions of regrets in decades 6 and 7 combined (40%) than in decades 2 and 3 
combined (34%).   Partial support was found for the fourth prediction of a significant 
overlap between the two distinctions: general regrets were significantly more likely 
to be due to inaction, while specific regrets were equally as likely to be due to action 
as inaction.  The results of the content analysis are also consistent with findings in 
the wider literature, as the most frequently reported regrets concerned the life 
domains of family, intimate relationships, education, work and self-actualisation.  
Taken at face value the regrets produced by this sample support the 
hypotheses advanced, despite the many categorisation errors.    
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Recategorised responses analysis 
After recategorisation only11 participants in the specific group were judged 
to have produced only specific regrets (22 regrets) and only 23 participants in the 
general group were judged to have produced only general regrets (70 regrets).  An 
analysis using only these participants was deemed unsuitable.  It was decided 
therefore that the analysis should include all participants who had produced at least 
one regret consistent with their group (i.e., at least one specific regret from someone 
who filled out a specific regret questionnaire), but that only group-consistent regrets 
would be included in the analysis (i.e., only the specific regrets from the specific 
group etc).  This resulted in the inclusion of 30 participants in the specific group, 
who produced 52 specific regrets, and 38 participants in the general group who 
produced 113 general regrets.  The totals after the partial decade 7 adjustment are 57 
specific and 117 general regrets.  Seven participants (6 specific, 1 general) were 
excluded because they had failed to produce any regrets consistent with their group.    
The within-group decade proportions and decade 7 adjustment were 
calculated exactly as for the original responses.  The distributions of both specific 
and general regrets are shown in Figure 2.2, and as can be seen the recategorisation 
has not radically altered the overall shape of the distributions.  The main difference 
is that the specific regret distribution has a more pronounced recency component, 
which occurs because of the smaller group size resulting from recategorisation, 
which means the denominator used in the adjustment of decade 7 is smaller. 
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Figure 2.2 Study 1: recategorised responses. Proportion of regrets as a 
function of time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
As with the analysis of the original regrets the proportions in each decade for 
each group were compared with chance by means of single sample t tests, with 
chance set at .0166 (1/6).  Within specific regrets only decades 3 (M = .21. SD = 
.31), 6 (M = .19. SD = .32), and 7 (M = .31. SD = .37) had mean proportions above 
chance, but none of these were significant (Appendix B).  Within general regrets the 
only decades with above chance proportions were decades 2 (M = .30. SD = .23); 
t(37) = 2.85, p < .01, r = .42, and 3 (M = .28. SD = .27); t(37) = 2.82, p < .01, r =.42. 
None of the other decades within general regrets differed significantly from chance 
(see Appendix B).  Within general regrets, post hoc comparisons between the bump 
decades and the adjacent decade 4 showed that both decades 2 [ t(37) = 2.12, p < .04, 
r = .33] and 3[ t(37) = 2.12, p < .04, r =.33] contained significantly higher 
proportions of regrets than decade 4 (M = .14. SD = .23).   Between group 
comparisons within the bump decades showed that in decade 2 there were 
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significantly higher proportions of general (M = .27. SD = .23) than specific (M = 
.10. SD = .22) regrets; t(66) = 3.13, p < .01, r = .36.  Although decade 3 contained 
higher proportions of general than specific regrets, the difference did not reach 
significance; t (66) = 1.12, p < .27, r = .14.  Within decade 7, after correcting for 
unequal variances, the proportion of specific regrets (M = .31, SD = .36) was 
significantly higher than the proportion of general regrets (M = .09, SD = .13); t(35) 
= 2.94, p < .01, r = .44. 
  
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
As with the previous analysis, proportions were calculated for specific 
actions (“Assaulting two policemen”), specific inactions (“Not going to a police 
open day and applying to join the force”), general actions (“Getting involved with a 
married woman”), and general inactions (“Not going to commercial college after 
leaving school”).  These proportions were entered into a 2 (type: specific/general) by 
2 (agency: action/inaction) ANOVA.  Regret type was a between subjects factor and 
agency was a within subjects factor. 
The analysis produced no main effects of regret type, F(1, 66) = .21, p >.05 
and no main effect of agency, F (1, 66) = .04, p >.05, but there was a significant type 
by agency interaction, F (1, 66) = 10.21, MSE = .17, p <.005, ηp
2
 = .13.  Planned 
comparisons of the means involved in this interaction showed that general regrets 
were significantly more likely to be due to inaction (M = .49, SD = .29) than action 
(M = .22, SD = .26);  t(37) = 2.71, p < .05,  r =.40, and specific regrets were 
marginally more likely to be due to action (M = .46, SD = .29)  than inaction (M = 
.26, SD = .32); t(29) = 1.91, p = .07, r = .33. 
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Analysis of emergence 
Because respondents in the general regret group estimated both the decade to 
which the source experience belonged and when they began to experience regret, it 
was possible to estimate the time elapsed between the regretted event and the 
manifestation of its affective consequence.  For general regrets the median decade 
for the source experience was the 3
rd
  and the median decade in which respondents 
became conscious of the regret was the 4
th
 (mode = 6), so for general regrets there 
was on average up to a decade between the experience and awareness of its 
regrettable consequences. A comparable analysis for specific regrets was not 
possible, as most had only one temporal index.  
 
2.3.3 Discussion of Study 1 
 Overall, the analyses of both the original and recategorised responses did not 
produce dramatically different results, and although recategorisation reduced the 
number of regrets overall, it did not change their relative distributions. Neither did 
recategorisation produce significantly more inaction than action regrets and the 
overlap between the two distinctions was more or less the same in both analyses.   
Taken as a whole, the results are supportive of the first two predictions of the 
study in that a reminiscence bump was observed for general but not for specific 
regrets.  The third prediction, that there would be more general regrets from the early 
part of people‟s lives and more specific recent regrets, was partially confirmed by the 
planned comparisons showing significantly higher proportions of general than 
specific regrets in decade 2.  As expected the reverse pattern was found in decade 7 
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for both the original and recategorised responses, in that this decade contained 
significantly more specific than general regrets. 
Analysis along the action-inaction dimension failed to support previous 
research in that there was not an overall inaction effect, and the fourth prediction of 
an overlap between the action/inaction and general/specific distinctions was partially 
confirmed by the observation that participants‟ general regrets were significantly 
more likely to be due to inaction than action.  Overall, their specific regrets were not 
more likely to be due to action than inaction, and although the overlap between 
specific and action regrets was not as strong as expected, this may be due to the 
manner in which different types of regret were defined, and may explain why it was 
deemed necessary to recode some of the regrets produced in this study.  In Study 2 
clearer definitions of general and specific regrets were provided. 
In terms of regret content these findings are broadly consistent with previous 
research (Roese & Summerville, 2005) in showing that the domains of family, 
education, intimate relationships, work and self-actualisation are the most frequently 
regretted. Also, the finding that the time elapsed between the source event and the 
awareness of general regrets was at least a decade is consistent with the view 
(Gilovich, Medvec & Kahneman, 1998) that it is the consequences of their decisions 
emerging over time that cause people to feel regret.   
 
2.4 Study 2: replication and extension of Study 1 
 In Study 2 an attempt was made to replicate the results of Study 1 using 
another group of participants in their 60s. Also included was a group in their 40s to 
test whether the bump for regret might be observed in younger adults, as has been 
described for autobiographical memories in adults from the age of 35 on (Jansari & 
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Parkin, 1996). In this study concerns about participants‟ self-categorisation of their 
regrets were addressed by providing clearer definitions of specific and general 
regrets.  
 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants   
 An opportunity sample of 71 residents of County Durham and Stockton upon 
Tees was recruited by postal survey using procedures similar to those used in Study 
1 and involving approximately 320 questionnaires. The sample comprised 45 
females and 26 males from diverse demographic backgrounds, all of whom were 
relatively well educated.  Two age groups were recruited, one in their 40s (n = 41) 
with a mean age of 44.4yrs (SD = 3.4), and one in their 60s (n = 30) with a mean age 
of 64 yrs (SD = 2.9). The combined mean age was 53 years (SD = 10.2).  
Educational levels for the two groups (40s, 60s respectively) were as follows: 
Secondary (6; 6); Advanced Secondary (2; 9); Graduate (17; 5) and Postgraduate 
(16; 7). Three respondents from the 60s group did not supply this information.  
 
Design, Materials and Procedure  
 In this study a within-subjects design was employed, but the procedure was 
otherwise similar to that used in Study 1 in that participants first described their 
regrets and then answered questions about them.  However, because of the within-
subjects design the questionnaire used in Study 2 differed from that used in Study 1 
on one fundamental dimension: participants in Study 1 were asked to recall regrets 
of a specified type (either specific or general), whereas respondents in Study 2 were 
free to recall either or both types of regret.  Participants first recalled and described 
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their regrets on the regret sheet provided, after which they designated each of their 
regrets as being either specific or general in nature.  This categorisation process was 
simplified by providing respondents with clear definitions of both types of regret, 
which reduced categorisation errors and made reassignment unnecessary.   
A specific regret was defined as an experience that “happened on a 
particular day in a particular place and involved you personally.  It doesn‟t matter 
whether you felt regret immediately after the event or because of things that 
happened later. What matters is that you can say when the regretted experience 
happened.”  Participants were instructed that general regrets should meet the 
following description: “the regretted experience did not happen on a particular day 
in a particular place. It should be something that involved you personally. Although 
you could not put an exact date on such an experience, you could say which decade 
of your life it belonged to.” For both regret types the method of dating remained the 
same as in the first study.  
The present study also differed from the previous study in that two additional 
temporal measures were included.  To gauge how long participants expected their 
regrets to last they were asked to estimate how likely they thought it was that their 
regrets would persist to the end of their lives. Persistence ratings were given on an 11 
point scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) and 10 (absolutely certain).  Participants 
were also asked to estimate how intense their regret was at the time of the regrettable 
experience, how intense it was at the time of completing the questionnaire, and how 
intense they expected it to be at the end of their lives. As has already been 
mentioned, general regrets by their nature differ from specific regrets in that they 
concern experiences with diffuse temporal and spatial origins and many may also 
concern experiences that were not deemed regrettable at the time, so for such regrets 
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it is clearly not appropriate to ask about past regret intensity. However, for many 
other general regrets (a regrettable holiday with friends for example) it is quite 
appropriate to ask about past regret intensity.  Whilst acknowledging the limitations 
of this question for general regrets, it is included for the sake of balance and the 
limitations must be taken into account when interpreting the results.  All intensity 
ratings were given on a 10 point scale anchored at 1 (very mild) to 10 (very intense).   
 
2.4.2 Results 
The principal aims of this study were twofold; first, to replicate the findings 
of Study 1 by showing a reminiscence bump for general but not specific regrets, and 
second, to demonstrate the bump phenomenon for different age groups.  The 
analyses of the two groups are presented separately, with the exception that 
combined analyses are reported for persisitence and intensity,and for the overlap 
between action-inaction and specific-general regrets. 
 
Analysis of the 60s group 
 Because the present study uses a within subjects design the procedure used to 
calculate regret proportions differs somewhat from the procedure used in Study 1 for 
both the original and recategorised responses.  In Study 1 the proportions per decade 
were calculated using the group total as the denominator, whereas in Study 2 
proportions are calculated using the overall total of the sample as the denominator.   
The 60s group produced 31 specific and 68 general regrets after the partial-
decade adjustment.  Preliminary analyses showed that the number of regrets 
produced was not affected by either sex, F (1, 20) = 2.14, MSE = 1.52, p > .05 or 
level of education, F (3, 20) = 1. 73, MSE = 1.52, p > .05.  
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A single sample t-test revealed that the mean proportion of general regrets (M 
= .65, SD = .32) was significantly above chance, t(29) = 2.50, p < .05, r =.42. 
As can be seen in Figure 2.3 the bump phenomenon observed in Study 1 has 
been replicated for a second group of 60 year olds, with the peak of the bump in the 
third decade for the combined categories.   
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Figure 2.3 Group A (60s).  Proportion of regrets as a function of time in 
decade intervals for combined, specific and general regrets. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
A One Way ANOVA produced a significant main effect of decade, F (3.61, 
104.54) = 2.61, MSE = .03, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .08. Tukey HSD post hoc analysis 
confirmed that the reminiscence bump peaked in decade 3. Thus, although decade 2 
(M =.16, SD = .19) contained a higher proportion of participants‟ regrets than 
decades 4 (M = .10, SD = .15), 5 (M = .15, SD = .24) and 6 (M = .11, SD = .21), 
none of the differences were significant (ps > .05).   However, decade 3 (M = .29, 
SD = .28) contained a significantly higher proportion of participants‟ regrets than 
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decades 4 (t = 3.01, p<.05, r =.49) and 6 (t = 2.46, p< .05, r =.42).  Analyses of the 
specific and general distributions separately showed a significant main effect of 
decade for general regrets, F(3.42, 99.08) = 2.47, MSE = .05, p<.05, ηp
2
 = .08, but 
not for specific regrets, F(3.33, 96.49) = 1.912, MSE = .03, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .06. Tukey 
HSD post hoc analysis of the significant main effect showed a significant difference 
between general regret proportions in decades 3 (M = .19, SD = 26) and 4 (M = .07, 
SD = .13); t (29) = 2.41, p < .05 r =.41) and a significant difference between decades 
3 and 7 (M = .06, SD = .07); t (29) = 2.58, p < .01, r =.43).  
 Planned comparisons showed significantly higher proportions of general than 
specific regrets in decade 2, t(29) = 3.41, p <.01, r =.53 and a marginally significant 
difference in decade 7, which contained higher proportions of specific than general 
regrets, t (29) = 1.92, p = .06, r =.28, showing the same recency effect for specific 
regrets that was found in Study 1.  Surprisingly, given that the peak of the bump 
appears to fall in the third decade, the proportion of general regrets in this decade 
was not significantly greater than the proportion of specific regrets, t(29) = 1.36, p = 
.18, r =.33. Nonetheless, these findings are consistent with the third prediction that, 
across time, people report proportionally more general than specific regrets.. 
 
Analysis of emergence 
 For general regrets the analysis of the time elapsed between the source 
experience and awareness of regret showed that for the source experience the median 
decade was the 3
rd
 , while the median decade for awareness of regret was the 5
th
  (the 
modal decade was the 6
th
 ), so at least ten years separated the experience from its 
affective consequences.  Again, no comparable analysis was possible for specific 
regrets. 
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Analysis of content 
Using the content domains of Study 1, regrets from both the 60s and 40s 
groups were coded by the researcher and one blind rater and then separate and 
combined analyses of content were carried out.  Initial agreement of 89% was 
reached (kappa = 0.76) and this was increased to 96% after discussion. The 
remaining regrets were excluded.  Analysis of content for the 60s group revealed the 
following domains in rank order: Family (24%); Self-Actualisation (16%); Work 
(10%); Education and Intimate relationships, both with 10%; and Health (6%).  As 
with the previous study, an analysis of the regrets in the bump decades revealed that 
all eight education regrets were located in the bump decades, as were 70% of work 
regrets, a third of regrets concerning intimate relationships and just over a third of 
family regrets, as well as about 60% of self-actualisation and character regrets.  
 
Analysis of the 40s group 
After a partial-decade adjustment was applied to the fifth decade, the 40s 
group produced 59 specific and 84 general regrets. A preliminary ANOVA showed 
that this adjusted total of 143 regrets was not significantly affected by sex F (1, 34) = 
.19, MSE = 1.55, p > .05 or level of education F (3, 34) = .65, MSE = 1.52, p > .05.  
A proportion was calculated for each participant‟s regrets that were specific or 
general and from each of the five decades of their life (see Appendix B for the 
descriptive statistics). The distribution of these proportions is presented in Figure 
2.4.  Again, a single sample t-test revealed that the mean proportion of general 
regrets (.60, SD = .29) was significantly above chance, t(40) = 2.31, p <.05, r =.34.  
The proportions per decade (excluding those for decade 1) were entered into a One 
Way ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main effect of decade, F (2.33, 92.81) = 
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4.61, MSE = .05, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .10.  Tukey HSD post hoc analysis of this main effect 
showed significantly higher proportions of regrets in decade 3 (M = .38, SD = .32)  
than in decades 4 (M =.15, SD = .21); t (40) = 3.17, p <.005, r =.51, and 5 (M =.21, 
SD = .17); t(40) = 2.43, p <.05, r =.36.   
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Figure 2.4 Group B (40s). Proportion of regrets as a function of time in 
decade intervals for combined, specific and general regrets. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Analysis of the distributions separately showed that the overall effect of 
decade was due to general regrets; F (2.02, 80.79) = 8.41, MSE = .07, p <.001, ηp
2
 = 
.17.  No main effect was found for specific regrets, F (3, 120) = 1.60, MSE = .02,  p 
>.05, ηp
2
 = .03. Tukey HSD post hoc comparisons on the general distribution showed 
significantly higher proportions of regrets in decade 3 (M = .28, SD = .30) than in 
decades 4 (M =.07, SD = .14); t (40) = 3.97, p <.001, r =.53, and 5(M =.08, SD = 
.11); t(40) = 3.90, p <.001, r =.52.   
Planned comparisons of the means showed that general regrets were found in 
significantly higher proportions than specific regrets in decades 2 (Mgeneral =.17, SD 
 88 
=.22 vs Mspecific =.07, SD =.15; t (40) = 2.22, p <.05, r =.33) and 3 (Mgeneral = .28, SD 
=.30, vs Mspecific =.09, SD =.15; t (40) = 3.46, p <.005, r =.48).  In decade 5 specific 
regrets (M =.13, SD =.21) were found in significantly higher proportions than 
general (M =.08, SD =.11) regrets, t(40) = 2.22, p<.05, r =.33.  
 
Analysis of content 
Analysis of content for the 40s group revealed the following domains in rank 
order: Family (21%); Education (19%); Intimate relationships (16%); Self-
actualization (9%); Work and Character, both with 8.5%.  Again, almost all 
education regrets (92%) fell in the bump decades, as did 73% of work-related 
regrets, 63% of intimate relationship regrets, over half (56%) of family regrets and 
most of the regrets concerning self-actualisation (89%).  All eight character regrets 
reported by this group came from the bump decades.  
 
Estimates of persistence and intensity over time 
The persistence and intensity ratings for both groups are provided in Table 
2.1. Only 37 participants reported having at least one regret of each type and since 
the analyses of persistence and intensity are entirely within-participants, only the 132 
regrets from these participants are used. Although no between group hypotheses 
were advanced for this analysis a between groups analysis was carried out 
nonetheless. 
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Table 2.1 Persistence and intensity across time for specific and general 
regrets, with means and standard deviations. 
 60s  (N = 13) 40s  (N = 24) 
Specific 
n = 23 
General 
n = 26 
Specific 
n = 41 
General 
n = 42 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Persistence 
To the end of life 
        
8.54 (2.96) 7.15 (2.70) 6.34 (3.20) 4.55 (3.09) 
Intensity         
T1 (At the time) 7.60 (3.02) 5.02 (3.00) 6.89 (3.31) 4.97 (2.38) 
T2 (Now) 7.70 (2.94) 5.61 (2.89) 6.26 (2.20) 5.28 (2.56) 
T3 (End of life)         6.87 (3.41) 5.19 (3.04) 4.02 (2.77) 3.88 (2.92) 
 
The mean persistence ratings were entered into a 2 (type) by 2 (group) 
ANOVA, revealing a main effect of regret type such that ratings overall were higher 
for specific (M = 7.11, SD = 3.25) than for general (M = 5.47, SD = 3.18) regrets; F 
(1, 35) = 9.11, MSE = 4.67, ηp
2
 = .21, p <.01.  There was a significant main effect of 
group, such that participants in their 60s (M = 7.85, SD = 2.50) rated their regrets as 
significantly more likely to persist than did participants in their 40s (M = 5.45, SD = 
2.70); F (1, 35) = 7.00, MSE = 13.85, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .17.  The two way interaction 
between regret type and group was non-significant; F (1, 35) = .15, p >.05.   
The ratings of intensity were entered into a 2 (type) by 2 (group) by 3 (time: 
then, now, end of life) ANOVA.  There was a main effect of regret type F (1, 35) = 
12.94, MSE = 1.58, p >.005, ηp
2
 = .27 such that intensity ratings were higher overall 
for specific (M = 6.30, SD = 2.21) than for general (M = 4.91, SD = 2.15) regrets. 
There was a main effect of time; F(1.22, 42.70), 3.82, MSE = 13.18, p <.05, ηp
2
 = 
 90 
.10, but no main effect of group; F (1, 35) = 3.46, MSE = 17.81, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .10. 
There was a significant interaction between regret type by time F (1.59, 55.74) = 
3.48, MSE = 10.24, p <.05, ηp
2
 = .10, but no significant interaction between group 
and type; F (1, 35) = 1.58, MSE = 9.37, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .04, between group and time; F 
(1.22, 42.70) = 1.59, MSE = 20.95, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .04, nor between type, group and 
time; F (1.59, 55.74) = .031, MSE = 2.94, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .01. 
Tukey HSD post hoc analysis of the main effect of time showed a significant 
drop in intensity ratings between T2 (M = 6.18, SD = 2.40) and T3 (M = 4.99, SD = 
2.71), so overall participants expected the intensity of their regrets to decrease with 
the passage of time; t(30) = 5.82, p <.01, r = .77.  Separate ANOVAs for specific and 
general regrets showed that the interaction between regret type and time was driven 
by specific regrets, F (1.2, 44.3) = 7.74, MSE = 9.95, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .18, as the 
intensity rating for specific regret at T3 were significantly lower than the ratings at 
T1 (t = 2.92, p <.05, r = .51) and T2 (t = 5.64, p <.01, r = .75). For general regrets 
there was no significant effect of time, F (1.4, 51.4) = 2.42, MSE = 6.08, p >.05, ηp
2
 
= .06. 
Participants in their sixties rated their regrets as more likely to persist than 
did participants in their forties. In both age groups the intensity ratings for specific 
regrets were significantly higher than those for general regrets. There were no other 
significant differences between the two age groups.  
  
Analysis of the overlap between the two distinctions 
To examine the overlap between the specific-general and action-inaction 
distinctions the data from both groups were combined, using the regret totals from 
the first five decades of the 60s group (n =71) and the adjusted totals for the 40s 
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group (n=143), giving a total of 214 regrets.  Using the system of action/inaction 
coding from Study 1, initial agreement of 96% was reached by two judges (kappa = 
0.88) and after resolving differences through discussion and moderation by the 
researcher this reached 98%. Three “indeterminate” regrets were removed from 
further analysis. Of the remaining 211 regrets 27% were coded as actions (“selling a 
valuable chest of drawers”), 46% as inactions (“not going into teaching earlier”), 
and 27% coded as neither (“I regret that I am a widow”).    
As with the analysis in Study 1 proportions were calculated for each 
participant‟s regrets (those coded as, action, inaction and neither) that were due to 
specific action (“Choosing to go out with a new boyfriend”), specific inaction  (“Not 
going to have coffee with ex wife”), general action (“Smoking”) and general inaction 
(“Not appreciating my soul mate”). These proportions were entered into a 2 (group) 
by 2 (type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) mixed model ANOVA.  
There was a main effect of type, F (1, 68) = 8.40, MSE = .08, p < .006, ηp
2
 = .11, so 
that, on average, participants were more likely to have general (M = .45, SD = .34) 
than specific (M = .27, SD = .30) regrets. The analysis also revealed a main effect of 
agency, F (1, 68) = 35.10, MSE = .05, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .34, such that a higher 
proportion of the regrets described by each participant were due to inaction (M = .50, 
SD = .32) than action (M = .23, SD = .23). There was also a significant interaction 
between regret type and agency, F (1, 68) = 20.25, MSE = .07, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .23. 
Planned comparisons of the means involved in this interaction revealed that, as in 
Study 1, participants‟ general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to 
inaction (M = .37, SD = .33) than action (M = .09, SD = .15), t(69) = 6.23, p < .001, 
r =.60.  Although on average, participants described more specific regrets that were 
due to action (M =.14, SD =.20) than they did specific regrets due to inaction (M 
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=.13, SD = .26), this difference was not significant. The results of the analysis also 
contained a significant agency by group interaction, F (1, 68) = 21.60, p <.001, ηp
2
 = 
.24. As no specific predictions had been made about this interaction, Tukey HSD 
tests were used to compare means. These showed that participants in the 40s group 
reported a significantly (p < .001) higher proportion of action regrets (M = .32, SD = 
.22) than did participants in the 60s group (M = .10, SD = .18). The reverse pattern 
was observed for inaction regrets, with significantly (p < .01) higher proportions 
reported in the 60s group (M = .66, SD = .37) than in the 40s group (M = .39, SD = 
.26).  Finally, the type by group interaction was non-significant, F(1, 68) = 1.60, 
MSE = .08, p = .2, ηp
2
 = .02 .  Although participants in the 40s group described more 
specific regrets (M = .30, SD = .24) than did those in the 60s group (M = .23, SD 
=.37), and there was a higher proportion of general regrets in the 60s group (M = .50, 
SD = .40) than in the 40s group (M = .41, SD = .28), neither of these differences was 
statistically significant.  
 
Fine grained recency analysis 
Finally, the distribution of recent specific regrets was examined to see 
whether or not they followed the patterns found for memories in comparable 
reminiscence bump studies.   Because of the small number of recent regrets in each 
study the analysis is collapsed across both studies and combines the specific regret 
totals from the most recent decade in each group (43 regrets). One participant 
produced two regrets in the most recent decade, but these were excluded from the 
analysis in order to keep the data independent; so no participant contributed more 
than one regret to this analysis. For each specific regret the time elapsed between the 
participant‟s age and the date given for the regrettable event was calculated.  The 
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temporal distribution of these regrets, broken down into two year time periods may 
be seen in Figure 2.5. As predicted by previous work (Rubin et al., 1986) there were 
significant differences in the within-decade distribution, χ2 (3) = 13.65, p < .001, 
with the highest number of regrets (46%) in the most recent two years and 74% of 
the total falling within the most recent half of the decade.  These results further 
strengthen the view of specific regrets as being comparable to negative memories. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Specific regrets located in the most recent decade as a function of 
time elapsed in 2 –year bins. Results collapse across study and age group. 
 
 
2.4.3 Discussion of Study 2 
The results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 by showing a bump overall 
for participants in their 40s and in their 60s. In both groups the bump is confined to 
general regrets and there are more general than specific regrets early on, but more 
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specific than general recent regrets. The overlap between the action/inaction and 
specific/general distinctions has also been replicated, with strong evidence for the 
general/inaction overlap but more ambiguous evidence for the overlap between 
specific/action regrets.  
Interestingly, the persistence and intensity analysis showed that for both age 
groups specific regrets were rated as more likely to endure to the end of life and were 
rated as more intense overall, though the intensity was expected to decrease towards 
the end of life. The fact that Studies 1 and 2 produced so few specific regrets overall 
is evidence that on the whole specific regrets either do not in fact persist over long 
periods or else they become less accessible. The higher intensity ratings may mean 
either that these are particularly troublesome specific regrets, or that they feel more 
intense because specific regrets tend to be more recent. 
One point worth noting concerns the problem of miscategorisation found in 
Study 1 and in Davison (2005).  The fact that this problem was effectively removed 
in Study 2 is itself interesting, as it might seem natural to assume that a type-
constrained recall should be more likely than free recall to produce the target type of 
regret.  However, Davison (2005) found only specific regrets to be miscategorised, 
whereas errors were found for both types of regret in Study 1. There are many 
possible interpretations of this problem, but there are at least two straightforward 
practical explanations that might be advanced.  The first is that participants simply 
didn‟t understand the instructions, which is a reasonable assumption. Participants 
may understand specific to mean „particular‟ and so assume they are being asked to 
provide a discrete regret that is distinct from other regrets they might have.  A 
second interpretation is that respondents simply feel the need to use their regrets 
once they have generated them.  In memory studies participants draw on an almost 
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unlimited pool of memories, which may then be discarded and replaced if they don‟t 
fit the experimental criteria, whereas even the most disastrous life is unlikely to 
include an unlimited supply of regrets.  Most participants in the studies presented 
here struggled to find even five, suggesting that they are a relatively precious 
commodity not to be wasted. It is doubtless even more difficult to think of five 
specific regrets, (and there were more miscategorisation errors for specific regrets) 
so in the absence of a choice, respondents may simply supply whatever they have 
remembered.  This may be an attempt to justify their own effort, or it may be that 
writing their regrets down serves some cathartic function, or perhaps they simply 
feel a sense of obligation to the researcher.   
 
2.5 Chapter discussion  
The results of both studies reconcile the life script account of the reminicence 
bump with regret research locating life‟s most regretted experiences in the period of 
early adulthood.  First of all, adults in their 40s and 60s regretted proportionally 
more experiences from early adulthood than from other periods of their lives, but this 
pattern applied only to general and not to specific regrets.  That no bump was found 
for specific regrets is consistent with the life script argument and with research 
showing less favourable retention of negative events (Walker et al., 1997).  Second, 
the intuition that regret content should predict a bump was confirmed by the 
distribution of general regrets, the most frequent source of which were experiences 
concerning education, intimate relationship (including marriage and parenting) self-
actualisation and character.  These domains were predominantly associated with the 
bump decades.  
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More broadly, the results are consistent with models of autobiographical 
memory and with theories of temporal construal in showing that regrets for distant 
events tend to concern experiences of a general nature, while recently regretted 
events tend to be more specific.   
Why should a bump be observed for general but not for specific regrets?   
Rubin and colleagues (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Berntsen & Rubin, 2004) attribute 
the absence of a bump for negative events to the idiosyncratic and chronologically 
random nature of such events.  A specific regret like “Arguing with a family 
member” is a common but idiosyncratic experience that could occur anywhere in the 
life course.  These characteristics and the distributions observed for specific regrets 
suggest they are comparable to the specific negative memories studied by Rubin and 
colleagues.  
The bump for general regrets seems less straightforward to interpret.  
Summarised regrets (“Being too fussy about housework at the expense of time spent 
with the children.”) are aggregates of repeated experiences and as such require the 
passage of time to be realised.  Regrets indexed by lifetime periods (“Not working 
hard enough at school”), unlike specific regrets, appear to be neither random nor 
idiosyncratic, and have instead a script-like cultural and temporal regularity.  When 
generating their regrets participants may have imagined alternative personal histories 
by manipulating „typical‟ or schematised life experiences, which are by definition 
generic. Experiences such as finishing education, starting a family and so on are 
located in the bump period. As these personally and socially important transitions are 
loaded with positive expectations, many general regrets may concern scripted events 
gone wrong.   
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter an important difference between 
general regrets and the specific negative memories used in life script studies is that 
the source event of a general regret need not have been negative, and  as Gilovich, 
Medvec and Kahneman (1998) note, what emerges over time is the awareness that 
there are consequences to be regretted.  This was apparent in both studies: 
participants reported up to a decade elapsing between the regretted event and the 
awareness of its consequences.  
The emergent quality of general regrets makes them something to be 
explained, more like retrospective judgements than straightforward recollections. 
This characterisation reflects views of adult development which see retrospective 
reasoning in the form of reminiscence and „life review‟ as naturally occurring 
processes of both the middle (Erikson, 1950/1997; Levinson, 1978; Stewart & 
Vanderwater, 1999) and latter stages of the lifespan (Butler, 1963).  This view is also 
consistent with autobiographical memory research showing a greater reliance on 
judgement processes for events that do not originate directly from perception 
(Johnson, Foley, Suengas & Raye, 1988).  Whereas regret for a consequential exam 
failure is likely to be anchored to a specific event, the more general regret for a poor 
academic outcome will require a causal explanation combining memories and 
inferences based on multiple experiences of poor performance.    
Narrative accounts of autobiographical memory support this view of general 
regrets. Bluck and Habermas (2000) propose that through autobiographical 
reasoning people mentally organise their life narratives and construct life story 
schemas from recollections and semantic knowledge.  Continuity and narrative 
coherence are maintained over time by chronologically ordering events according to 
normative timetables, while linking events and themes helps people to find causal 
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explanations for their experiences.  Since establishing causality and retrospective 
sense-making are central to counterfactual thinking and regret, general regrets 
doubtless involve much autobiographical reasoning.   
When people are seeking causal explanations for life‟s regrettable 
consequences, they might be expected to focus on the formative experiences of early 
adulthood.  This was reflected in the finding that regrets of family, relationships, 
education, work, self-actualisation and character figured prominently in the bump 
period, which is consistent with autobiographical memory studies previously 
described in which the importance of this period is confirmed. When Conway and 
Holmes (2004) plotted lifespan memory distributions according to themes associated 
with the psychosocial stages of Erikson‟s (1950/1997) model of adult development, 
they found a preoccupation with issues of identity and intimacy in memories from 
the bump.  Finally, the autobiographically consequential experiences found by 
Mackavey, et al. (1991) to be associated with early adulthood were predominantly 
non-episodic, or general in nature.    
In summary, no bump was observed for specific regrets because like the 
negative memories in the life script studies they are idiosyncratic and randomly 
distributed across the lifespan. At the same time a number of factors may contribute 
to the bump observed for general regrets: (1) the formation of general memories 
requires the passage of time; (2) many general regrets concern positive events 
scripted to occur in the bump period; and (3) many general regrets emerge years after 
the incidents that caused them, and in the course of attributing cause for those 
regrets, people may focus on big changes to their lives which, due to the structure of 
autobiographical memory, may lead to them identifying early scripted events as 
potential causes.  
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2.5.1 The overlap between the distinctions 
 A primary aim of these studies was to examine the relationship between the 
action/inaction and specific/general distinctions as applied to regret. While there is 
evidence for alignment between the distinctions, these results suggest that they are 
not completely interchangeable.  The relationship between inaction and general 
regrets seems strong, but the relationship between specific and action regrets is less 
clear, as suggested by the observation that although specific regrets were as likely to 
be due to action as inaction, they are not as reliably associated with action as general 
regrets are with inaction.  In addition, Study 2 showed that agency interacted 
significantly with group whereas regret type did not. Older participants were 
significantly more likely than younger participants to regret inaction, but the 
difference due to age in general regrets was non-significant.  
 
2.5.2 The relationship between regrets and the life script 
These studies appear to suggest that the bump found for general regrets might 
be influenced by generic representations involving normative, script-like events.  
The domains most representative of the bump period were education, work, intimate 
relationships and family, self-development, and character, and of these regrets two 
thirds were general.  These domains are reliably found across regret surveys and 
have been shown here to be implicated in determining regret‟s temporal profile. This 
suggests that it should be possible, using life script methodologies (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Erdogan et al., 2008) to predict what people 
are likely to regret in life and when their regrettable experiences are likely to occur.  
If a normative script influences the way regrets are remembered, then its influence 
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should be observed in the way regrets are anticipated.  Simply put, it should be 
possible to demonstrate a regret script by asking young people what they expect 
themselves and others to regret in life and to say when they expect these regret-
worthy experiences to occur.  Studies addressing these questions are presented in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Regret and the preminiscence bump 
 
3.0 Chapter overview 
In the previous chapter the life script was recruited to explain the 
reminiscence bump for retrospective (experienced) regret.  As the life script can also 
be applied to future events (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003)  the 
studies in this chapter consider its contribution to the lifespan distribution of 
prospective (anticipated) regrets provided by young people living through the 
reminiscence bump period.  If the life script is important in determining the 
reminiscence bump for retrospective general regrets, then a pronounced 
preminiscence bump in early adulthood should also be found for prospective general 
regrets.  This claim is examined in a series of four studies involving the remembered 
(Study 3) and imagined (Studies 3 – 4c) regrets of young adults.  
 
3.1 Thinking about past and future autobiographical experience 
Many of the cognitive and motivational factors that constrain remembering 
also constrain how the future is imagined (Johnson & Sherman, 1990).  Thinking 
forwards and backwards in time engages similar cognitive processes and may even 
recruit similar neural substrates (Atance & O‟Neill, 2001; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; 
Cabeza & St Jacques, 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Wheeler et 
al., 1997).  D‟Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) found many perceptual and 
affective attributes were shared by specific past and future events elicited by word-
cues.  The phenomenology and specificity of both types of event were also mediated 
by temporal distance, such that temporally near past and future events evoked a 
stronger sense of being “re(pre)-experienced” and contained more sensorial and 
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contextual detail than did temporally distant events.  In both temporal directions 
positive events outnumbered negative events and the latter were significantly less 
detailed.  A word cue study by Spreng and Levine (2008) found that the retention 
function for remembered events was mirrored by an inverse „intention function‟ for 
future events, which decreased monotonically as a function of distance from the 
present.   
Past and future events also differ in some important ways: thoughts about the 
future are less likely to concern specific events than are memories about the past 
(Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008), and future events are represented with less sensorial 
and contextual detail than are remembered events (D‟Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004).  People remember their pasts as containing a greater mixture of positive and 
negative experiences, but tend to imagine futures that are generic, idealised and 
positive (Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003).  The Berntsen and Jacobsen (2008) study is 
particularly relevant to the present studies, as it directly tested for the presence of 
cultural scripts in prospective events, and although scripted events were found in low 
numbers overall, their frequency increased with temporal distance, peaking for 
events more than five years into future.  As their participants were on average 25 
years old it seems that most of their scripted events fell within the bump period. At 
the same time, event specificity decreased with temporal distance, so the scripted 
events tended also to be more general in nature. 
 
3.1.1 Thinking about past and future life scripts 
A primary function of scripts and schemas is to help structure knowledge and 
facilitate the planning and execution of future behaviour, whether for routine daily 
events such as eating in restaurants (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Schank, 1982) or for 
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culturally determined life transitions (George, 1993). The major life events 
associated with childbirth/child rearing, education, career, marriage and retirement 
follow a timetable that is culturally prescribed and sanctioned by social institutions 
and family members. People are sensitive to age-appropriate norms and know when 
they are “on time” or not (Neugarten, Moore & Lowe, 1965).  As described in 
Chapter 2, Berntsen and Rubin (2002; 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003) applied the 
template of the script to timetables derived from the age-norm literature and came up 
with the life script, which locates many of the normative transitions within the 
reminiscence bump period.  Evidence supporting life scripts was obtained by asking 
people to estimate when in a prototypical life course certain positive and important 
events would be expected to occur.  Such estimates were obtained for an average 70 
year old (Rubin & Berntsen, 2003; Study 1), a hypothetical 100 year old, and a 
prototypical newborn (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Studies 1 & 2 respectively).  The 
resulting distributions produced a bump in the second and third decades for positive, 
but not negative events and these distributions overlapped significantly with those 
produced from recall data in previous studies (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002, Study 2; 
Rubin & Berntsen, 2003, Study 1),thus confirming the hypothesis that life scripts 
explain the reminiscence bump.  Similar results have recently been obtained in a 
Turkish sample using similar methods (Erdogan, Baran, Avlar, Tas & Teckan, 
2008). 
 
3.1.2 Thinking about where things might go wrong in life: the preminiscence bump 
Asking people to speculate about prototypical lives probes their implicit 
theories about the patterns of long-term action that make up the life course (Clarke, 
1995).  Rubin and Berntsen, (2003; Berntsen & Rubin , 2004) did not ask their 
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younger participants to make predictions about their own futures, but had they done 
so it is likely that distributions similar to those predicted for an average person 
would have been found.  Such a request would elicit thoughts about what is deemed 
important and therefore regret-worthy in life, which implicates many of the landmark 
transitions captured by the life script.  Students in a study by Klinger, Barta and 
Maxeiner (1980) for instance were asked to list seven things they thought about 
either often or rarely: negative events were more frequently thought about than 
positive events and these thoughts were often about threatened relationships or goals. 
Thinking prefactually (Gleicher et al., 1995) about what might go wrong in 
life means holding negative outcomes up for consideration (a failed career, a 
childless retirement, an unfulfilled ambition) and then locating the possible source of 
these outcomes.  Whereas a counterfactual poses the question; „where did things go 
wrong in life?‟ the prospective equivalent asks; „where might things go wrong in 
life?‟ The life script supplies plausible answers to both questions by implicating the 
important and consequential transitions of early adulthood.  Johnson and Sherman 
(1990) suggest that such “counterfactual future thinking” appropriately reflects how 
people think about future events which have a high probability of occurring.  
Expectations about how things might be expected to unfold (and therefore how these 
expectations might be violated) are constrained by norms, and so the future, rather 
than being a blank canvass of possibility, is actually quite predictable. People 
struggle to overcome the inertia of normality when thinking about the future, and 
because atypical events are more difficult to imagine than typical events, people tend 
to predict a future “where highly probable events occur too often and improbable 
events occur too infrequently” (Johnson & Sherman, 1990, p. 502).  Future events 
certainly appear to be more generic (D‟Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
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Newby-Clark & Ross, 2003) and more likely to comprise culturally-scripted events 
(Berntsen & Jabobsen, 2008). 
 
Overview of the studies and their predictions 
If autobiographical memory is primarily an archive of goals and 
achievements (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) then imagined futures should 
represent an agenda of goals to be achieved and expectations to be fulfilled.  Many 
future events described by Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) concerned desirable goals 
to do with education, work, marriage, family and travel, and these domains were also 
rated high in importance and self-relevance. D‟Argembeau and Van der Linden 
(2004) observed few differences in the content of past and future events, and the lists 
of both positive and negative events included romantic relationships, family, 
relatives, success/failure at school, success/failure at work, weddings and childbirth.   
Berntsen and Rubin (2004) suggest that the transitional experiences captured by life 
script are essentially extended general level events (Barsalou, 1988) nesting many 
other specific scripted events.  If such events are deemed important and regret-
worthy then the content and timing of young people‟s anticipated general regrets 
should resemble the experienced general regrets found for older adults in Studies 1 
and 2, in that they will concern similar life domains and be disproportionately 
represented in the period of early adulthood, producing a preminiscence bump.  
Based on the view that people share knowledge of life scripts (Clarke, 1995), and on 
research showing that people use their own experiences to make inferences about the 
likely behaviour of others (Karniol, 2003; Ross, Greene & House, 1977), similar 
patterns are expected to be attributed to the anticipated regrets of others.  Also, based 
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on the findings of the studies comparing past and future thought, it is expected that 
anticipated regrets will be disproportionately general in nature.   
  These predictions are examined in a series of 4 studies involving 
predominantly people currently living through the reminiscence bump period of their 
lives, which is defined as the period between the ages of 10 and 30 years.  In Study 3 
young people describe their experienced regrets, designate them as specific or 
general, and rate them on measures of past and present intensity, and likely 
persistence over time.    
Participants then describe up to five things they anticipate regretting in the 
future and rate the likelihood that these regrets will persist into old age. The content 
of both the experienced and imagined regrets is expected to reflect the same life 
domains that were found in the experienced regrets of older adults in Studies 1 and 2 
and in the regret literature (Roese & Summerville, 2005).  Consistent with Studies 1 
and 2, a significant overlap is also expected between the two dimensions of regret 
type and agency, such that general regrets will tend to concern inactions, while 
specific regrets will be more frequently attributed to action.  The temporal 
distribution of general anticipated regrets is expected to show a „preminiscence 
bump‟ in early adulthood.  Since the life script does not determine the distribution of 
specific regrets, no bump is expected for these regrets.  
In Study 4a a second group of young people describes up to five things they 
could imagine regretting when reviewing their lives from the eve of their 70
th
 
birthday. These regrets are coded for content and categorised along the specific-
general and action-inaction dimensions.  Regret content is expected to match that 
previously reported, and again it is expected that greater numbers of these 
anticipated regrets will concern general script-like events and that they will tend to 
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describe regrets of inaction.  A „preminiscence bump‟ for general regrets is expected 
in decades two and three.  Predictions regarding the distribution of specific regrets 
are the same as those described already for Study 3.   
A more direct test of the script account is carried out in two further studies.  
Study 4b asks people in their bump years to imagine what an average person of their 
age might regret when looking back from the eve of their 70
th
 birthday.  Study 4c 
asks a group to perform a similar task, but the descriptions they produce are then 
given to a separate group of judges who estimate when in the lifespan these events 
are most likely to occur.  Predictions for these studies are similar to those made for 
the preceding two studies in terms of content, temporal distribution, overlap between 
the distinctions and specificity. 
Because the studies are very similar in design and because broadly similar 
results are predicted across the studies, the discussion of the four studies is reserved 
for the end of the chapter in order to avoid unnecessary repetition.  
   
3.2 Study 3: the experienced and anticipated regrets of young adults 
  Although the studies to be reported are principally concerned with 
establishing a preminiscence bump for imagined regrets, this first study in the 
sequence also asks a group of young adults to describe their remembered regrets in 
order to examine the content and structural properties of the experienced regrets of 
young people currently living through the reminiscence bump period.  The purpose 
of this is twofold.  First, because the intention was to ask young adults in later 
studies to describe their imagined regrets, it was deemed important to first establish 
what participants of that age already regret, so that comparisons can be made 
between the actual and imagined regrets of bump-age adults.  Second, it allows for a 
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comparison between the regrets of those currently living in the bump, and the regrets 
reported by people in their 40s and 60s for that same period.  If certain categories of 
experience are found to recur then this may indicate an underlying script.   
 
3.2.1 Method   
Participants   
An opportunity sample was recruited from the Durham area comprising 
mostly students, along with some members of the general public.  Recruitment was 
carried out by direct request, (verbally or by e-mail), or through contacts who 
distributed questionnaires to friends, housemates and colleagues etc.   Approximately 
250 questionnaires were distributed and there were 58 usable responses. Of the 58 
respondents, 41 were female and 17 were male.  Ages ranged from 18 to 25 years (M 
= 21.8, SD = 2.2).  Respondents supplied information about their highest level of 
academic achievement and the academic profile of the sample was as follows: 2 
participants had completed secondary education, 21 had completed advanced 
secondary education, 23 had degrees or a vocational equivalent, while 12 had 
postgraduate degrees or a vocational equivalent.  Respondents received 
questionnaires by post, through contacts or in person from the researcher.  Responses 
were by post. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure  
 The study employed a within subjects design in which all participants were 
asked to describe and answer questions about their own experienced and anticipated 
regrets as part of a postal survey.  Respondents received a questionnaire (see 
Appendix A) contained in a stamped, self-addressed envelope. Each questionnaire 
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contained two sections, which will be described separately.  The first section was for 
experienced regrets, and the second was for anticipated regrets.  The cover sheet was 
for the questionnaire as a whole and it was identical to the one used in Studies1 and 
2 with the exception of a sentence indicating that the researcher was interested in 
“what people regret in their lives, when these regrets occur, how strongly they feel 
about them, and how they expect to feel about them in the future.”  
Consent was indicated by ticking a box.  On a separate sheet were numbered 
spaces for experienced regret descriptions, and at the top of the page respondents 
received instructions to “look back on your life so far and the things you have 
regretted, or regret still.  Please use the spaces provided below to describe in one 
sentence each of the regretted experiences. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t 
worry if you have fewer than 5 regrets. It is important however that each description 
corresponds to only one of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over into the next 
space.” 
The rest of the section for experienced regrets comprised question sheets.  A 
separate sheet was provided for each regret, and the same questions were repeated on 
each sheet. The structure of the questionnaire was such that the sheet for writing 
down regret descriptions was presented first, and it was assumed that participants 
would first describe all of their regrets before answering the relevant questions, 
though no explicit instructions were given to this effect.   
On each question sheet respondents first had to designate the corresponding 
regret as being either specific or general, after which they answered the questions 
relevant to that type of regret.   A specific regret was defined as one directly caused 
by a specific experience. There were two categories of specific regret to choose 
between, one for events where the regret followed immediately and the other for 
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where regret was triggered by subsequent events.  For a regret of the first type 
participants simply dated the regrettable experience. For a regret of the second type, 
they dated the experience, and then provided the date at which they began to regret 
the experience. A third question concerned general regrets, which were defined as 
concerning any non-specific experiences.  Since the temporal location of the source 
experience for general regrets was not a critical factor in this study (as it had been in 
Studies 1 and 2), respondents simply indicated when they had become conscious of 
feeling regret. For all three types of regret participants provided dates by estimating 
their age at the time.   
After they had designated and dated each of their regrets respondents then 
provided estimates of persistence and intensity over time for each regret described.  
For the persistence item they indicated how likely they thought it was that their 
regret would persist; „ten years into the future‟, and „till the end of your life‟.  Each 
response was indicated on an 11 point scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) and 10 
(absolutely certain).  
In a separate box participants were asked to think about the feelings caused 
by the regretted experience and to rate how intense the regret…. i) was at the time 
[specific regrets only], ii) is now, iii) will be in ten years time, and iv) will be when 
you reach the end of your life.  Participants indicated their responses by circling the 
appropriate number on a 10 point scale anchored at 1 (very mild) and 10 (very 
intense), or by circling „N/A‟ where the question was not applicable because the 
regret had been rated in the previous question as „not at all likely‟ to persist. 
In the second section of the same questionnaire respondents were asked about regrets 
they anticipated for events in the future.  A separate sheet contained the following 
instructions:  
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We would like you to think about the life ahead of you and imagine the 
choices, goals, expectations and experiences you anticipate for the 
future. We would like you to think about how you might feel if the things 
you anticipate in your life don‟t turn out as planned.  Which of these 
things are you likely to regret and when?  Please try to imagine yourself 
in your 60‟s looking back on your life and use the spaces provided to 
describe the things you are likely to regret. Please describe in one 
sentence each of the experiences you anticipate regretting if things don‟t 
go to plan. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you can‟t 
think of 5 experiences. It is important however that each description 
corresponds to only one of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over 
into the next space 
On a separate sheet there were five numbered question boxes, each one 
corresponding to a numbered space on the previous page where the anticipated 
regrets were described.  For each regret the same two questions were asked; the first 
required respondents to indicate when in the future the experience they anticipated 
regretting was likely to occur by stating how old they would be at that time.   Next 
they were asked how likely they thought it was that the regret they anticipated would 
persist into old age, which was defined as their 60s. They indicated their response by 
circling the appropriate number on an 11 point scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) 
and 10 (absolutely certain). 
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3.2.2 Results: experienced regrets 
In total, 199 regrets were produced, 127 of which were designated as specific 
and 72 of which were designated as general.  Examination of the responses however 
revealed miscategorisation similar to that observed in Study 1 and in Davison 
(2005), such that many specific regrets had been wrongly designated, with the most 
frequent error being one of overgeneralisation.  Typical overgeneral responses are; 
“Not working hard enough at school for A levels”, “Getting too drunk on many 
occasions”, “Not going out more at university ”, and “Investing too much time into a 
relationship”; all of these were initially designated as specific regrets.  In line with 
the procedure adopted in Study 1 and Davison (2005), two independent judges
1
 
recategorised all regrets and differences were settled by a third independent judge.  
Agreement was acceptable (Kappa = .77) and recategorisation produced totals of 60 
specific and 139 general regrets.   Recategorisation resulted in there being very few 
observations in the category of specific regrets where the feeling of regret was 
triggered by subsequent events (i.e., telling someone a secret which they later 
disclose to someone else, leading to regret for sharing the confidence) so the two 
categories of specific regret were collapsed into one.  Following recategorisation 
there were more general than specific regrets and this difference was tested for 
statistical significance using a single-sample t-test, which showed that the proportion 
of general regrets (M = .69, SD = .31) was significantly greater than would be 
expected by chance; t(57) = 4.34, p < .001, r = .50. 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise specified, the different types of coding (regret type; agency; regret content) were 
carried out by different pairs of judges.  Different moderators were also used for each type of coding. 
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A preliminary ANOVA revealed that the number of experienced regrets 
produced by participants was not significantly affected by sex  F (1, 50) = .01, MSE 
= 1.21, p > .05 or level of education  F (3, 50) = 1.90, MSE = 1.52, p > .05. 
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type by agency 
Using the coding method described earlier, two hypothesis-blind judges 
designated each regret as being due to action, “Drinking so much at a young age” 
(31%); inaction, “Not trying harder for exams” (50%); both action and inaction, 
“Not moving away to university and living at home instead” (4%); and neither action 
nor inaction, “Being sad for periods of my life” (15%). Inter-rater agreement was 
acceptable (kappa = .73) and differences were settled by a third independent 
moderator.   
 The proportions of specific and general action and inaction regrets were 
entered into a 2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) 
ANOVA.  As would be expected from the single-sample t-test reported above, the 
analysis produced a main effect of regret type, F (1, 57) = 14.17, MSE = .08, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .19. The analysis also produced a main effect of agency, F (1, 57) = 7.51, 
MSE = .07, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .17, such that higher proportions of participants‟ regrets 
were due to inaction (M = .50, SD = .31) than to action (M = .31, SD = .28). There 
was also a significant interaction between agency and regret type, F (1, 57) = 21.87, 
MSE = .06, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .28.  Planned comparisons of the means in the interaction 
revealed that participants‟ general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to 
inaction (M = .39, SD = .29) than to action (M = .15, SD = .22); t(57) = 4.60, p < 
.001, r = . 52.  Although on average, participants described more specific regrets that 
were due to action (M = .16, SD = .23) than they did specific regrets due to inaction 
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(M =. 11, SD =.18), this difference did not reach significance; t(57) = 1.38, p = .17, r 
= . 18.  
 
Estimates of persistence and intensity over time 
The estimates of persistence and intensity used in this study are similar to 
those used in Study 2 with the exception that the present ratings include an extra 
temporal index, so participants were asked to estimate the likelihood that their 
regrets would persist ten years into the future, as well as to the end of their lives.  As 
with Study 2, ratings were given on an 11 point scale anchored at 0 (not at all likely) 
and 10 (absolutely certain).  The intensity ratings were given on a scale anchored at 1 
(very mild) to 10 (very intense).  In total 31 participants reported having at least one 
regret of each type and in total 101 regrets were included in the analysis. The 
descriptive statistics for the analysis are presented in Table 3.1. 
Persistence. As can be seen from Table 3.1, the mean persistence ratings 
for P2 (the end of life) are lower than the ratings for P1 (10 yrs into the future) for 
both types of regret, indicating that regrets were expected to become less persistent 
over time.  These differences were tested statistically by means of a 2 (regret type; 
specific/general) by 2 (time; 10 yrs/end of life) ANOVA.  There was no significant 
main effect of regret type, F (1, 30) = .64, p > .05, but there was a significant main 
effect of time, F (1, 30) = 12.33, MSE = 3.03, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .31, such that persistence 
ratings overall decreased significantly between P1(M = 4.40, SD = 2.10) and P2 (M 
= 3.26, SD = 1.97); t (31) = 3.91, p <.001, r = .57.  The two way interaction between 
regret type and time was non significant, F (1, 30) = .36, p > .05 ,and so the pattern 
of decreased persistence applied equally to both specific and general regrets.  
 
 115 
Table 3.1 Experienced regrets: ratings of persistence and intensity across 
time for specific and general regrets, with means, standard deviations and 
number of observations (n). 
 Specific 
n = 45 
General 
n = 56 
 M SD M SD 
Persistence     
P1 (10 yrs into future) 4.08 (3.33) 4.72 (2.82) 
P2 (To the end of life) 3.06 (3.08) 3.46 (2.54) 
Intensity      
T1 (At the time)  7.60 (2.60) 6.19 (2.66) 
T2 (Now) 5.45 (2.20) 4.64 (2.17) 
T3 (10 yrs into future) 4.51 (2.28) 4.50 (1.87) 
T4 (At the end of life) 3.45 (2.35) 4.02 (2.44) 
 
Intensity. The mean intensity ratings in Table 3.1 show a decrease over 
time for both types of regret and this pattern was analysed by means of a 2 (regret 
type: specific/general) by 4 (time: then, now, in 10 yrs, to the end of life) repeated 
measures ANOVA.  As with the previous analysis there was no significant main 
effect of regret type F (1, 14) = 3.12, p > .05, but there was a significant effect of 
time, F (1.7, 24.3) = 11.30, MSE = 5.32, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .45.  There was no significant 
two way interaction between regret type and time F (1.7, 24.3) = 1.81, p >.05.   
Tukey HSD post hoc analysis on the main effect of time showed that the 
intensity of regret had decreased significantly between T1 (M = 6.90, SD = 2.12) and 
T2 (M = 5.12, SD = 1.46); t(25) = 4.51, p <.01, r =.67, and the ratings at T3 (M = 
4.66, SD = 1.69) and T4 (M = 3.77, SD = 1.84) were also significantly lower than at 
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T1 (both ps <.01,  rs .64 and .76 respectively).  There was no significant decrease 
expected between T2 and T3 ( t = 2.22, p >.05, r = .47) but intensity was expected to 
decrease significantly between the present (T2) and the end of life (T4); t = 5.03, p 
<.01, r = .80.  Regret intensity was also expected to decrease significantly between 
T3 and T4; t = 3.61, p <.01, r = .67. 
 To sum up these results then; the persistence ratings for both types of regret 
are below the midpoint, so these participants did not feel strongly that their regrets 
would persist into the future, and they expected their regrets to become significantly 
less persistent towards the end of life.  In terms of intensity, for both types of regret 
the intensity of feeling had decreased significantly since the time of the regrettable 
experience. Participants did not expect the intensity to decrease significantly in the 
near future, but only towards the end of life.  
 
Analysis of content 
A primary interest of this study was to see what experiences people living in 
the bump period actually regret and whether they resemble the regrets remembered 
from the same period by older adults.  To this end an analysis of content was carried 
out using the coding system employed in Studies 1 and 2.  Two independent judges 
reached acceptable agreement (kappa = .73). Differences were settled through 
moderation by the researcher.  Using individual regrets as the units of analysis the 
main domains were ranked in descending order as follows:  Education, “Choosing 
the wrong modules for the final year” (14%); Character, “Not being able to control 
my temper” (14%); Family, “ Hurting my parents with my actions” (13%); Intimate 
relationships, “Not trying harder to make a relationship work” (12%); Friendships, 
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“Losing touch with friends from college” (10%); Self-development, “That I haven‟t 
fulfilled my ambitions” (5%).  
As can be seen, the domains do not differ greatly in terms of their relative 
frequency, but what is clear is that they are consistent both with the domains 
reported by the older participants in Studies 1 and 2, and also with the domains 
reported in the regret literature (Roese & Summerville, 2005).  One notable 
difference is the absence from the list of the domain of work/career, which is to be 
expected given the age of these participants, the majority of whom were still in 
education at the time the questionnaire was completed.   Roese and Summerville 
report the same age-specific difference between the ranking they found in their meta-
analysis and the ranking produced by their own students.  The themes represented in 
the rankings also reflect findings from research into self-defining memories which 
suggest that relationships, achievement and leisure are frequent preoccupations in 
this age group (Blagov & Singer, 2004; Thorne, McLean & Lawrence, 2004). 
 
Summary of the findings for experienced regrets 
 Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, there is evidence of an overlap between the 
two distinctions of specificity and agency, as general regrets were more than twice as 
likely to concern inactions as actions.  However, the specific-action overlap was less 
clear.   
The study also considered whether the experiences regretted by bump-age 
adults are similar to the experiences regretted from the bump period by older adults, 
and on the whole it seems that they are. The most frequently reported regrets were in 
the domains of character, education, family, friendships, intimate relationships, and 
self-development and these domains are broadly consistent with the experiences 
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reported by participants in their Studies 1 and 2. One exception was in the domain of 
work/career, which did not feature among the regrets of young people for reasons 
that are predictable given their age, as was also found by Roese and Summerville 
(2005, Study 1) in their analysis of college students‟ regrets.   
The results of the first part of Study 3 show that people in the bump period of 
their lives regret similar things to those regretted by older adults for the same period.  
The question asked in the next part of the study is what do they anticipate regretting 
from the life ahead of them?  
 
3.2.3 Results: anticipated regrets 
 For this and the three following studies the proportions of specific and 
general anticipated regrets were calculated for each participant in each decade and 
the resulting distributions are presented graphically. Tables containing the 
proportions are presented in Appendix B.  
Overall the sample in Study 3 produced 163 anticipated regrets, three of 
which had been assigned to the 8
th
 decade and so were excluded in order to keep the 
number of decades consistent with Studies 1 and 2.  Seven participants did not 
provide anticipated regrets, and one participant provided but did not date his two 
anticipated regrets; these eight participants were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. The 158 remaining regrets were coded along the specific-general 
dimension by two independent judges, who reached acceptable agreement (kappa = 
.64).  Differences were resolved through discussion. There were 136 general and 22 
specific regrets. An analysis similar to that carried out on the experienced regrets 
showed that the number of anticipated regrets produced by each participant was not 
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affected either by sex, F (1, 42) = .004, MSE = 1.35, p > .05, or level of education, F 
(3, 42) = 1.25, MSE = 1.35, p > .05. 
 
Temporal distribution 
Respondents dated their anticipated regrets by giving their expected age at 
the time, but for consistency with Studies 1 and 2 these dates were converted to 
decades.  Respondents were asked to imagine which future events they anticipated 
regretting, the future being defined as extending only into their sixties.  It was 
necessary to take into account the fact that many respondents had already lived 
through some of the third decade, while others had not yet entered it, meaning that 
some participants had less future available to them in which to encounter regrettable 
experiences. To correct for this, an adjustment was calculated to give the number of 
extra regrets that would have been produced had all participants completed the 
questionnaire on the eve before entering the third decade (the eve of their 20
th
 
birthday).  The adjustment, adapted from Berntsen and Rubin (2003), was similar to 
that applied to the recency component of older adults‟ regrets in Studies 1 and 2 (see 
Appendix C) and it produced 17 extra regrets that could have been anticipated had 
the whole of decade 3 been available to all participants.  These regrets were then 
distributed between categories according to the relative proportions of specific and 
general regrets in this decade.  The adjustment resulted in totals of 29 specific and 
146general regrets. A single sample t-test revealed that participants produced 
significantly greater numbers of general anticipated regrets (M = .83, SD =.22) than 
would be expected by chance; t (49) = 10.78, p <.001, r = .84. 
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Figure 3.1 Study 3: proportion of participants’ own anticipated regrets as a 
function of time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.   
 
The distributions of specific and general anticipated regrets are presented in 
Figure 3.1, and the first thing to note about the distributions is that there are no 
regrets anticipated for the 2
nd
 decade, even though 10 participants were still living in 
that decade and could plausibly expect to have regrettable experiences before it 
ended.  This suggests that the instruction to think about the future prompted these 
respondents to look beyond their current or approaching year.  Also of interest is the 
fact that specific anticipated regrets are clustered almost entirely in the 3
rd
 decade, 
while the majority of general anticipated regrets are located in decades 3, 4 and 5, 
with the peak in the 4
th
 decade.  The between-decade differences were analysed for 
both distributions separately; for general anticipated regrets the proportions of 
regrets in each decade (excluding decade 2) were entered into a repeated measures 
ANOVA.  Due to the very low count of specific anticipated regrets in this and 
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subsequent studies, a non-parametric equivalent (Friedman‟s) was used.  Post hoc 
comparisons within specific regrets are carried out using a Wilcoxon test.  In all 
analyses of specific regret distributions the bump decades individually are compared 
with the combined proportions of all other decades beyond the bump.  
The analysis of general anticipated regrets revealed a significant main effect 
of decade, F (4, 196) = 6.34, MSE = .06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .11. Tukey HSD post hoc 
tests showed this effect to be attributed mainly to decade 4 (M = .27, SD =. 20) 
which contained significantly higher proportions of anticipated general regrets than 
decades 6 (M = .09, SD =. 15); t(49) = 4.32, p <.01, r = .52, and 7 (M = .05 , SD =. 
21); t(49) = 3.63, p <.01, r = .46). Decade 5(M = .22, SD =. 26) also contained 
significantly higher proportions than decade 6; t(49) = 3.11, p <.05, r = .41.   
 As would be expected from the distribution in Figure 3.1, a Friedman‟s 
analysis of the specific anticipated regret distribution revealed a significant effect of 
decade, χ2(4) = 167.94, p < .001, that was due entirely to decade 3 (M = .12, SD 
=.17) which contained significantly higher proportions than the combined 
proportions of all subsequent decades (M =.04, SD = .12); Z = 4.50, p <.001, r = .83.  
A comparison of the proportions of general and specific anticipated regrets in 
decade 3 showed that although there were slightly higher proportions of general than 
specific regrets, the difference did not reach significance, t(49) = 1.74, p = .09, r 
=.24. 
 This analysis suggests that the general regrets anticipated in the future by this 
sample lie predominantly in the period spanning the 3
rd
, 4
th
 and 5
th
 decades of life, 
although there are still some regrets anticipated for the 6
th
 and 7
th
 decades.  By 
contrast, 76% of the specific regrets are expected to concern experiences in the very 
near future.   
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Likely persistence of anticipated regrets 
Participants rated the likelihood that the regrets they anticipated would persist 
into their sixties. Some participants dated the experiences they anticipated regretting 
as likely to occur in their sixties, so only the ratings from regrets in the preceding 
decades were used, and a comparison was made between the mean ratings of both 
types of regret for those participants who described at least one of each type, which 
was only 15 participants.  The mean persistence ratings for general regrets (8.05, SD 
= 2.34) were significantly higher than the same ratings for specific regrets (6.25, SD 
= 3.02); t(13) = 2.44, p <.05, r = .56, so future general regrets were expected to be 
more enduring than were future specific regrets.  
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
Two hypothesis-blind judges coded the anticipated regrets that were 
attributed to action, “Making bad career choices” (19%); inaction “Not spending 
enough time with family” (66%); both action and inaction “Bringing children into the 
world then failing to teach them how to deal with it” (1%); and neither action nor 
inaction “Never having enough money (14%).   The judges reached acceptable 
agreement (Kappa = .73) and disagreements were resolved through discussion. 
After adjusting for the 17 extra regrets, the proportions were calculated for 
each participant‟s regrets that were specific actions (“A decision I have to make in 
the near future”), specific inactions (“Not passing an aptitude test for the RAF”), 
general actions (“Probably regret the way I manage money”) and general inactions 
(“Not completing my PhD by the age of 28”), and these were entered into a 2 (regret 
type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) ANOVA.  
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 As might be expected, the analysis produced a significant main effect of 
regret type, F (1, 49) = 141. 30, MSE = .04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .74, with significantly 
higher proportions of general than specific regrets. There was a significant main 
effect of agency F (1, 49) = 35. 03, MSE = .08, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .42, such that on 
average participants described significantly more regrets due to inaction (M = .66, 
SD =.34) than to action (M = .19, SD =.28). There was also a significant two way 
interaction between regret type and agency, F (1, 49) = 25.99, MSE = .08, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .35.  Planned contrasts of the means involved in the significant interaction 
revealed that general regrets were significantly more likely to describe inactions (M 
= .57, SD =.30) than actions (M = .16, SD =.22)  t(49) = 5.95, p <.001, r = .65.  
Although specific regrets were more likely to be due to inaction (M = .09, SD =.14) 
than action (M = .03, SD =.09), the difference failed to reach significance, t (49) = 
1.34, p > .1, r = .23.  
 
Analysis of content 
Two hypothesis-blind judges coded the anticipated regrets for content and 
reached acceptable agreement (kappa = .71).  Using regrets as the units of analysis 
the main domains were ranked by frequency in the following descending order: 
Work, “Choosing the wrong career” (18%); Family, “ Not having a family” (17%); 
Intimate relationships, “Staying in a relationship that is not right” (10%); Education, 
“Not being successful in chosen degree” (8%); Travel “Not travelling more” (8%); 
Friendships, “Losing contact with good friends” (7%); Material “Missing out on the 
right house” (6%) Self-development, “Not following my dreams” (5%).    
The domains in which this group anticipated having most of their regrettable 
experiences are similar to the domains in which they reported having already 
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experienced regret; education, family, and intimate relationships are important in 
both cases, and to a lesser extent friendships and self-development.  A predictable 
difference given the age of the sample lies in the domain of work, which comes top 
of the list of anticipated regrets but does not make the top six domains of 
experienced regrets. Travel is also a future-oriented concern, as might also be 
expected in such a young sample. 
 
3.2.4 Summary of Study 3 
As was found with the experienced regrets in this study, the anticipated regret 
descriptions were predominantly general in nature, accounting for about 80% of the 
total number of anticipated regrets.  As predicted by the studies of prospective 
thinking (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Spreng & Levine, 2008) and temporal 
construal (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Sagristano & Trope, 2003), almost 
all of the specific regrets concern events in the near future.  General anticipated 
regrets on the other hand extend further into the future and peak in the fourth decade.  
General regrets were also expected to persist further into the future than were 
specific regrets.  In line with the results already reported in Studies 1 and 2, there 
was a significant overlap between the specific-general and action-inaction 
dimensions, which is strong for general inactions, but less stable for specific actions. 
In terms of content, similar domains made up the experienced and anticipated regrets 
of this sample. 
  
3.3 Study 4a: young adults predict their own life regrets 
 Because participants in Study 3 described their experienced regrets before 
describing their anticipated regrets, the temporal distribution shown in Figure 3.1 
 125 
represents a shortened lifespan, as it excludes past and current regrets.  This is 
evident in the absence of regrets anticipated for experiences occurring in the 2
nd
 
decade, the effective removal of which may explain why the bump is displaced to the 
4
th
 and 5
th
 decades.  The present study addresses this matter by allowing participants 
in the same age group to include experiences from any part of their lifespan, whether 
they belong to the past, present, or future. 
 
3.3.1 Method  
Participants 
A total of 65 undergraduates from Durham University‟s Queen‟s Campus, 
Stockton participated in this study.  The sample consisted of 12 males and 53 
females and their ages ranged from 18 to 26 years, with the mean age of 20 years 
(SD = 1.7yrs).  
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
As with the previous study, a within-participants design was employed in 
which participants supplied anticipated regrets of both a specific and general nature. 
Participants were introduced to the aim of the study both verbally, while the 
materials were being distributed, and by means of a cover sheet on the front of the 
questionnaire, which read as follows: 
 
 This study is concerned with establishing cultural norms related to 
certain types of experience.  In particular it is concerned with identifying 
the kinds of experiences people expect to regret in life.  Regret is the 
emotion people feel when things don‟t turn out as they wished them to 
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and it may concern things they did or didn‟t do, bad decisions, 
unfulfilled ambitions, or something else.  You will be asked to imagine 
what things you are likely to regret when looking back at your life from 
the eve of your 70
th
 birthday. Then you will be asked to estimate when in 
your life those regrettable experiences are likely to have occurred.  The 
study is anonymous and the only personal details you are asked to supply 
are age, sex, and whether English is your native language.  
 
Because the samples in this and the following two studies were drawn from a 
culturally diverse population, the question about English was included simply as a 
way of detecting any variation that might occur due to cultural factors. If there 
turned out to be many participants whose first language was not English then this 
would have been factored into the analysis.  Since the vast majority of participants 
(94%, 88%, and 99% across the three studies) did put English as their first language, 
no such analysis was necessary and so this matter is not reported further.  On a 
separate sheet participants were provided with five numbered spaces in which to 
describe their anticipated regrets.  The task was explained to them as follows: 
 
I would like you to think about the life you will have lived by the time you 
reach the eve of your 70
th
 birthday.  Think of all your goals and 
expectations, all the choices you will have made, and all the experiences 
you wanted out of life.  Imagine yourself looking back across your whole 
life and how you might feel if things haven‟t worked out as planned.  
What things are you likely to regret?  Please use the spaces provided to 
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describe the things you are likely to regret by the time you reach the age 
of 70 
 
The remainder of the questionnaire consisted of question sheets containing 
numbered boxes, each corresponding to a regret description on the previous page.  
Participants were asked to  
 
Please consider each of the anticipated experiences you have described.  
Imagine looking back from the eve of your 70
th
 birthday.  Try to estimate 
when in your life each of the experiences you think you might regret is 
likely to have occurred (not the feeling of regret, which may have 
occurred later). Circle the appropriate decade. 
 
After the questionnaires had been completed and collected, 
participants were given a verbal debrief and were given the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 The study produced a total of 263 anticipated regrets. Participants produced 
on average 4 regrets each and a preliminary analysis showed that this average was 
not affected by sex, t(63) = 1.20, p > .05.  For 10 of these regrets participants had 
indicated more than one decade; sometimes circling two decades, sometimes a range.  
Where an odd number of decades was circled the middle decade was chosen, and 
where an even number was circled the most distant decade was chosen to give a 
conservative estimate.  As with the previous study, the regrets were coded as either 
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specific or general by two independent judges, who reached acceptable agreement 
(kappa = .74).  Differences were resolved by a third coder. 
As with previous studies, the proportions of each participant‟s regrets that 
were specific and general were calculated. A single sample t test showed that this 
sample produced significantly higher proportions of general regrets (M = .87, SD = 
.23) than would be expected by chance; t(64) = 12.91, p <.001, r = .85.  
 
Temporal distribution 
The distributions of specific and general anticipated regrets are presented 
graphically in Figure 3.2 and as can be seen the vast majority of these regret 
descriptions were general in nature, and approximately half (49%) of these general 
regrets were expected to concern events from the bump period.  Whereas the 
distribution of general regrets in Study 3 peaked in decade 4, the peak in the present 
study is in the 3
rd
 decade, although the bump overall still shows a shift towards the 
4
th
 decade.  More than three quarters (78%) of specific anticipated regrets were 
expected to concern experiences occurring in the bump years, a pattern that is similar 
to that found in Study 3.  There is only a single specific regret anticipated for the 
decades beyond the 30s, whereas almost a quarter of general anticipated regrets are 
spread over the latter three decades.  
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Figure 3.2 Study 4a: proportion of participants’ own anticipated regrets as a 
function of time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.   
 
 As with Study 3 an analysis of each distribution was carried out separately; 
for general regrets the proportions were entered into a repeated measures ANOVA, 
which revealed a main effect of decade interval, F (3.5, 223.9) = 17.00, MSE = .05, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .21.  Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed this effect to be driven by 
decade 3 (M = .31, SD = .25), which contained significantly higher proportions of 
general regrets than decades 2 (M = .11, SD = .22; t = 4.58 , p <.01, r = .49 ), 4 (M = 
.20, SD = .18; t = 3.07, p < .05, r = .36), 5 (M = .14, SD = .18; t = 3.90, p <.01, r = 
.44), 6 (M = .05, SD = .11; t = 6.69, p <.001, r = .64) and decade 7 (M = .05. SD = 
.13; t = 6.67, p <.01, r = .65).  Decade 4 contained significantly higher proportions of 
general regrets than decade 6 (t = 5.24, p <.01, r = .55) and decade 7 (t = 5.29, p 
<.01, r = .55).  
An analysis of the specific regret distribution using Friedman‟s test showed a 
significant effect of decade; χ2 (5) = 48.83, p <.001. Two Bonferroni-corrected post 
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hoc comparisons were carried out in which the regret proportions in decades 2 (M = 
.04, SD = .12) and 3 (M = .06, SD = .12) were each compared with the combined 
proportions of non-bump decades 4 -7 (M = .02, SD = .06).  There was no significant 
difference between the specific regret proportions in decade 2 and the proportions in 
decades 4-7; Z = 1.14, p >.05, r = .19, but the proportion of specific regrets in decade 
3 was significantly greater than the combined proportions of decades 4-7; Z = 2.56, p 
<.02, r = .52.  Decades 2 and 3 combined (M = .10, SD = .18) contained significantly 
higher proportions of anticipated regrets than the combined non-bump decades; Z = 
3.70, p <.01, r = .62. 
Planned comparisons of the general and specific regret proportions within the 
bump decades showed significantly higher proportions of general than specific 
regrets in decade 2, t(64) = 2.21, p <.05, r = .27, and also in decade 3, t(64) = 7.12, p 
<.001, r = .66.  
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
 Two judges coded the anticipated regrets according to whether they were due 
to action, “Working in jobs that I haven‟t enjoyed” (15%); inaction, “That I never 
wrote a novel” (75%); both action and inaction, “Stopping education and not going 
on to a doctorate” (9%); and neither an action nor an inaction, “Losing a baby” 
(1%).  Acceptable agreement was reached and differences were resolved through 
discussion (Kappa = .72).  As with the previous studies the proportions were 
calculated for all specific actions/inactions and general actions/inactions, and these 
were entered into a 2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) 
ANOVA.     
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As would be expected from the single sample t-test reported above, the 
analysis produced a significant main effect of regret type, F (1, 64) = 172.14, MSE = 
.04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .73.  There was a significant main effect of agency, F (1, 64) = 
130.22, MSE = .04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .67, such that there were significantly higher 
proportions of regrets attributed to inaction (M = .75, SD = .25) than to action (M = 
.15, SD = .22); t(64) = 11.44, p <.001, r = .82.  The two way interaction between 
regret type and agency was also significant, F (1, 64) = 98.61, MSE = .05, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .61.  Planned comparisons of the means in this interaction revealed that general 
regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction (M = .68, SD = .28)  than 
to action (M = .11, SD = .19); t(64) = 11.61, p < .001, r = .82.  Within specific 
regrets, higher proportions were attributed to inaction (M = .07, SD = .15) than to 
action (M = .04, SD = .09), but this difference was only marginally significant, t(64) 
= 1.78, p = .08, r = .22.  
 
Analysis of regret content 
 Two coders rated the regrets for content and reached acceptable agreement 
(Kappa = .83).  The life domains in which most regrets were anticipated were ranked 
in descending order as follows; Family “Not spending enough time with my family” 
(20%); Travel ,“Not having taken the opportunity to travel while still young” (11%); 
Work/Career; “Getting fired from a good job” (11%); Intimate relationships, “Not 
forming a loving relationship” (10%); Self-development“, Not living life to the full” 
(8%); Character, “Not being true to myself” (7%); Education, “Failing my degree” 
(6%); and Health, “Taking up smoking” (6%).   
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3.3.3 Summary of Study 4a 
 As with the previous studies, the vast majority of anticipated regrets were 
general and again were overwhelmingly regrets of inaction.  The distribution of 
general regrets does suggest that changing the instructions to encompass the entire 
lifespan made a difference, as there is a clear peak in the 3
rd
 decade for general 
regrets, although the bump is still skewed towards decade four, which contains more 
general regrets than decade two. 
Studies 3 and 4a have dealt with regrets people anticipate experiencing in the 
course of their own lives, and in terms of content, relative proportions of regret 
types, temporal distribution and agency, there is considerable concordance between 
the two studies.  Although this suggests some sort of collective expectation about 
what might be regretted in life, it does not provide any direct evidence that this 
expectation is projected onto the lives of others, which is a feature of the life script 
(Clarke, 1995; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003). The majority of participants in the two 
previous studies were students, so it is likely that as well as sharing current issues, 
they also share expectations about their future trajectories, which to some extent are 
shaped by similar constraints, as the decision to enter further education necessarily 
involves sacrificing other options.   In Study 4a for example, all of the anticipated 
regrets concerning travel are about not travelling, which is clearly something many 
will have had to forego in order to go to university.  Similarly, regrets to do with 
careers feature prominently, though they are more mixed in terms of action and 
inaction. So there is evidence that these participants are using their current 
experience to inform their forecasts.  The next two studies move away from the 
focus on the self and require instead that participants imagine what other people are 
most likely to regret in life. 
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3.4 Study 4b: young adults predict the life regrets of a peer 
 
3.4.1 Method  
Participants 
 The participants in this study were undergraduate students at Durham 
University‟s Queen‟s Campus.  They were recruited from human sciences and 
psychology classes at different times.  There were 81 participants in total, 54 females 
and 27 males, who ranged in age from 18 to 52 (M = 22 yrs, SD = 7.5 yrs).  Despite 
the age range, only 10 participants were not currently in the bump years of their 
lives.  
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
As with the previous two studies a within participants design was employed in 
which participants were free to supply both specific and general anticipated regrets. 
The cover sheet for this study was identical to the one used in Study 4a, with the 
exception of the following paragraph:   
 
You will be asked to imagine what experiences a person is likely to 
regret when looking back at their life from the age of 70. Then you will 
be asked to estimate when in that person‟s life those regrettable 
experiences are likely to have occurred.   
 
On a separate sheet participants received the following instructions: 
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I would like you to think about the life that an average person who is 
your age today will have lived by the time they reach the eve of their 70
th
 
birthday.  Think of all their goals and expectations, all the choices they 
will have made, and all the experiences they wanted out of life.  Imagine 
that person looking back across their whole life and how they might feel 
if things haven‟t worked out as planned.  What things are they likely to 
regret?   
 
 Participants then described up to 5 regrets in the numbered spaces provided.  
On a separate sheet they were asked to consider each of the experiences they had 
described and to try to estimate when in the person‟s life the regretted experience is 
likely to have occurred (not the feeling of regret itself, which may have occurred 
later).   For each regret there was a separate box containing instructions to complete 
the sentence; “the experience this person regrets would have happened …..in 
decade”, and then they circled the appropriate decade from a line anchored at 1 (0-9) 
to 7
 
(59-60).  
 Participants were given as long as necessary to complete the questionnaire 
and the whole session took no more than 10-15 minutes from the time the study was 
introduced to the collection of the questionnaire.   After the collection of all 
questionnaires, participants were given a short debrief and an opportunity to ask 
questions.  
 
3.4.2 Results 
 On average each participant described 4 experiences an average person their 
age might regret on the eve of their 70
th
 birthday, producing a total overall of 357 
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events.  A preliminary analysis showed that the average total produced was not 
affected by sex, t(79) = 1.10, p >.05.   Two judges coded these events as either 
specific or general, reaching acceptable agreement (kappa = .75). Differences were 
resolved by a third coder.  The coding resulted in category totals of 43 specific and 
314 general regrets.   
 
Temporal distribution 
The distributions of specific and general anticipated regrets are presented in 
Figure 3.3 and they show that the experiences described are overwhelmingly general 
(88%), as was the case for anticipated regrets in studies 3 and 4a.  A single sample t-
test showed that the mean proportion of general regrets (M = .88, SD = .17) was 
significantly greater than chance; t(80) = 19.90, p <.001, r = .91. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Study 4b: proportion of regrets predicted for a peer as a function 
of time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.    
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What is striking about the distributions in Figure 3.3 is how similar they are 
to the distributions in Figure 3.2.  In each case there is a pronounced bump for 
general regrets spanning decades 2 to 4 and peaking in the 3
rd
 decade.  Again the 
bump differs from that found in the experienced regrets of older adults (Studies 1 
and 2) in that it has shifted towards the 4
th
 decade, which contains more regrets than 
decade 2.  Of the small number of specific regrets, 70% are in decades 2 and 3.  The 
between-decade differences of both distributions were analysed as in Study 4a, using 
a one way repeated measures ANOVA for general regrets and Friedman‟s 
nonparametric test for specific regrets.  Again, the first decade was excluded in both 
analyses to avoid weakening the analysis. For general regrets there was a significant 
effect of decade, F (4.2, 339.8) = 27.95, MSE = .04, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .26.  Tukey HSD 
post hoc tests showed that decade 3 (M = .32, SD = .20) contained significantly 
higher proportions than decades 2 (M = .11, SD = .17; t = 6.63, p <.001, r = .59), 4 
(M = .22, SD = .17; t = 3.06, p <.05, r = .32), 5 (M = .09, SD = .13; t = 7.63, p 
<.001, r = .65), 6 (M = .07, SD = .12; t = 5.90, p <.001, r = .68) and decade 7 (M = 
.06, SD = .15; t = 5.70, p <.001, r = .68).  Decade 4 also contained significantly 
higher proportions of general regrets than decade 2 (t = 3.31, p <.05, r = .35) decade 
5 (t = 4.93, p < .001, r = .48),6 (t = 5.90, p < .001, r = .55) and 7 (t = 5.70, p < .001, r 
= .54). None of the other between decade differences reached significance. 
The analysis of specific regrets using Friedman‟s ANOVA showed a 
significant effect of decade; χ2 (5) = 28.89, p < .001. Wilcoxon pairwise comparisons 
using a Bonferroni correction showed this main effect to be driven by the difference 
between decade 3 (M = .05, SD = .13) and decades 6 and 7 (both Ms = .003, both 
SDs = .02, both Zs = 3.56, and both ps < .001).  However, as decades 6 and 7 contain 
only one regret each this analysis is not informative, so for consistency with the 
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previous two studies an analysis was carried out comparing the proportions of 
specific regrets in decades 2 (M =.03, SD = .09) and 3 (M = .05, SD = .13), with the 
combined proportions of specific regrets in decades 4 -7 (M = .03, SD = .09).  
Neither decade 2 (Z = .38, p > .05, r = .06) nor decade 3 (Z = 1.19, p > .05, r = .21) 
on their own contained significantly higher proportions than the combined non-bump 
decades, but although decades 2 and 3 combined (M = .08, SD = .16) did contain 
higher proportions than the combined non-bump decades, the difference was non-
significant after the Bonferroni correction Z = 2.07, p >.05, r = .31. 
Planned comparisons of the general and specific regret proportions within the 
bump decades showed significantly higher proportions of general than specific 
regrets in decade 2, t(80) = 3.88 p <.001, r = .40, and also in decade 3, t(80) = 9.29, 
p <.001, r = .72. There were also significantly greater proportions of general than 
specific regrets in decade 4; t(80) = 10.03, p <.001, r = .74. 
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type by agency 
 Two independent judges coded the anticipated regrets that were attributed to 
action, “Deciding on a particular career” (21%); inaction, “Not going to places they 
wanted to” (62%); both action and inaction, “Focussing on career instead of 
enjoying life” (12%); and neither action nor inaction, “Career path” (5%). 
Agreement was acceptable (Kappa = .73) and differences were resolved through 
discussion.  Proportions of specific/general actions/inactions were calculated as 
previously described and entered into a 2 (type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: 
action/inaction) ANOVA.    
As would be expected from the significant single sample t-test reported 
earlier, there was a main effect of regret type, F (1, 80) = 224.80, MSE = .03, p < 
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.001, ηp
2
 = .74, and a main effect of agency, F (1, 80) = 65.99, MSE = .05, ηp
2
 = .45, 
p < .001 such that inaction regrets (M= .62, SD = .28) significantly outnumbered 
action regrets (M= .21, SD = .24); t(80) = 8.12, p < .001, r = .67.  There was also a 
significant type by agency interaction, F (1, 80) = 96.32, MSE = .05, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.55.  Planned contrasts of the means involved in the interactions showed that general 
regrets were significantly more likely to be attributed to inaction (M= .59, SD = .29)  
than to action (M= .14, SD = .20); t(80) = 9.66, p < .001, r = .74.  Although specific 
regrets were more likely to be due to action (M= .07, SD = .13) than to inaction (M= 
.04, SD = .10), the difference was not significant; t(80) = 1.59, p >.05, r = .18.  As 
with the previous studies, there is a strong overlap between the two dimensions, 
though again the results for specific-action regrets are not clear.  
 
Analysis of Content 
Coding for content was carried out by two judges, who reached acceptable 
agreement (kappa = .77).  Differences were resolved through moderation by the 
researcher. The domains were ranked in descending order as follows; Family, 
“Regret the way they brought up their kids” (18%);  Relationships-general, “Certain 
relationships that went wrong” (11%); Intimate relationships, “Breakdown of 
marriage”(11%); Character , “Keeping themselves closed and contained” (11%);  
Education, “Not taking advantage of opportunities at school”(10%);  Travel, “Not 
going places they always wanted to go” (8%); Self development , “Not having 
fulfilled their life in the way they wanted” (7%), and Career/Work , “A wrong career 
choice” (6%). 
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3.4.3 Summary of Study 4b 
 The results of this study are very similar to those of Study 4a, in terms of the 
predominance of general regrets, the overlap between the specific-general and 
action-inaction distinctions, and in terms of the content and distribution of both types 
of regret.  The experiences people expected a contemporary to regret in life were 
very similar to the experiences participants in Study 4a anticipated for themselves, 
although the descriptions are more generic.   
The final study takes a slightly different approach from the previous three 
studies, which used entirely within-subjects designs in which participants both 
generated and dated the experiences they thought most likely to be a source of regret.  
This is only one of the methods used to abstract underlying schemas: another method 
is to provide participants with descriptions of life events and have them estimate 
when they think these events are most likely to occur in the lifespan of an average 
person.  Neugarten et al. (1965) and also Berntsen and Rubin, (2004, Study 1) use 
this method to obtain normative estimates for age-appropriate behaviour.  
The following study uses a type of triangulation similar to that used by 
Berntsen and Rubin (2004, Study 1) in that it involves two groups, one to generate 
life events and another to date them.  The generate group provides descriptions of 
experiences they imagine an average person might regret in life and these 
descriptions are then transcribed and given to a second group, whose job it is to 
estimate when in the lifespan each of the experiences described is likely to occur.  To 
introduce variance into the dating procedure five judges date each experience and so 
multiple estimates are available for comparison. This method of having different 
groups generate and judge experiences is used in other paradigms to gain estimates 
of perceived normality (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996; Ross, Green & House, 1977) and 
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is also found in some prototype approaches to emotion classification (Shaver, 
Schwartz, Kirson & O‟Connor, 1987; Storm & Storm, 1984). 
 
3.5 Study 4c: young adults predict the regrets of an average person 
 
3.5.1 Method  
Participants 
This study was carried out in two stages, using two groups recruited at 
different times.  The first group generated descriptions of experiences a typical 70 
year old might regret in life and then estimated when these experiences would occur, 
using the person‟s age at the time as the temporal index.  These descriptions (but not 
the associated dates) were then given to the second group, who simply estimated 
when the experiences were most likely to occur by dating them to the nearest decade.   
The procedure for both stages of the study will be described before the two analyses 
are presented. 
 
Group 1 (generate/date) 
 This group was recruited from a psychology class at Durham University.  
There were 73 students in the group, 64 females and 9 males. The group ranged in 
age from 18 to 22 years (M = 18, SD = .8).  
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 Participants in Group 1 were given a simple two page questionnaire.  The 
cover sheet was exactly the same as the one used in Study 4b, with the exception that 
they were told they would be asked to imagine what experiences a person was likely 
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to regret when looking back at their life from the age of 70 (as opposed to the eve of 
their 70
th
 birthday).  A separate sheet was provided with five numbered spaces for 
describing the regrettable experiences. Participants were given the following 
instructions:  
I would like you to think about the life that an average person of your 
age will have lived by the time they reach 70 years of age.  Think of all 
their goals and expectations, all the choices they will have made, and all 
the experiences they wanted out of life.  Imagine that person looking 
back across their whole life and how they might feel if things haven‟t 
worked out as planned.  What things are they likely to regret?  Please 
use the spaces provided to describe the things that this person is likely to 
regret. 
 
On the other side of the description sheet a numbered box was provided for 
each of the descriptions.  Participants were instructed to consider each of the 
experiences they had described and to try and estimate when in the life of an average 
70 year old the experience was likely to have occurred, by giving that person‟s age at 
the time of the experience.  A space was then provided where participants completed 
the sentence, “At the time of the regrettable experience the person would be… … 
years old. Because participants had difficulties assigning regrets to a specific age, 
analysis of this data will not be reported. Instead, the dates given by the second 
group of participants will be reported. 
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Group 2 (date only) 
Procedure 
The descriptions generated by the first group were transcribed by the 
researcher and divided into 13 batches, so that each batch contained between 21 – 29 
regrets (M = 25), which were presented in a tabular list.  The number of regrets per 
batch was determined by what would fit onto one side of A4 paper as some 
descriptions contained only one line of text, while others contained two or three 
lines.  A further 13 batches were created by inverting the order of the original lists.  
The resulting 26 lists (13 Standard order and 13 Inverted order) were then used in 
the second part of the study.  The second „judge‟ group comprised 65 participants, 51 
females and 14 males.  The majority (61) were recruited from a psychology class at 
Durham University‟s Queen‟s Campus, Stockton, and a further 4 participants were 
recruited on campus in order to ensure that each batch of descriptions received 
ratings from an equal number of judges.  The extra 4 participants comprised two 
postgraduates, one computer technician, and an undergraduate.  The age of the 
sample ranged from 19 – 43 years (M = 20, SD = 3.3), with only one participant 
above „bump age‟ (i.e., older than 29 years).  Participants were given a brief verbal 
introduction to the purpose of the study and assured that they were under no 
obligation to participate.  After consenting to take part in the study participants 
received a two page questionnaire. The cover sheet was similar to the one used for 
the generate/date group, with the exception of one paragraph instructing participants 
that they would be presented with a list of experiences that a person is likely to regret 
when looking back at their life from the age of 70. They were told that their task was 
to estimate when in that person‟s life those regrettable experiences were likely to 
have occurred. 
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On a separate sheet was a tabular list containing the transcribed descriptions of 
the experiences an average 70 year old was expected to regret.  Above the table were 
the following instructions:   
 
Below is a list of experiences a person might regret in life.  Your task is 
to try and estimate when in that person‟s life the regretted experience is 
most likely to have occurred (not the feeling of regret, which may have 
occurred later).  Use the following decades as a guide and date the 
experiences by writing the appropriate number in the „Decade‟ column.    
 
To clarify the dating procedure a line of decade bins was presented between the 
instructions and the top of the tabular list. The list and decade bins are presented 
below: 
 
Decades 
(age)
:    1 
(1-9)
     2 
(10-19)
     3 
(20-29)   
   4 
(30-39) 
   5 
(40-49)
    6 
(50-59)
      7
(60-70)
   
Regretted experience Decade 
“Not having children”  
 
3.5.2 Results  
Group 1 – Analysis of regret type.  In total Group 1 produced 304 regret 
descriptions, with each participant producing on average 4 descriptions.  This 
average did not differ between sexes, t(71) = .30, p > .05.  The descriptions were 
coded along the specific-general dimension by two independent judges who reached 
acceptable agreement (kappa = .70).  Differences were resolved by a third rater.  The 
resulting category totals were 252 general and 52 specific regrets.   A single sample 
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t-test using the mean proportion of general regrets (M = .84, SD = .20) showed that 
the number of general regrets was significantly higher than chance, t(72) = 14.27, p 
<.001, r = .86. 
Group 2 – Dating regrets. Each batch of descriptions was rated by 5 
judges from Group 2 (3 of whom rated the standard order lists and 2 of whom rated 
the inverted order lists), and a composite estimate was created for each regret 
description using the median decade from the 5 ratings.  These estimates were used 
to calculate the mean proportion of specific and general regrets assigned to each of 
the 7 decades.  The resulting distributions are presented in Figure 3.4.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Study 4c: proportion of regrets predicted for an average person 
as a function of time in decade intervals for specific and general regrets.  Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean.    
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Temporal distribution 
 The distributions of the two types of regret shown in Figure 3.4 are consistent 
with the distributions in studies 4a and 4b.  Three quarters of the specific regrets are 
clustered in the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 decades, while the distribution of general regrets is more 
varied, with 53% located in the bump decades.  Although the distribution of general 
regrets peaks in decade 3, the bump is once again skewed in favour of the 4
th
 and 5
th
 
decades, which contain 43% of general regrets.  As with the previous studies, the 
distributions of both types of regret were analysed separately, using a one-way 
repeated measures ANOVA for general regrets and the Friedman‟s non-parametric 
equivalent for specific regrets. Decades 1 and 7 were excluded from both analyses 
because these were the only two decades where neither type of regret was found, and 
for the analysis of the specific regret distribution decade 6 was also excluded for the 
same reason. 
 As would be expected from the distribution in Figure 3.4, the ANOVA for 
general regrets showed a significant effect of decade, F (2.7, 196.6) = 36.02, MSE = 
.06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .33.  Tukey HSD post hoc tests showed that this main effect was 
produced by decades 3 (M = .37, SD = .25) and 4 (M = .26, SD = .24), both of which 
contained significantly higher proportions than decades 2 (M = .08, SD = .13), 5 (M 
= .10, SD = .15) and 6 (M = .03, SD = .11; all ps <.001, all rs between .55 -.75). 
Although decade 3 contained higher proportions of general regrets than decade 4, 
this difference did not reach significance following correction, t(72) = 2.18, p > .05, 
r = .25. 
 Because no specific regrets were reported in decades 6 and 7, only the 
proportions in decades 2,3,4 and 5 were used in the Friedman‟s ANOVA, which 
showed a significant effect of decade,  χ2(3) = 28.87.  Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
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comparisons showed this effect to be produced by decade 3 (M = .09, SD = .15) 
which contained significantly higher proportions of specific regrets than the 
combined proportions of decades 4 and 5 (M = .04, SD = .09); Z = 2.47, p < .01, r = 
.38. The proportions of specific regrets in decade 2 (M = .03, SD = .08) did not differ 
significantly from the combined proportions in decades 4 and 5; Z = .56, p >.05, r = 
.08.  
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
Two independent judges coded the regrets as actions, “Having a drunken 
one-night stand” (68%); inactions, “Not pursuing a relationship” (20%); both action 
and inaction, Having/Not having children” (11%); and neither action nor inaction, 
“Regretting anything!”(1%).  Reliability was acceptable (Kappa = .76) and 
differences were resolved through discussion.  The proportions were calculated to 
determine how many of each participants regrets were specific actions, specific 
inactions, general actions, and general inactions, and these proportions were entered 
into a 2 (type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: action/inaction) ANOVA.   
Unsurprisingly, there was a significant main effect of regret type, F (1, 72) = 
190.30, MSE = .03, , p < .001, ηp
2
 = .73.  There was a main effect of agency, F (1, 
72) = 64.88, MSE = .06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .47, such that inaction regrets (M = .68, SD 
= .30) significantly outnumbered action(M = .20, SD = .24) regrets; t(72) = 8.05, p < 
.001, r = .69, and also a significant type by agency interaction, F (1, 72) = 62.55, 
MSE = .06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .46.  Planned contrasts of the means involved in the 
interactions showed that general regrets were significantly more likely to be 
attributed to inaction (M = .61, SD = .30) than to action (M = .13, SD = .21); t(72) = 
8.62, p < .001, r = .71.  Specific regrets were equally as likely to be due to action (M 
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= .07, SD = .13) as to inaction (M = .07, SD = .13); t(72) = .36, p >.05, r = .04.  As 
with the previous study, there is a strong overlap between the two dimensions, 
though again the results for specific-action regrets are not clear.  
 
Analysis of content 
Two independent raters coded the regrets for content.  Reliability was 
acceptable (Kappa = .70) and differences were resolved by the researcher.  The main 
life domains were ranked in the following descending order: Family , “Never having 
had children” (16%);  Relationships-general, “Failed relationships” (12%);  Work , 
“Passing up a career opportunity” (12%);  Travel, “Not having travelled more” 
(12%);  Intimate relationships, “Not marrying the right person” (11%);  Education, 
“Making the wrong choices in education” (6%); Character, “Not being brave enough 
to speak their mind.”(6%).  Once again, the analysis of content reveals remarkable 
consistency between the studies of anticipated regrets. 
 
3.5.3 Summary of Studies 3 – 4c 
 To sum up the findings of the 4 studies presented here, there was 
considerable overlap across studies in terms of the ranking of domains in which 
regrets were listed, whether experienced or imagined; the domains of family, 
intimate relationships, work, education, travel, character and self-development were 
consistently listed.   Across all studies there were significantly more general than 
specific regrets and these were significantly more likely to be attributed to inaction 
than to action.  Specific regrets were equally as likely to be attributed to action as to 
inaction.   
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The relative distribution of general and specific imagined regrets across the 
lifespan was consistent across studies 4a, 4b and 4c.  General regrets produced a 
bump in decades 3 and 4, with the peak in decade 3.  The exception to this profile 
was Study 3, where general regrets peaked in the 4
th
 decade.   For the purpose of 
comparison, the distributions of general regrets from all 4 studies are presented in 
Figure 3.5. 
 
 
Figure 3. 5  The distribution of anticipated general regrets for studies 3, 4a, 
4b and 4c 
 
 With regard to specific regrets, they were very few in number across all four 
studies and they were almost exclusively located in the near future, producing a 
bump spanning decades 2 to 4 and peaking in the 3
rd
 decade.  The distributions of 
specific regrets from the four studies can be seen together in Figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3. 6 The distribution of anticipated specific regrets for studies 3, 4a, 
4b and 4c 
 
3.6 Chapter discussion 
The studies presented here have yielded four striking results.  First, as 
predicted there was a „preminiscence bump‟ in early adulthood for general 
anticipated regrets, which peaked in the third decade and which is consistent with a 
life script interpretation.  Second there was considerable overlap in the content of the 
experiences described, which was consistent with that found in Studies 1 and 2 for 
older adults, as well as that reported by Roese and Summerville (2005).  Third, the 
descriptions produced were overwhelmingly general in nature, and finally, 
participants overwhelmingly described anticipated regrets of inaction.   
In terms of the temporal distribution of anticipated regrets, there was 
remarkable consistency across the studies, as can be seen in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.  
Overall, the bump for general anticipated regrets was similar to the distributions 
found in Studies 1 and 2 in that they peaked in the 3
rd
 decade, although for 
anticipated regrets the distributions were skewed towards the 4
th
 decade.  
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However, the studies also produced two unexpected findings: a bump for 
specific regrets and the temporal displacement of the bump itself.  There are at least 
two possible explanations for both of these findings. The first interpretation draws on 
construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), which was introduced in Chapter 1.  
This theory proposes that the mental representation of temporally near and 
temporally distant events differs in that temporally near events are construed in more 
detailed, concrete terms, whereas temporally distant events are construed in more 
abstract terms.  As construal theory applies to future as well as to past events 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, Sagristano & Trope, 2003) it provides a good 
account of these two unexpected findings.  
As far as the distribution of specific regrets is concerned, they were located 
almost exclusively in the near future (decades 2 and 3), with only 22% of all specific 
anticipated regrets located beyond the 3
rd
 decade.  This clustering of specific events 
in the near future is precisely what construal theory predicts and it is also consistent 
with the studies reviewed in the chapter introduction comparing past and future 
thought, which show that specific future events tend to be located in the near future 
(Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Spreng & Levine, 2008).  Although the life script does 
not locate specific regrets in an particular part of the lifespan, construal predicts that 
they would concern temporally near events, which in these studies happens to be the 
bump period, so while the distribution of specific regrets may appear at first glance 
to be problematic to the script-based hypotheses, it is not at all problematic in 
temporal construal terms.  
Greater temporal extension is observed for general anticipated regrets, and in 
most cases more regrets were anticipated for the 4
th
 and 5
th
 decades than for the 2
nd
 
decade.  The distribution of general anticipated regrets and the overall displacement 
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of the bump itself require a more complex interpretation than the one used for 
specific regrets, as it suggests that the life script and temporal construal are working 
in opposite directions.   
On the one hand the life script locates the bump for general regrets in the 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 decades, whereas temporal construal locates general events in the very distant 
future.  Since general anticipated regrets do not cluster in the most distant decades, it 
seems that the construal mechanism does not have as strong an influence on the 
distribution of anticipated general regrets as does the life script.  
Of course it is also possible that the overall displacement of the bump may 
represent a genuine shift in the actual or perceived normative timetables.  
Government statistics in the UK show for example that the average age at which 
women have their first child has risen by three years in as many decades, to 27.3 
years.  The average age at which men and women marry has also risen in the last 
three decades, from 25 and 23 years for men and women respectively in 1971, to 32 
and 29 years in 2005/6 (Self & Zealy, 2007).  These figures suggest that people are 
entering many of the normative roles later in life and such generational variation is 
widely reported (George, 1993). This interpretation of the shift in the bump is 
speculative, but certainly plausible and something that needs to be taken into account 
in future research on the bump phenomenon.   
In terms of the content of anticipated regrets, young people appear to know 
what types of experiences are likely to be regretted in life, as the same domains 
emerged, with some variation, across all 4 studies.  The rankings also reflected those 
reported for the experienced regrets of older adults in Studies 1 and 2, which 
strongly suggests that there is something resembling a norm for regret.  But is this 
really surprising?  At the level of the specific, idiosyncratic events that make up an 
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actual life there are probably countless possibilities for what can be regretted, but at 
the more general level observed here, what can be regretted in life becomes 
relatively limited.   
 This leads to the second striking finding of these studies, which is the 
consistently general nature of the descriptions produced. This is an important 
observation with quite broad implications.  The studies of prospective thought by 
Newby-Clark and Ross (2003) and D‟Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) 
explicitly requested specific, episodic events, whereas participants in the present 
studies freely recalled whatever came to mind, and what came to mind tended to be 
general.  As Conway (1992) has suggested, this level of representation is the most 
cognitively efficient and provides easiest access to the autobiographical memory 
knowledge base, and events at this level are brought to mind more easily during 
memory retrieval (Conway & Bekerian, 1987).    
The observation that people consistently anticipated regrets associated with 
not doing, or inaction, has implications for regret research, as it lends considerable 
weight to the argument made in the previous chapter that inaction regrets are 
predominantly general in structure. That this pattern is found for imagined events 
also raises the possibility of a culturally scripted attitude to agency, such that 
inaction may be more negatively perceived.  People confuse „what might have been‟ 
with „what ought to have been‟ (Miller & Turnbull, 1990) and it is quite probable 
that such reasoning extends to „what ought to be‟.   
There is clearly a norm for what is worth regretting in life, as the evidence 
presented in this chapter suggests that the things older adults regret about the period 
of the reminiscence bump are similar in many ways to the regrets of those currently 
living through that period of life.  More interestingly, those living in the bump know 
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what they and their contemporaries will regret, although they seem to see their 
regrettable experiences lying further down the road than may eventually turn out to 
be the case.   
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Chapter 4: Regret and other emotions 
 
4.0 Chapter overview 
The studies in the two preceding chapters have been concerned with the 
distribution of specific and general regrets across the lifespan.  The study reported in 
this chapter considers the affective profiles of different regret types, with the 
principal aim of applying the specific-general regret distinction to a distinction made 
by Gilovich, Medvec and Kahneman (1998) between “hot”, “wistful” and “despair-
related” regrets.   Gilovich et al. argue that action and inaction regrets evoke 
different emotions and that these associations may be mediated by temporal factors.  
In support of this claim they have shown that action regrets tend to be more recent 
and evoke hot emotions, whereas inaction regrets tend to be more distant and evoke 
wistful or despair emotions.  The aim of Study 5 is to show that these patterns can be 
replicated for specific and general regrets.  This prediction is based on the overlap 
established in studies 1-4c between the two distinctions, and also on the intuition that 
some emotions are simply more likely to be associated with specific than with 
general events.  The present study extends Gilovich et al.‟s distinctions by including 
a separate cluster of “moral” emotions with a view to exploring the relationship 
between regret, guilt, shame, and remorse.  
A secondary aim of the study is to extend a distinction made by Berndsen, 
van der Pligt, Doosje and Manstead, (2004) between intrapersonal (self-focussed) 
and interpersonal (other-focussed) regrets, which they suggest represents a basis for 
distinguishing regret from guilt.  It will be investigated whether a meaningful 
distinction can be made within intrapersonal regrets between those concerning 
achievement and those involving broader aspects of self-actualisation.  
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4.1  Introduction: ‘varieties of regret’   
As explained in Chapter 1, Gilovich and Medvec (1995) account for the 
temporal pattern of regret by viewing regret as a unitary emotion that changes over 
time.  Psychological repair work makes regrettable actions short lived, whereas 
regrettable inactions fester over time due to an increased awareness of their 
consequences, reduced memory for obstructive antecedents, and memory biases 
favouring unfinished business.  Kahneman (1995) accounts for regret‟s temporal 
pattern by viewing short and long-term regrets as two distinct emotions which differ 
in affective „heat‟.   In his view action regrets typically concern “hot” responses to 
painful losses or embarrassing mistakes, which are usually short-lived and so 
concern relatively recent events, whereas inaction regrets for lost opportunities have 
a “wistful” quality due in part to the framing of questions in regret surveys, which 
participants interpret as an invitation to consider ways in which their lives could 
have been better.  The resulting regrets represent elaborative counterfactuals that 
Kahneman describes as “pleasantly sad fantasies” (p 361).  
Gilovich, et al. (1998) attempted to reconcile these positions in a series of 
three studies, the first of which had participants recall their „single biggest‟ regrets of 
action and inaction from both the recent and distant past (defined as the “the past 
week” and the “entire life” respectively) and then select from a list of emotion terms 
those which corresponded to how they felt about their regrets.  The emotion checklist 
contained seven hot (angry, ashamed, disgusted, embarrassed, frustrated, guilty and 
irritated), seven wistful (contemplative, nostalgic, sentimental, and wistful), and 
eleven unspecified filler emotions.  Their results came down clearly in favour of 
Kahneman‟s distinction: action regrets were more likely than inaction regrets to be 
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hot, regardless of whether they were distant or recent, while inaction regrets were 
more likely than action regrets to be wistful, particularly if they concerned distant 
events.   
In a second study Gilovich et al. extended their hot/wistful distinction by 
including a cluster of despair emotions (empty, helpless, longing, sad and 
unfulfilled) to test the claim that some distant regrets might be more than just 
“pleasantly sad fantasies” and might instead have an unpleasantly sad or despairing 
quality.  Participants were asked to say which of the listed emotions they associated 
with the biggest regret of action or inaction from their entire lives.  The results 
confirmed that inaction regrets were more likely than action regrets to involve 
despair as well as wistful emotions, although the results for hot emotions were 
ambiguous, as hot emotions were endorsed for action and inaction regrets with equal 
frequency.  A third study gave participants the option of saying that neither their 
life‟s biggest action nor inaction regret was more strongly associated with the target 
emotions, and again inaction regrets tended to be associated with both wistful and 
despair emotions while action regrets tended to be more strongly associated with hot 
emotions.  Overall the authors‟ respective claims were partially reconciled, but they 
acknowledged that the studies provided only indirect evidence for the factors 
assumed by Gilovich and Medvec (1995) to underlie regret‟s temporal profile.  
Indeed, only their first study includes a temporal manipulation between recent (past 
week) and distant (entire lifetime) regrets: the other two studies use only regrets 
from the entire lifetime and assume them to be synonymous with distant regrets.  As 
this assumption is not tested Gilovich et al. place the emphasis of their discussion on 
the systematic patterns of emotions evoked by different types of regret and this 
emphasis is adopted for the present study.   Although temporal factors are assumed 
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to be involved in mediating these patterns, the nature and extent of that involvement 
is not of central concern.    
Matching discrete emotions with different types of regret is a somewhat 
intuitive process, but some associations seem more plausible than others.   For 
example, terms such as contemplative, nostalgic, sentimental, or wistful seem more 
likely to bring to mind general rather than specific experiences.  Similarly, emotion 
terms such as empty, helpless, longing, sad and unfulfilled are associated with more 
general moods or a general sense of absence (Storm & Storm, 1987) and so might be 
expected to be associated with general rather than specific experiences.  The hot 
emotion term angry was more likely to elicit specific than general memories when 
used as a cue word (Williams & Broadbent, 1996) and something similar might be 
expected for such terms as disgusted, embarrassed, frustrated and irritated, which 
seem more likely to refer to discrete events than to summarised or extended events.  
 
4.1.1 Comparing intrapersonal and interpersonal regrets 
  Berndsen, van der Pligt, Doosje and Manstead, (2004) have recently 
attempted to distinguish regret from guilt on the basis that regret is associated with 
failures of self-actualisation, broadly defined as “intrapersonal harm” (emphasis 
added), whereas experiences involving “interpersonal harm” are best described as 
involving guilt.  The authors support this distinction in two scenario studies where 
varying degrees of intrapersonal or interpersonal harm are depicted.  Participants are 
required to indicate how much regret or guilt they would experience in each of the 
situations described.  Scenarios depicting high intrapersonal harm elicited more 
regret than guilt, whereas scenarios depicting high interpersonal harm elicited more 
 158 
guilt (Study 1), and increases in the negative consequences for the other person was 
also associated with increased guilt but not regret (Study 2).   
A shortcoming of this self-other distinction for regret and guilt is that it fails 
to discriminate between types of experience within these dichotomous categories, 
particularly in its restricted application of the term self-actualisation to self-focussed 
experiences.  Maslow (1968;1970) originally intended the term to include all 
experiences that optimise personal potential, whether self-focussed or not, and he 
distinguished between motivations that serve to satisfy biological, material or social 
needs (such as hunger, financial security or respect from others) and “growth” needs 
focussing on the development of personal potential through the expression of love to 
other people.  Moral philosophers see behaviour towards others as a means of self-
actualisation, particularly through the acknowledgement of guilt and the expression 
of remorse for harm done (see Gaita, 1991, 2004). Regret is also engendered by 
failures to fulfill some inner obligation, either to oneself or to some higher purpose: 
the archaic notion of accidie, (spiritual torpor) was once considered a sinful 
experience (Harré & Finlay-Jones, 1986).  At the same time, Keltner and Buswell 
(1996) found that common antecedents of guilt were failure of duties (not studying 
hard enough) or breaching personal or moral codes (lying to parents, cheating on 
exams).  Such experiences may involve the judgement of others, but they do not 
qualify as instances of interpersonal harm in the sense intended by Berndsen et al. In 
short, it is possible to harm one‟s own potential in ways that are not self-focussed, 
just as it is also possible to feel self-focussed guilt.  One of the purposes of the 
present study is to clarify this distinction and show that some self-actualisation 
regrets are other-focussed and that some guilt experiences are self-focussed.  
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4.1.2 The emotion clusters used in Study 5  
The clusters used in the present study comprise 3 to 4 items. The “hot”, 
“wistful” and “despair” clusters are derived as closely as possible from items used by 
Gilovich et al.  and they include angry, disgusted, embarrassed, and irritated 
(“hot”); wistful, nostalgic, contemplative and sentimental (“wistful”); and empty, 
sad, unfulfilled and helpless (“despair”).   The “filler” items are bored, confused, 
disillusioned and resentful. Gilvoich et al. do not specify their filler emotions and the 
filler items used in the present study are drawn from various taxonomies (Fehr & 
Russel, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987) on the basis that they 
represent plausible associate terms that might „fit in‟ well enough act as fillers, but 
not „stand out‟ so much that they become targets themselves.     
The cluster of “moral” emotion items comprises guilty, ashamed and 
remorseful.   Gilovich et al. describe regret as “one of the other” moral emotions 
alongside guilt and shame, but as was discussed in Chapter 1, regret‟s status as a 
discrete emotion distinguishable from guilt, shame or remorse is a contested issue 
(Sabini & Silver, 2005), and one that is only partly addressed in this thesis.  
However, since many taxonomical studies group regret together with the moral 
emotions (Shaver et al., 1987; Storm & Storm, 1987) it makes sense to consider 
them as a distinct cluster and to consider their relationship with regret in isolation 
from other emotions. Although shame varies in affective „temperature‟ (Lazarus, 
1991) and can be associated with both hot and despair emotions, it is primarily 
regarded as a moral emotion and so is treated as such here.    
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Overview of Study 5 and main predictions 
The purpose of the present study is to use the specific-general distinction to 
replicate Gilovich et al.‟s findings, and so the following directional predictions are 
made: (1) specific regrets will be more likely than general regrets to be hot; (2) 
general regrets will be more likely than specific regrets to be wistful; and (3) general 
regrets will be more likely than specific regrets to be despair-related.  Gilovich et al. 
do not include a separate category of moral emotions, but they designate guilt and 
shame as hot emotions, thereby implicating them by association with specific more 
than with general regrets.   Remorse is also expected to be more strongly associated 
with specific regrets on the basis of characteristics described in Chapter 1. Remorse 
is an acknowledgement of harm done to another, (Proeve & Howells, 2006) and 
usually (but not always) involves behaviours we know all along to be wrong and 
doesn‟t come from a sudden insight following reflection on distant events 
(Wierzbicka, 1999).  While it is feasible to think remorse might be felt for 
summarised events (e.g. mistreating someone over many years), it is more likely that 
remorseful memories will mostly concern specific episodes.  Finally, although 
remorse may be experienced following a specific failure to take action, it is most 
likely to involve action.   It is expected therefore that the ratings in the moral cluster 
will be significantly higher for specific than for general regrets.   
The present study does not include a temporal manipulation, as temporal 
patterns are not the primary concern of the study and were not directly tested by 
Gilovich et al.  Also, the manipulations used by Gilovich et al. make unwarranted 
assumptions which have neither empirical nor theoretical bases. They assume for 
example that the biggest regret of one‟s entire life and the biggest regret from the 
past week are mutually exclusive categories, which they are not.  They also assume 
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that regrets from the entire lifetime are synonymous with distant regrets, which is 
clearly not the case.  No such assumptions are made in the present study and no 
hypotheses involving temporal factors are advanced or tested.  Instead the focus is on 
the different emotions evoked by different types of regret. 
The main prediction regarding the intrapersonal and interpersonal distinctions 
is that within intrapersonal regrets two clear categories will emerge, one to do with 
regrets of achievement and another concerning broader aspects of self-actualisation, 
which will include character regrets and regrets concerning self-implicating 
behaviour with others.  In this sense, self-actualisation regrets and other-focussed 
regrets are expected to share many characteristics in that they are both more likely 
than self- achievement regrets to evoke moral emotions such as guilt, shame and 
remorse.  
 
4.2 Study 5: examining the affective profiles of specific and general self- and 
other-focussed regrets. 
 
4.2.1 Method  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from various locations in the Durham and 
Teesside regions.  The sample comprised undergraduate and postgraduate students 
from Durham University‟s Queen‟s Campus (many of whom took questionnaires 
home to be distributed amongst friends and family), and a large proportion of the 
questionnaires were distributed to local branches of University of the Third Age, 
which is a self-governing organisation for retired people wishing to pursue 
educational and other self-development activities.  Along with these groups were 
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members of the wider community recruited through word of mouth and personal 
contacts.  Participants ranged in age from 18 to 82 years and the average age was 
48.6 years (SD = 19.3).  Approximately 400 questionnaires were distributed and 87 
usable questionnaires were returned. 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 A postal survey was conducted in which two separate groups of respondents 
were asked to provide either a specific or a general autobiographical regret and then 
answer some questions about that experience.  Respondents received a stamped, self-
addressed envelope containing a two-page questionnaire and a cover letter, both of 
which are presented in full in Appendix A. The cover letter informed respondents 
that the study was part of a PhD in Psychology looking at the emotion of regret and 
the way it is remembered, and that it involved a simple questionnaire about regret, 
which was totally anonymous and confidential.  The cover letter also gave the 
researcher‟s full contact details should respondents have any queries concerning the 
survey.  A separate cover sheet outlined the purpose of the study and gave some 
information of the task involved:   
 
This study is concerned with how people think and feel about the experience 
of regret.  Regret is the emotion we experience when we think about things 
that didn‟t turn out as we wanted them to.  It may be experienced in a 
variety of ways and may concern a wide range of experiences.  Regret may 
focus on a single moment in the past, or may concern something spanning 
days or decades. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free 
to withdraw at any point.    
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Should you choose to participate you will be asked to describe something 
that you regret and then answer questions related to that regret.  
 
Your responses will be anonymous and your age, sex and level of education 
are the only personal identity details you provide, and no-one will be able 
to link these to the experience(s) you describe. 
 
 
 Spaces were provided for demographic information and a box was ticked to 
indicate consent.  On a separate page of the questionnaire participants received 
instructions to think of a regret, which was followed by some questions about the 
regretted experience.  Instructions on the specific questionnaire asked participants to 
think of “something that you regret which concerns a specific episode that took 
place within the course of a single day.” Instructions on the general questionnaire 
asked for “something general, something spanning any period longer than a single 
day.”  In both cases participants were told that the experience could come from any 
period of their lives and concern anything they had done (or failed to do), anything 
they had said (or failed to say), any choices, decisions, or missed opportunities they 
wished had turned out differently.  A space was provided in which the participant 
then described in one sentence their regretted experience.  Following these 
instructions were three questions about the characteristics of the regret.  For both 
types of regret, the first question asked participants to say whether the regret was due 
to something they had done (action), something they didn‟t do (inaction), both, or 
neither.  The second and third questions concerned temporal characteristics of the 
regretted experience. 
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 For specific regrets, participants were asked to indicate which part of their 
lives the regret came from by indicating how old they were at the time of the 
experience.  The third question then asked them to indicate their age at the time they 
had become conscious of the experience as something they regretted. 
For general regrets, the second question was the same, except that it included 
the provision for dating experiences spanning more than one year, in which case 
participants estimated how old they were when they first had the opportunity to 
avoid the regret. The third question for general regrets was the same as that for 
specific regrets. 
 The remainder of the questionnaire comprised an emotion checklist presented 
on a separate sheet in the form of a grid box with the 19 emotions terms listed in 
random order in a column on the left.   Above the checklist were instructions.  
Participants were told that the researcher was interested in how they felt whenever 
they thought about their regret.  They were told to consider the list of adjectives 
describing emotional states and to consider how much each one applied to their 
feelings when recalling the regret they had described.  Inside the box containing the 
checklist, participants were instructed to indicate, by ticking the relevant column, 
how much their regret made them feel each of the emotion terms listed.  They 
provided ratings on a scale anchored at 1(not at all) to 5 (a lot).  
 
4.2.2 Results  
 Of the 87 useable questionnaires that were returned, 42 (48%) were specific 
and 45 (52%) were general. A preliminary reading by the researcher revealed that the 
vast majority (91%) of the regret descriptions provided were consistent with the type 
specified in the questionnaire, and so no recategorisation was necessary, as was the 
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case with Study 2.   There was no significant difference between the numbers of 
regrets of each type; χ2 (1) = .10, p >.05.   
 
Data coding 
A pair of independent judges coded the content of the regrets along two 
separate dimensions.  Regrets were first categorised according to life domains, as 
with all previous studies in the thesis, and then subsequently the same regrets were 
categorised according to the self-other focus of harm as laid out by Berndsen et al. 
(2005).  However, whereas Berndsen et al. treat this latter distinction as a simple 
dichotomy, the present study makes a distinction within self-focussed regrets 
between those that are concerned with achievement and those that are not.  Whilst 
acknowledging that all human endeavours are to some degree associated with the 
achievement of goals, achievement in the present study is operationalised as relating 
to attainment in the domains of education, career, sport, hobbies and so on.  Self-
focussed regrets not concerned with achievement are those involving experiences 
associated with obstructed or unfulfilled personal potential in other domains.  For 
ease of expression and understanding, these two types are referred to as self-
achievement and self-actualisation regrets respectively, bearing in mind the qualified 
use of this latter term previously mentioned.  Interpersonal regrets are 
operationalised as those involving real or perceived harm done to others, or good 
withheld from others.  Such regrets are referred to simply as other-focussed, and are 
distinct from regrets for the misfortunes of others which carry no implication of 
responsibility on the part of the person regretting. Inter-rater reliability for both sets 
of coding was acceptable, with kappas of .76 and .74 for content and self/other 
coding respectively. Differences were resolved through discussion with the 
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researcher.  In a subsequent section the results of this coding will be presented in the 
analysis of regret content, along with some descriptive examples. 
An average was calculated for each participant‟s combined cluster ratings.  
This measure, which is used in some of the analyses to be reported, is defined by 
Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) as a measure of regret intensity, and as a measure of 
overall negative affect by Wrosch, et al. (2005), but is used here simply as an overall 
measure of regret. 
 
Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency  
 Because the predictions of the study are predicated on an overlap between the 
two dimensions, the first analysis compared the frequencies of specific and general 
regrets that were due to action and inaction.   
 Overall, of the 87 regrets produced 27 were attributed to action, “Starting to 
smoke”; 33 to inaction; “An action I did not take at the time”, 24 to both an action 
and an inaction; “Not attending school and wasting time”, and 3 to neither an action 
nor an inaction; “Told I was no longer required by the company”.  An analysis of 
the frequencies of specific actions (13), specific inactions (18), general actions (14) 
and general inactions (15) revealed that this study does not replicate the overlap 
between regret type and agency observed in studies 1-4c: χ2 (1) = .24, p = .79. 
 
Relationships within the clusters: reliability analysis  
 A reliability analysis was carried out to assess the suitability of items and the 
constructs assumed to underlie the clusters.  Cronbach‟s (1951) alpha coefficient is 
used as the index of reliability: it is derived from inter-item correlations and the 
strength of the correlations between individual items and the scale as a whole.  Kline 
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(2000) suggests that for a 5-point response scale such as the one used in the present 
study, Pearson correlations are the most appropriate index of reliability, and he 
suggests item-total correlations of .5 or above as indicators of item suitability.  He 
also suggests that in order to ensure enough variance in the correlation matrix there 
should be at least twice the number of participants to items, a criterion met in the 
present study.   Table 4.1 shows the reliability coefficients for each cluster, the item-
total correlations, and the alpha coefficient that would result from removal of an 
item. As can be seen all alphas are above .70, which Kline regards as the lower 
bound of scale reliability.  
  The items in the Moral cluster all have coefficients above 0.5 and so 
correlate strongly with the scale total.  Ashamed is the strongest item, while 
remorseful appears to be the weakest.  Overall, the scale would not be improved by 
removal of any item. The Hot cluster has the lowest alpha of all the critical clusters 
and there is less variation between individual items.  The item embarrassed 
correlates with the scale below 0.5 and is the weakest item in this cluster.  However, 
removing this or any other item from the scale would not improve reliability.  The 
Wistful cluster has a high alpha and all items correlate strongly with the scale overall.   
Sentimental is the strongest item in the cluster and wistful is the weakest, which is on 
the border of Kline‟s (2000) inclusion criterion.  The despair cluster has a relatively 
low alpha and has the most varied items.  While empty and helpless are strongly 
correlated with the scale, unfulfilled and sad have correlations below 0.5, and sad is 
the only item from the four clusters whose removal would improve the overall 
reliability of the cluster.   
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Table 4.1 Reliability statistics for all emotion clusters, with alphas (α) and 
Pearson correlations 
Cluster and Alpha (α) Item-total correlation α  if item deleted 
Moral  (α = .77)   
          Guilty .60 .70 
          Ashamed .64 .65 
         Remorseful .58 .73 
Hot  (α = .71)   
          Angry .52 .63 
          Disgusted .51 .64 
          Embarrassed .45 .67 
          Irritated .52 .63 
Wistful  (α = .77)   
          Wistful .50 .75 
          Contemplative .54 .73 
          Sentimental .66 .66 
          Nostalgic .59 .70 
Despair  (α = .73)   
          Empty .60 .62 
          Helpless .61 .60 
          Sad .37 .74 
          Unfulfilled .49 .68 
   
 In the normal course of scale construction scale reliability is improved 
through an iterative process involving the removal or replacement of items and the 
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manipulation of the underlying factor structures.  The revised scale is then tested on 
a different sample and this process is repeated until eventually a refined and reliable 
measure is produced.  As the present study stands alone, items cannot be removed, 
but overall the psychometric properties of the clusters appear to be acceptable for the 
present purposes.  
   
Relationships between the clusters  
 Table 4.2 shows the zero-order correlations between the emotion clusters. As 
can be seen, the associations between the critical variables are consistent with the 
predictions of the study.  For example, the Moral and Hot emotions are strongly 
associated and both are statistically independent from the Wistful cluster, and there is 
a small negative correlation between the Hot and Wistful emotions.  Also, there is a 
strong association between the Wistful and Despair clusters. The Despair emotions 
appear to share characteristics of both the Moral and Wistful clusters, but they are 
not correlated at all with the Hot emotions.  These patterns suggest clear distinctions 
between emotions along a dimension of „heat‟ and on the whole the four critical 
emotion clusters appear to represent distinct affective constructs.  
 
Table 4.2   Zero-order correlations between all emotion clusters  
 Moral Hot Wistful 
Moral    
Hot .48**   
Wistful .03 -.12  
Despair .29** .01 .35** 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Main analysis: regret type, emotion cluster and regret focus.  
 To test the directional hypotheses that specific and general regrets are 
differentially associated with different emotion clusters, and that regret focus differs 
between emotion clusters, the composite means for each cluster were entered into a 2 
(regret type: specific/general) by 4 (cluster: moral, hot, wistful, despair)  by 3 (regret 
focus: self-achievement; self-actualisation; other-focussed) mixed model ANOVA. 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for this analysis.  The analysis revealed no 
main effect of regret type, F(1,76) =.15, p >.05, but there was  a significant main 
effect of cluster, F(2.6, 195.1) = 4.63, MSE = .92, p <.005, ηp
2
 = .06 and a 
significant main effect of regret focus; F(2, 76) = 4.12, MSE = 8.28, p < .05, ηp
2
 = 
.09. The two way interaction between  regret type and emotion cluster was also 
significant, F(2.6, 195.1) = 5.74, MSE = .92, p <.003, ηp
2
 = .07, as was the two way 
interaction between regret focus and emotion cluster; F(5.1, 195.1) = 3.36, MSE = 
5.13, p < .01, ηp
2
 = .08.  There was no significant two way interaction between  
regret type and focus, F(2,76) = 1.55, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .04, and no significant three way 
interaction between regret type, regret focus, and emotion cluster; F(2.6, 195.1) = 
.50, p > .05, ηp
2
 = .01. 
 As the main effect of emotion cluster was unexpected and no predictions were 
made in this regard, Tukey HSD post hoc comparisons were carried out to examine 
the between-cluster differences.  The cluster means can be seen in Table 4.3.  
Overall, the Moral cluster received higher ratings than the other three clusters, but 
only the differences between  it and the Hot, t (81) = 5.23, p <.01, r = .50 and 
Wistful, t(81) = 3.05, p <.01, r = .32 clusters were significant.  Ratings for the 
Despair cluster were significantly higher than the ratings for the Hot, t(81) = 3.26, p 
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<.01, r = .34) and Wistful, t(81) = 2.37, p < .05, r = .28 clusters.  There were no other 
significant between cluster differences. 
 
Table 4.3  Summary statistics for the 2 (type) by 4(cluster) by 3 (focus) 
ANOVA, with number of observations (n), means, and standard deviations.  
  Moral Hot Wistful Despair Focus** 
Specific n M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
S/ach* 5 2.00 0.85 2.45 1.12 2.05 0.94 2.30 1.11 2.20 0.66 
S/act 16 2.81 1.15 2.64 0.79 1.83 0.74 2.44 1.12 2.43 0.66 
Other 20 3.65 1.22 2.24 1.15 2.08 1.12 2.68 1.10 2.66 0.72 
Cluster (specific)  3.12 1.27 2.42 1.01 1.98 0.95 2.54 1.09 2.51 0.69 
General            
S/ach 12 1.44 0.80 1.56 0.53 2.04 0.88 2.13 0.60 1.79 0.53 
S/act 16 3.06 1.19 2.28 1.13 2.88 1.17 2.81 1.24 2.76 0.87 
Other 13 2.87 1.10 1.67 0.66 2.71 1.15 2.88 1.22 2.54 0.69 
Cluster (general)  2.53 1.26 1.88 0.89 2.58 1.12 2.63 1.11 2.40 0.82 
Cluster overall  2.83 1.29 2.15 0.99 2.28 1.07 2.59 1.09 2.46 0.75 
*S/ach = self achievement and S/act = self actualisation ** Marginal focus means 
  
 Tukey HSD pairwise comparisons of the means in the main effect of regret 
focus showed that the overall regret ratings for self-actualisation regrets (M = 2.59, 
SD = .77) were significantly higher than those for self- achievement regrets (M = 
1.91, SD = .58); t(47) = 3.17, p < .01, r =.42.  Other-focussed regrets (M= 2.61, SD 
= .70) also had higher ratings overall than did self-achievement regrets; t(48) = 3.52, 
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p < .01, r =.45.   Regret ratings for self-actualisation regrets did not differ 
significantly from other-focussed regrets; t(63) =.09, p >.05, r =.01.  
 Planned comparisons on the means involved in the significant interaction 
between regret type and emotion cluster showed that as predicted, Moral emotions 
were significantly more likely to be evoked by specific than by general regrets; t(80) 
= 2.13, p < .05, r =.23 as were Hot emotions; t(80) = 2.58, p < .05, r =.28.  Also in 
line with the predictions was the finding that Wistful emotions were significantly 
more likely to be attributed to general than to specific regrets; t(80) = 2.64, p < .05, r 
=.28.  Ratings for the Despair emotions did not differ significantly between general 
and specific regrets; t(80 = .40, p >.05, r =.04.   
  Tukey HSD post hoc comparisons of the means involved in the interaction 
between regret focus and emotion cluster revealed only one significant difference, 
which was in the moral cluster: self-actualisation regrets (M = 2.94, SD = 1.16) were 
significantly more likely than self-achievement regrets (M = 1.61, SD =  0.83) to 
evoke the moral emotions; t(47) = 4.12, p <.01, r =.51.  Similarly, other-focussed 
regrets (M = 3.34, SD = 1.22) were also significantly more likely than self-
achievement regrets to evoke the moral emotions; t(48) = 5.27, p <.01, r =.60.  
Although ratings on the moral emotions were higher on average for other-focussed 
than for self-actualisation regrets, the difference did not reach significance; t(63) = 
1.37, p >.05, r =.17. 
 
Analysis of agency, regret focus and emotion cluster 
 To test whether the patterns observed by Gilovich et al. would be found using 
the clusters in the present study, the previous analysis was repeated using agency as 
the between-subjects variable, with only action and inaction regrets included. For 
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consistency with the main analysis regret focus is also included.  The summary 
statistics involved in the 2 (agency: action, inaction) by 4 (emotion cluster: moral, 
hot, wistful, despair) by 3 (focus: self-achievement, self-actualisation, other-focused) 
mixed model ANOVA are presented in Table 4.4.   
 
Table 4.4  Summary statistics for the 2 (agency) by 4(cluster) by 3 (focus) 
ANOVA, number of observations (n), means and standard deviations. 
  Moral Hot Wistful Despair Focus** 
Action n M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
S/ach* 5 1.73 1.01 2.10 0.98 2.20 0.84 1.95 0.60 2.00 0.70 
S/act 10 3.33 1.38 2.95 1.25 2.05 1.17 2.65 1.22 2.75 0.90 
Other 10 3.60 1.44 2.58 1.24 1.93 0.88 2.18 0.76 2.57 0.66 
Cluster (action) 25 3.12 1.47 2.63 1.19 2.03 0.96 2.32 0.96 2.53 0.79 
Inaction            
S/ach 5 2.00 1.03 1.80 1.03 2.20 0.99 2.15 0.84 2.04 0.77 
S/act 15 2.62 1.08 2.02 0.69 2.53 1.11 2.48 1.01 2.42 0.62 
Other 12 3.08 1.29 1.94 0.92 2.75 1.37 3.31 1.26 2.77 0.80 
 Cluster (inaction) 32 2.70 1.18 1.95 0.76 2.56 1.18 2.74 1.15 2.49 0.74 
Cluster overall 57 2.88 1.32 2.25 1.02 2.33 1.11 2.56 1.08 2.51 0.76 
*S/ach = self achievement and S/act = self actualisation ** Marginal focus means 
 
 The analysis produced no main effect of agency, F (1, 51) = .02, p = .89, so 
the mean ratings overall were not greater for either action or inaction regrets.  There 
was a significant main effect of emotion cluster, F (2.4, 121.9) = 2.78, MSE = 2.64, 
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p < .05, ηp
2
 = .09, and a marginally significant main effect of regret focus, F (2, 51) 
= 2. 83, MSE = 2.20, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .10. 
 There was also a significant two way interaction between agency and cluster, 
F (2.4, 121.6) = 3. 77, MSE = 2.64, p < .05, ηp
2
 = .07, but no interaction between 
agency and focus F (2, 51) = .77, p > .05, no two way interaction between focus and 
cluster, F (2.4, 121.6) = 1.54, p > .05, and no three way interaction between agency, 
emotion cluster, and focus F (4.7, 121.6) = .99, p > .05.  
 Tukey HSD post hoc tests on the means in the  significant main effect of 
cluster showed that although the Moral cluster was more strongly endorsed than any 
other cluster, it differed significantly only from the Hot cluster; t (56) = 4.30, p <.01, 
r = .49.  Post hoc tests on the marginal effect of focus showed only one significant 
difference, between other-focussed regrets and self-achievement regrets; t(30) = 
2.47, p =.05, r = .41. 
 Planned comparisons of the interaction between agency and emotion cluster 
show that the interaction is driven mostly by differences in the Hot cluster which is 
significantly more likely to be endorsed for action than for inaction regrets; t(38.6) = 
2.47, p <.05, r = .37.    There is a marginally significant difference within the Wistful 
emotions, which are more likely to be associated with inaction than action regrets; 
t(55) = 1.83, p = .07, r = .24.  These patterns are consistent with those found by 
Gilovich et al., although the associations here are considerably weaker.  
 To summarise thus far; regret overall seems to be most strongly associated 
with the moral and despair emotions.  Specific regrets are more likely to evoke moral 
and hot emotions, while general regrets are more likely to evoke wistful emotions.  
Neither type of regret is more strongly associated with despair emotions.  Not all of 
the patterns found for specificity also extend to agency.  
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Temporal factors  
 Although no temporal manipulation was included in this study some temporal 
patterns were derived post hoc for the purpose of comparison with previous studies 
in this thesis and because they have a bearing on claims made by Gilovich et al.  
 
Recent and distant regrets 
First of all a simple descriptive analysis showed that only 4 regrets in total 
(5%) concerned events from within the most recent year of participants‟ lives, and 
only 32 (38%) concerned events from the most recent decade. This finding suggests 
that people do not naturally gravitate towards very recent events when selecting their 
regrets. 
 For the purpose of comparison with Studies 1 and 2 a simple analysis of 
temporal distribution was carried out using the regrets of participants over 40 years 
of age.  The distributions of specific and general regrets in Figure 4.1 clearly show 
patterns similar to those in Study 1 and 2, with a distinct reminiscence bump for 
general regrets, 57% of which concern experiences from the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 decades.  By 
contrast only 11% of specific regrets concern experiences from this period, with the 
majority (63% ) concerning experiences from the 4
th
 and 5
th
 decades.  Needless to 
say participants under 40 years of age reported all of their regretted experiences as 
coming from the second and third decades (43% and 57% respectively). 
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Figure 4.1 The temporal distribution of specific and general regrets as a 
function of time in decade intervals for participants over the age of 40 
 
Analysis of emergence 
 As with Studies 1 and 2 a measure of emergence was derived by calculating 
the time elapsed between the source experience and the awareness of its regrettable 
consequences.  For specific regrets the time lapse ranged from 0 to 17 years (M = 
1.2, SD = 3.1), while for general regrets the range was much broader, from 0 to 41 
years (M = 5.8, SD = 8.5).  For 67% of specific regrets the consequences were 
regretted in less than a year, and 83% in less than two years.   For general regrets, 
only 35% of the consequences were regretted in less than a year, and only 44% in 
less than two years.  Due to concerns regarding unequal variances, these differences 
were compared using a non-parametric test.   The median time elapsed for general 
regrets was 2yrs and the median time elapsed for specific regrets was 0 yrs, so the 
consequences of general regrets took significantly longer to emerge than those for 
specific regrets; U = 522.5, p <.001, r =. 39, which is similar to what was found  in 
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Studies 1 and 2, although the time lapses overall were considerably longer in those 
studies.   
 
Participant age and overall regret  
 One factor not taken into account by Gilovich et al. is participant age.  
Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) found that older participants experienced less regret 
overall than their younger counterparts, and in the present study there was a 
significant correlation between age and the overall measure of regret (r = -.42, p 
<.001) suggesting that the affective impact of regret diminishes as people get older.  
Although the strength of this relationship was somewhat attenuated when the time 
since awareness of the regret was controlled for, nonetheless it continued to be 
statistically significant (r = - .22, p < .05.).  
 
Analysis of regret content  
 As previously mentioned the regrets were coded for content and according to 
whether they were self- or other-focussed.   The analysis of content shows the top six 
life domains ranked in descending order as follows: Family, “Not saying goodbye to 
my father, who died suddenly” (24%); Intimate relationships, “Splitting up with my 
ex the way I did” (16%); Character, “Not intervening on behalf of someone being 
bullied” (13%); Multiple domains, “Going straight to work from school and not 
having time for travel, fun, university” (13%); Education, “Not getting to 
University” (11%); Work/Career, “A job that I should have applied for” (10%).  The 
ranking is consistent with the previous studies in the thesis and with the wider 
literature.   
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 The analysis of self- and other-focussed regrets showed that 57% of the 
regrets could be described as self-focussed, 20%  of which concerned experiences of 
personal achievement (“Not getting my qualifications earlier”) and the remaining 
37% concerning self-actualisation (“Taking drugs and ruining my chances in life”).  
Thirty eight per cent of regrets were coded as other-focussed and these concerned a 
variety of experiences, but many appear to be tinged with bad conscience, either for 
having wronged others (“The way I treated my boyfriend”), or for having failed to 
take opportunities to do good for other, (“Didn‟t support my mum enough when she 
was dying”), the latter being a typical example of regret for not „being there‟ for a 
loved one.  Other-focussed regrets also imply or describe a moral transgression 
(“Not calling the police after witnessing an accident”; “Breaching the confidence of 
a close friend for the right and moral good.”) and suggest different kinds of 
guilt/shame experiences. The remaining 6% of regrets were coded as miscellaneous 
(“That my parents looked on the older sibling as second best”).   
  
4.2.3 Summary of the main findings 
 Contrary to what has been found in previous studies in this thesis there was 
no significant overlap between regret specificity and agency, as neither specific nor 
general regrets were significantly more likely to be due to either action or inaction.  
Nonetheless, the results support the main predictions regarding the relationships 
between regret type and emotion cluster.   Specific regrets were significantly more 
likely than general regrets to evoke hot and moral emotions, whereas general regrets 
were more likely than specific regrets to evoke wistful emotions.  Despair emotions 
were less clearly associated with regret type and were as likely to be evoked by 
specific as by general regrets.  With the exception of the results for the despair 
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cluster, these patterns replicate those found by Gilovich et al. for action and inaction 
regrets.  Agency was less reliably able to discriminate between the clusters, and 
although action regrets were more likely than inaction regrets to be hot, inaction 
regrets were only marginally more likely than action regrets to be wistful and neither 
actions nor inactions were significantly more likely to be associated with the moral 
or despair clusters. 
Overall, regret was more strongly associated with the moral emotions than 
with any other cluster, which is consistent with previous research linking regret with 
guilt and shame (Mandel, 2003; Saffrey & Summerville, 2008; Tangney, 1995; 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen & Reinderman, 1998) 
and with taxonomical studies associating regret with remorse (Shaver et al., 1987; 
Storm & Storm, 1987 ).   Regret was also more frequently associated with despair 
emotions than with either the hot or wistful emotions, and this too reflects 
taxonomical associations found by Shaver et al., who consider sadness as a basic 
level category which includes despair and related emotions in one cluster and regret, 
remorse, guilt and shame in a cluster of their own. 
 Consistent with Studies 1 and 2 in this thesis, the general regrets of adults 
over 40 tended to concern events from the reminiscence bump period, whereas 
specific regrets tended to cluster in more recent decades, primarily decades four and 
five. The consequences of general regrets also took longer to emerge than did the 
consequences of specific regrets.  An analysis of the relationship between participant 
age and overall measures of regret showed that older participants experienced less 
regret than did younger participants even when the age of the regret was controlled 
for, which is consistent with findings by Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002).   
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 The results of the analysis between self-focussed and other-focussed regrets 
extend the distinction proposed by Berndsen et al. between self-actualisation regrets 
and guilt experiences.   Two types of self-focussed regret were identified in the 
present study; those concerned with achievement and those concerned with other 
aspects of the self.  These two types differed reliably in that self-actualisation regrets 
evoked more emotion overall, and more moral emotions than regrets involving 
achievement.   
  
4.3 Chapter discussion 
Overall, the results of this study add to the  general claim that models of 
autobiographical memory offer viable alternative interpretations for many of the 
effects found in the regret literature, not only those relating to regret‟s temporal 
profile but also to distinctions between regret and emotions such as guilt. For 
example, Berndsen et al. distinguish regret from guilt solely on the basis of a self-
other focus, but an alternative suggested by the results of the present study is that a 
distinction can be made between guilty or highly moral regrets, which tend to 
concern specific events, and regrets of a less guilty or moral nature, which tend to 
concern general, achievement-related experiences. 
 The predicted patterns of relationships between event specificity and the 
emotion clusters were found despite the absence of an overlap between the specific-
general / action-inaction distinctions, suggesting that the patterns have more to do 
with the way that events are represented in memory than with attributions of agency, 
which did not discriminate as clearly between the emotion clusters.  Although the 
specific-action overlap has been unreliable throughout the preceding studies, the 
general inaction overlap has been relatively robust and the absence of the overlap 
 181 
here prompts the question; what makes this study different?  First of all participants 
in the present study had to provide a single regret of a designated type, and so it 
seems likely that they chose their single most important regret.  Secondly, this is the 
only study where regret was explicitly associated with other emotions, especially the 
moral emotions.  Although the design of the questionnaire required participants to 
first describe their regret and then turn to the emotion checklist, natural curiosity 
would lead most people to look at the entire questionnaire before beginning, which 
means they would have the emotion checklist in mind from the outset.  This may 
have prompted participants to give greater consideration to the moral aspect of their 
regrets, as reflected in the high ratings for moral emotions and the relatively low 
ratings for wistful emotions.  More than half (53%) of the regrets reported concerned 
family, intimate relationships, and character, whereas only 18% concerned work and 
education, which may explain why there were more general actions than is found 
when those achievement domains are better represented.   
 Many specific inaction regrets convey a sense of moral failing or bad 
conscience (turning down an opportunity to attend an anti-war rally; not calling the 
police after witnessing an accident), as do many general action regrets, which are 
more idiosyncratic and less obviously „scripted‟ than the general regrets found in 
previous studies (having started to smoke; taking drugs at an early age; having an 
affair; telling lies; being unfaithful, and being thoughtless towards a loved one).  It 
may simply be that the overlap between specificity and agency is blurred by the 
narrow focus created in this study. 
 Only four regrets in the present study concerned events from within the most 
recent year, which is a revealing finding given that participants could choose from 
any period of their lives.  This has implications for the manipulations used by 
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Gilovich et al. and suggests that regrets for very recent events are either not as salient 
in memory as those from the entire lifetime, or are not as memorable for other 
reasons.  Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002) found that the average age of „entire 
lifetime‟ regrets was 21 years, and Wrosch et al. (2007) found that people‟s „most 
severe‟ regrets concerned events that happened between 28 and 35 years ago.  
Perhaps more striking is Strongman and Kemp‟s (1991) finding that of the 912 
mostly specific events recalled by their participants in response to emotion cue  
words, almost all were at least a month old, with only 14% that were less than a 
month old.  Equally striking is Bonnefon and Zhang‟s (2008) finding that of the 957 
participants in their study, 766 (80%) reported regrets that were at least one year old. 
These findings suggest that defining recent and distant regrets in terms of the past 
week and the entire lifetime creates an artificial distinction which may lead to the 
comparison of two entirely different types of experience for which measures of 
affective „temperature‟ are inadequate.  There may be a need to distinguish regrets 
with primarily affective consequences (those that can be recollectively experienced 
for example) from those for which the consequences have more abstract, narrative 
impact.   
On the whole Gilovich et al. introduced into regret research an important 
functional distinction which appears to be intuitively clear but which may be less so 
in reality.  Lecci et al. (1994) associate the term regret with “unfulfilled or rueful 
goals and their associated „hot‟ cognitions.”(p731) and whereas the present study 
found hot emotions to be statistically independent of wistful emotions, they were 
positively associated with the despair emotions, something also found by Wrosch 
and Heckhausen (2002) and Wrosch et al. (2007). The moral emotions were also 
strongly associated with hot and despair emotions, so the results of this study suggest 
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that additional distinctions are necessary to capture the many varieties of regret that 
people can experience and remember.  
 Finally, what of Berndsen et al.‟s claim that regrets involving harm done to 
others are better thought of as guilt? The analysis along the self-other dimension 
suggests that a simple dichotomy is too crude to capture the complexity of regret and 
does not reliably distinguish it from guilt.  In fact, it was easier to distinguish 
between the two types of self-focussed regret than it was to distinguish self-
actualisation regrets from those involving other people.  Although highly guilty 
regrets (those rated 5 on the guilty item)  tended to concern other people, several 
were also directed towards the self (“starting to smoke”; “remarrying after divorce”; 
“giving in to a negative emotion and throwing away 2 years of education”; “having 
too much to drink and missing out on the main event of a hen party”; “taking drugs 
and ruining my chances in life”).  Neither was it the case that highly guilty regrets 
only involved harm done to others; they also concerned good withheld (“not inviting 
friends and relatives of the deceased to a funeral”) or not „being there‟ for people 
(“not going away with a partner who died while away”; “not being with parent when 
they died”).  There was considerable overlap between guilt and remorse; of the 17 
regrets rated as highly remorseful, 10 were also rated as highly guilty, and of the 19 
highly guilty regrets,10 were also rated as highly remorseful. It must be noted 
however that while many regrets received high ratings on other emotions, the means 
overall were at the low end of the scale, suggesting that on the whole participants did 
not associate their regrets strongly with other emotions. Overall, the results of this 
study suggest that there is more to regret than can be represented by either 
hot/wistful or self/other distinctions and much more will need to be  done before it is 
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possible to say whether regret is in fact a discrete emotion, and if so, how it might be 
distinguished from the emotions with which it is frequently associated. 
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Chapter 5: The consequences of regret 
 
5.0 Chapter overview 
This final empirical chapter reports the findings of a study that is primarily 
concerned with the impact of different types of regret on people‟s lives and with how 
patterns of impact might contribute to an interpretation of the temporal profile of 
regret.  An operational definition of impact derived from the structure of the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base measures the number of life domains 
affected by each regret and the number of consequences it produces. The study is 
motivated by the intuition that general regrets are likely to have a broader impact 
over time than are specific regrets, because general regrets encompass broader time 
frames and have a greater explanatory role in the self narrative.  Because general 
events tend to concern inactions it is suggested that this might partly explain the 
temporal pattern of regret.  This claim is tested in contrast with a recent study 
making similar claims about impact but using agency as opposed to event specificity 
as an explanatory factor (Rajagopal, Raju & Unnava, 2005). 
Other aspects of regret are also examined in the study, including people‟s 
awareness of the impact their regrets have for other people, their awareness of the 
positive consequences of their regrets, and differences between private and shared 
rehearsal.    
 
5.1  Introduction: the impact of regret over time 
As was described in the introductory chapter, the impact of regret can be 
represented and measured in a variety of ways, but in everyday parlance people often 
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talk about the impact an experience has had on this or that area of their lives, often 
describing the knock-on consequences within or between domains. For example, 
regrets for missed educational opportunities are thought to be so frequent precisely 
because education is seen as a gateway to achievement in so many other domains of 
life (Roese, 2005; Roese & Summerville, 2005). Having no qualifications may limit 
a person‟s work options, which may in turn have consequences for their finances, 
their relationships, and even their health (Jokisaari, 2004).  Although the actual 
impact a regrettable experience has on a person‟s life may depend on numerous 
affective and pragmatic factors, how that person perceives and describes the impact 
may have much to do with the way it is represented in autobiographical memory.  
As was demonstrated in Studies 1 and 2, people tend to express their life 
regrets in general terms, both at the level of lifetime periods (“Not going to 
university”) and summarised events (“Arguments with family”).  Because such 
experiences can span periods from months to decades it is reasonable to assume that 
they are seen as having a broader impact over time than are regrets at the level of 
specific events (“An argument with my dad”), which span much shorter periods of 
time.  Moreover, because general events are thematically organised (Conway & 
Rubin, 1993), connected by interlocking goals (Barsalou, 1988), and central to the 
coherence of the personal narrative (Bluck & Habermas, 2000) it is likely that 
general regrets, which have been shown to have scripted characteristics, have a 
prominent explanatory role in the self narrative.    
Of course some specific regrets can also have far-reaching consequences (a 
drink driving offence that leads to a loss of one‟s driving license and job), but the 
consequentiality of such regrets may be viewed as having more to do with the nature 
of the event itself, (i.e., in practical terms a drink driving offence is inherently 
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consequential) and less to do with the specificity of the representation in memory, 
whereas it is the relatively abstract mnemonic structure of general regrets that 
contributes to their perceived impact. Because general regrets represent a broader 
category of event knowledge they will have nested within them many thematically 
linked lower level general consequences, which will in turn nest many specific 
consequences.  
A similar argument framed in terms of agency rather than specificity is made 
by Rajagopal et al., who recruit memory-based mechanisms to test whether regret‟s 
temporal pattern is due to inaction regrets being more available
2
(more numerous) or 
more accessible (more easily retrieved) than action regrets. The authors reason that 
inaction regrets are more accessible than action regrets because they have a broader 
and deeper impact, and because inaction regrets affect more domains and have more 
consequences than do action regrets, they become associated with more cues in 
memory, which increases their chances of retrieval. In addition, inaction regrets are 
more frequently rehearsed (Savitsky et al., 1997) and this increases their salience in 
memory. 
Rajagopal et al.‟s studies include two measures of accessibility (retrieval time 
and order of retrieval), one measure of availability (total regrets listed in untimed 
recall), a measure of rehearsal (frequency of thought), and a temporal manipulation 
similar to that used by Gilovich and Medvec (1994; 1995) and Gilovich et al. (1998), 
whereby long term regrets are drawn from the entire lifespan and short term regrets 
are drawn from the previous week. 
                                                 
2
Rajagopal et al. use Tulving and Pearlstone‟s (1966) definition of availability as the existence of a 
trace in memory, and accessibility as the ease with which that trace is recalled. However, considerable 
ambiguity surrounds the definition and measurement of these concepts and many researchers treat 
availability as meaning easily accessible for recall (Asch & Ebenholtz, 1962b; Horowitz, Norman  & 
Day, 1966; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).   
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As neither accessibility nor availability are tested in the present study, 
Rajagopal et al.‟s findings on these variables can be summarised as follows: 
accessibility was superior for long term inaction regrets, which were retrieved more 
quickly (Study 1) and were more frequently listed within a period of two and a half 
minutes (Study 2) than were long term action regrets.  No differences in accessibility 
were found for short term regrets.  No differences in availability were found between 
action and inaction regrets in either the long or short term.  
 On their measures of breadth and depth of impact Rajagopal et al. predicted 
that inaction regrets would affect more life domains and have more consequences 
than would action regrets, because the outcomes of inaction regrets are uncertain, 
and so they can have potentially unlimited consequences attributed to them, whereas 
the consequences of actions are limited by what has actually happened.  As 
predicted, long term inaction regrets affected more domains than did long term 
action regrets.  For short term regrets there were no differences.  On the measure of 
depth of impact they found, as predicted, that long term inaction regrets produced 
more consequences than did long term action regrets. No difference was found for 
either action or inaction regrets in the short term.  Depth of impact also increased 
over time for inaction regrets but not for action regrets.   
Mixed results were obtained for rehearsal.  When measured on a numerical 
scale, frequency of thought was greater for inactions than for actions, in both the 
short and long term; but when measured by asking participants which type of regret 
they thought about most frequently, only long term inactions were more frequently 
thought about.   
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In summary, Rajagopal et al. find that inaction regrets are more accessible 
than action regrets in the long term, affect more life domains, produce more 
consequences and occasion greater rehearsal than do long term action regrets.  
No issue is taken here with Rajagopal et al.‟s main findings, but there are 
issues regarding the memory-based mechanisms motivating their arguments, which 
are derived from serial recall and associative memory research.  For example, the 
claim that inaction regrets are more accessible than action regrets because they are 
attached to more cues draws on an analogy with the “fan effect” (Anderson, 1974) 
from recognition memory research. This is the observation that adding facts to a 
knowledge concept in memory (increasing its “fan” structure) raises the probability 
that the concept will be activated.  The argument for the greater availability of 
inaction regrets draws an analogy with the “list length effect” (Murdock, 1962) 
whereby more items are recalled from a longer list than from a shorter one: inaction 
regrets are seen as items on a list that gets longer over time than the list for action 
regrets, making inaction regrets more plentiful in memory.   
It is doubtful that the consequences of regret, with their affective and 
narrative overlap, are thought about in the same way as semantic facts attached to a 
knowledge concept.  Neither is it likely that the list length effect describes the 
process of retrieving life regrets, because this effect applies to the recall or 
recognition of words on a list in a short-term memory study where the items are 
literally of no consequence to the participant.  Such analogies ignore the 
motivational core of regret and autobiographical memory. 
Whether such analogies are valid is questionable; but they are not even 
necessary, as Rajagopal et al.‟s findings can be accounted for by models of 
autobiographical memory if the overlap between general-inaction and specific-action 
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regrets is assumed.  The superior accessibility of general inaction regrets for instance 
can be explained by the fact that the general level of event representation is the 
preferred level of access to the autobiographical memory knowledge base (Conway 
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and general level events are known to provide quicker 
access when used as primes (Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Reiser, Black & Abelson, 
1985).  The alternative proposed here is very simple: since inaction regrets tend to be 
general in nature they will touch more domains, be attached to more consequences, 
and be more frequently rehearsed than action regrets, which tend to concern specific 
events.    
  
Overview of Study 6 and main predictions 
The main predictions of Study 6 are predicated on finding a significant 
overlap between general/inaction regrets and specific/action regrets.  Following this, 
it is expected that the impact effects found by Rajagopal et al. for agency will be 
mirrored for regret specificity, such that general regrets will affect more domains, 
have more consequences overall, and have more consequences per domain than will 
specific regrets. General regrets are also expected to be rated higher on measures of 
rehearsal than are specific regrets.   
Some additional variables not tested by Rajagopal et al. are included in this 
study.  Two measures tap the self-referential nature of regret; these are measures of 
perceived impact for the self and other people, and awareness of the consequences 
for the self and other people. Autobiographical memory is self-serving (Conway, 
2005), and regret is a self-focussed emotion (Mandel, 2003), but research presented 
in the previous chapter shows that some regrets are also other-focussed, implying an 
awareness of the impact of one‟s behaviours on others.  On the whole perceived 
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impact and awareness of consequences are expected to be greater for the self than for 
other people.  In addition, the awareness of consequences measure is taken for two 
points in time: the time of the regrettable experience and the time of participating in 
the study. This latter manipulation is included because it has been suggested that 
inaction regrets have emergent consequences (Gilovich et al.,1998) and in Studies 1 
and 2 evidence of emergence was provided for general regrets. If this is the case, 
awareness of consequences for general regrets should be greater in the present than 
at the time of the source experience. Awareness for the consequences of specific 
regrets is more likely to be greater at the time of the event.  
A similar then/now measure of importance is also included, and for similar 
reasons. If consequences become apparent in hindsight, then so should the 
importance of the source experiences increase when their consequentiality is 
recognised.  Specific regrets on the other hand, which have relatively instant and 
short-lived consequences, would be expected to diminish in importance over time.  
Also measured is participants‟ awareness of positive consequences, as recent 
work suggests that people can readily see the positive aspects of regret (Saffrey, 
Summerville & Roese, 2008) and so it is expected that participants will be able to 
list positive consequences to their regrets. A direct measure of perceived impact is 
expected to correlate positively with the indirect measures of impact (breadth and 
depth). 
Two measures of rehearsal (private and shared) are included in this study. 
Rajagopal et al. found that inaction regrets were thought about more often than 
action regrets, and although they allude to the possibility that rehearsal includes 
talking about one‟s regrets to others they do not measure shared rehearsal.  In this 
study people will be asked explicitly to say how much they have thought (private 
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rehearsal) or talked (shared rehearsal) about their regrets.  Overall differences are 
expected for both the private and shared rehearsal, such that ratings of private 
rehearsal will be greater than those for shared rehearsal, as the association between 
regret and rumination is well established (Jokisaari, 2003, 2004; Savitsky et al., 
1997; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002), while negative events are assumed to be less 
frequently shared socially (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  
Directional differences for rehearsal are expected to mirror those found by Rajagopal 
et al. for action and inaction regrets, which is to say that general regrets will be more 
frequently rehearsed than will specific regrets.  Finally, in line with previous 
research linking regret with personal responsibility (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead 
& van der Pligt, 1998), a measure of personal responsibility is included.  
No temporal manipulation is included in the present study, as the distinction 
used by Rajagopal et al. between regrets from the past week and those from the 
entire life was deemed unsuitable for comparisons along the specific-general 
dimension.   It has been shown that retrieval of emotional experiences shifts from 
episodic (specific) to semantic (general) memory over very short time frames 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002a,b), meaning that regrets from the past week would be 
expected to involve disproportionate numbers of discrete episodes, whereas general 
events would be relatively few.  There are no accessibility or availability 
manipulations in the present study. 
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5.2 Study 6: measuring the impact of regret   
 
5.2.1 Method   
Participants  
 Fifty three people took part in this study, 42 females and 11 males ranging in 
age from 17 to 61 years (M = 31.7, SD = 11.7).  The sample comprised students and 
staff from various faculties within Durham University and members of the general 
public recruited from the Durham, Stockton and South Tyneside areas.   The 
educational profiles of the respondents were as follows; secondary 1 (2%), advanced 
secondary 13 (24%), degree 8 (15%), postgraduate or equivalent 31 (59%). 
 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
 The study had a within-participants design and took the form of a semi-
structured interview for which participants were paid £5 for a session lasting up to 1 
hour.  The interview was conducted by the researcher personally, either in a 
dedicated office in the Applied Psychology Department at Durham University‟s 
Queen‟s Campus, or in a handful of cases (5) where participants were unable to 
travel, interviews were conducted in participants‟ homes. 
 Participants were recruited through colleagues, through e-mails sent out to 
various faculties at Queen‟s Campus, and through personal contacts.  Prospective 
participants were told that the study was about regret and that it would take the form 
of a semi-structured interview.  They were told that they would be asked questions 
relating to something they regretted, but would not be asked to disclose the content 
of the regretted experience itself.  They were assured that at no point would they be 
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required to disclose any information of a personal or embarrassing nature and 
anonymity and confidentiality were assured. 
 At the start of the interview participants received the following sheet, which 
contained an outline of the study.   
 
This is a study about regret and memory.  In particular, it is about how people 
remember their regrettable life experiences.     
 
You will be asked to think of experiences that you regret, but you will not be 
asked to disclose the content of your regrets.  You will answer questions related 
to the experiences, but you won‟t have to disclose the experiences themselves. 
 
The study takes the form of a semi-structured interview in which you will fill out 
a questionnaire and answer some questions.  Nothing you say will be recorded 
and your age, sex and level of education are the only personal details you will 
be asked to disclose.  Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw at any point. 
 
After reading the outline of the study and supplying demographic details and 
consent, participants received a sheet of paper with the following instructions:  
 
 I would like you to take some time to think about your life and to think of 
anything that you regret or have regretted in life.  It can be something you did 
or didn‟t do, a missed opportunity, a bad decision, or an unfulfilled dream.  It 
doesn‟t matter whether it seems trivial or important, so long as it is something 
that concerns you personally and which caused/causes you to feel regret.  
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Use the paper provided to write your regrets down.  This is to help you 
remember the experiences and you can keep or destroy it when the session is 
over.  You will be given a questionnaire to fill in.  There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions, but it‟s very important that you answer them as 
accurately and truthfully as you can.  I will go through the questionnaire with 
you to explain certain things. 
 
 Participants were told to take as long as necessary to think of the regrets and 
at this point the interviewer took the opportunity to leave the room.  Participants 
wrote down their regrets at their leisure in private, and at no point could the 
interviewer see what they had written down.  Once participants had written down all 
of their regrets they were told that for each regret they would be asked the same 
series of questions.  The first question concerned the specificity of the regretted 
experience and participants were asked whether the regret concerned an experience 
that had happened within the space of a single day (a specific regret) or over a longer 
period (a general regret).   
 For a specific regret they were then asked whether the feeling of regret was 
instant or delayed.  If it was delayed they were asked to estimate whether the delay 
could be measured in days, weeks, months or years. They were then asked how old 
they had been at the time of the regretted experience.  Then they were asked about 
agency and whether the regret was due to something they had done, failed to do, 
whether it was due to both, or neither.  The order of these terms was alternated 
between participants.   
 For a general regret the questions varied slightly.  Because general regrets 
span wider time frames, participants were first asked to estimate whether their 
regrettable experience spanned days, weeks, months or years.  They were asked to 
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estimate their age at the time they had become conscious of the feeling of regret and 
then to estimate their age at the time of the source experience.  If the regret 
concerned something they had failed to do, they estimated how old they were when 
they felt they first could have avoided the regretted inaction.  Although participants 
could supply an exact age if they wanted, most general regrets have diffuse temporal 
origins, and so participants estimates were often expressed in ranges of years and to 
the nearest decade.  The questions about agency were the same as those asked for a 
specific regret.  
 After this series of questions had been asked about each of the participant‟s 
regrets, the interview part of the study was over and participants completed the 
second part on their own.  For the second part of the study participants received a 
two page booklet corresponding to each individual regret.  A complete example of 
the booklet is presented in Appendix A, but the materials are presented here in 
summarised format.  The first sheet was split into 5 sections, each containing either 
one or two questions.  All responses were indicated on a seven point scale. 
  
 Question 1 addressed the past and present importance of the regretted 
experience.  It was in two parts. 
a) How important to your life at the time  was the thing that you regret? 
b) How important to your life now is the thing that you regret?   
(1 = not at all important; 7 = very important). 
  
Question 2 assessed the perceived impact of the regretted experience for the self 
and other people. 
a) How much impact has the thing that you regret had on your life? 
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b) As far as you can judge, how much impact has the thing that you regret had 
on the lives of other people? 
(1 = no impact at al; 4 = moderate impact; 7 = huge impact) 
 
Question 3 included two measures of rehearsal; private and shared 
a) I have thought about this regret 
(1 = never before now; 4 = occasionally; 7 = frequently) 
b) I have talked about this regret to other people 
(1 = never; 4 = occasionally; 7 = frequently) 
 
Question 4 concerned participants‟ awareness of the impact (i.e., consequences) 
of the regretted experience at the time for the self and other people. 
a) At the time of the thing that you regret, how aware were you of the 
consequences for other people?  
b) At the time of the thing that you regret, how aware were you of the 
consequences for you personally?  
(1 = not at all aware; 4 = somewhat aware; 7 = very aware) 
 
Question 5 addressed personal responsibility for the regretted experience: 
How personally responsible do you feel for the thing that you regret? ( 1 = not at all; 
4 = somewhat; 7 = totally) 
 
After these questions had been answered participants went on to the second sheet, 
which contained a tabular list of 12 life domains derived from Studies 1 and 2.  
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Participants received the following written instructions, which were further clarified 
verbally by the researcher: 
 
I would like you to choose from the list below those areas of your life which 
have been affected by the thing that you regret.  You can tick as many as 
necessary. For each area of your life that has been affected, please try to 
estimate the number of positive and negative consequences that have resulted 
from the thing that you regret. Use the scrap paper provided to list all the 
consequences and then add them up to give a total for each separate area. 
 
Participants were verbally informed that they should list all the consequences 
as they came to mind, in any order they came, and although there was no time 
constraint on this part of the task, participants were told to list only the „obvious‟ 
consequences.  This was explained as meaning that they should not try to think of all 
the hypothetical consequences, which are potentially limitless, but only those 
consequences that they themselves could perceive or had knowledge of. This was 
particularly important in cases where more than one domain was obviously affected 
by an experience.  Once they had listed as many consequences as they could think 
of, participants then had to tally up the positive and negative consequences in each 
domain, which they entered into the two corresponding columns on the list.  This 
procedure was repeated for each individual regret. 
Upon completion of the listing task, participants were verbally debriefed and 
given the opportunity to ask questions about the study, though no information could 
be given about the hypotheses being tested.  They were also given the option of 
taking their sheets of consequences (which many did) or destroying them in the 
shredder.  Participants were paid and the session was concluded.  
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5.2.2 Results  
Descriptive statistics 
 In total, 53 participants produced 204 regrets, 41 of which were specific and 
163 of which were general.  As only 27 participants reported having at least one 
specific and one general regret the within-subjects specific-general analyses along 
the main variables of interest (breadth, depth, awareness of consequences etc) 
involve only regrets from the subsample of those participants who produced at least 
one of each type.  This means that for those analyses only 35 specific and 71 general 
regrets are included. Because some direct comparisons are made with Rajagopal et 
al. on measures of breadth and depth of impact, comparable analyses are also carried 
out using agency as the dimension of contrast, and using only the action and inaction 
regrets from the 33 participants who had at least one of each type.  To measure the 
interaction between specificity and agency on each of the main variables would 
require unnecessary subdivision and the exclusion of even more participants, so to 
avoid such subdivision the analyses of the main measures are carried out for each of 
the two distinctions separately.  For certain descriptive and other analyses regrets 
from the whole sample are included (N = 53). 
 One further consideration concerns the absence of a temporal manipulation in 
the present study, which makes certain direct comparisons with Rajagopal et al. 
(2006) impossible.  Although some temporal measures are reported which have a 
bearing on relative psychological and chronological „distance‟, there is no 
comparable measure of recency.   
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Analysis of the overlap between regret type and agency 
Unlike previous studies in the thesis, there are no regret descriptions and 
participants designated their own regrets along the dimension of agency.  In total, 
35% of regrets were attributed to actions, 44% to inactions, 17% to both action and 
inaction, and 4% to neither action nor inaction.  Consistent with the procedure 
adopted in Studies 1-4c in this thesis, the overlap between the specific/general and 
action/inaction distinctions was analysed by calculating the proportion of each 
participant‟s regrets (all those coded as action, inaction, both or neither) that fell into 
each of four categories: specific action; general action; specific inaction; and general 
inaction.  
 The proportions were entered into a 2 (type: specific/general) by 2 (agency: 
action/inaction) ANOVA.  The analysis revealed a significant main effect of regret 
type; F(1, 52) = 35.23, MSE = .06, p < .00, ηp
2
 = .40 showing that the proportion of 
general regrets was higher than the proportion of specific regrets.  Although the 
proportion of inaction regrets (M = .44, SD = .28)  was greater than the proportion of 
action regrets (M = .35, SD = .27) there was no main effect of agency, F(1, 52) = 
1.75, p >.05, but there was a significant interaction between regret type and agency; 
F(1, 52) = 44.71, MSE = .04,  p < .001, ηp
2
 = .46.    Planned comparisons of the 
significant interaction showed specific regrets to be significantly more likely to be 
due to action (M = .17, SD = .20) than to inaction (M = .02, SD = .08); t(52) = 5.10, 
p <.005, r =.58.  General regrets were significantly more likely to be due to inaction 
(M = .42, SD = .29) than to action (M = .18, SD = .21); t(52) = 4.36, p <.005, r =.52.    
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Analyses by specificity 
 The summary statistics for all of the variables used in the main analyses by 
specificity are presented in Table 5.1. 
 Domain breadth (domains affected).   The first measure of breadth of impact 
was the number of domains affected by each regrettable experience.  To compare the 
differences between regret types, the means for domains affected by specific and 
general regrets were entered into a paired samples t-test.   General regrets affected 
significantly more domains than did specific regrets; t(26) = 4.20, p <.001, r = .63. 
 Global impact (number and valence of consequences).  The second measure 
of impact was the overall number of consequences listed for each type of regret, 
which Rajagopal et al. call depth of impact, but which in the present study is taken as 
another measure of breadth and is simply called global impact.  As participants listed 
both positive and negative consequences, the means for each type were entered into a 
2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 (valence: positive/negative) ANOVA.  The 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of regret type; F (1, 26) = 40.56, MSE 
=13.73, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .61, such that general regrets had significantly more 
consequences overall than did specific regrets.  As might be expected there was a 
significant main effect of consequence valence; F (1, 26) = 19.64, MSE =14.18, p 
<.001, ηp
2
 = .43, such that significantly more negative consequences were listed than 
were positive consequences.  The interaction between regret type and valence of 
consequence did not reach significance; F = 1.48, p >.05. 
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Table 5.1 Analysis by specificity: descriptive statistics for all critical 
variables, including means, standard deviations, for combined, specific and 
general regrets (N = 27) 
 
 
No. of regrets 
Combined 
(n = 106) 
Specific 
(n = 35) 
General 
( n = 71) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Domains 5.56 (1.67) 4.08 (1.89) 6.30 (2.31) 
Consequences       
Positive 3.32 (2.28) 1.85 (1.83) 4.14 (3.43) 
Negative 8.22 (4.15) 5.47 (3.84) 9.60 (5.74) 
Total 11.54 (5.01) 7.32 (4.57) 13.74 (6.93) 
Per domain 1.96 (.64) 1.81 (.69) 2.12 (.82) 
Awareness of 
consequences 
      
For self 3.81 (1.31) 3.95 (1.99) 3.79 (1.52) 
For other 3.10 (1.46) 3.24 (2.11) 2.97 (1.63) 
Impact       
For self 4.82 (1.01) 4.07 (1.71) 5.07 (1.23) 
For other 3.80 (1.09) 3.79 (2.01) 3.84 (1.26) 
Importance       
Then 4.61 (1.43) 4.90 (2.16) 4.55 (1.65) 
Now 4.78 (1.02) 4.10 (1.99) 5.01 (1.26) 
Rehearsal       
Freq of thought 5.22 (.67) 4.82 (1.21) 5.41 (.93) 
Talking to 
others 
3.45 (.94) 3.17 (1.48) 3.60 (1.20) 
Responsibility 5.82 (.72) 5.89 (1.19) 5.72 (.97) 
   
 Local impact (consequences per domain).  Rajagopal et al. suggest that 
inaction regrets might have more consequences in some domains than in others, 
although they do not directly test this assumption.  It is tested here by comparing the 
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mean number of consequences per domain as another measure of breadth of impact, 
which for convenience is called local impact.  Overall, general regrets had more 
consequences per domain than did specific regrets and this difference was 
marginally significant; t(26) = 1.96, p = .06, r = .36.   
 Awareness of consequences (for the self and others).  A 2 (regret type: 
specific/general) by 2 (awareness of consequences: for self/other) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run to assess the extent to which people are aware of the consequences 
their regretted experiences have for themselves and for other people, and whether 
this awareness differs according to regret type.  The analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of awareness focus; F (1, 26) = 7.86, MSE =2.01, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .23, with 
greater awareness of consequences reported for the self than for other people.  There 
was no main effect of regret type; F (1, 26) = .34, p >.05, and no significant 
interaction between regret type and awareness focus; F (1, 26) = .06, p >.05.   
 Perceived impact (on self and others). Perceived impact on the self and other 
people was measured by means of a 2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 (impact: 
self/others) repeated measures ANOVA.  The analysis revealed no significant main 
effect of regret type; F (1, 26) = 2.09, p >.05, but a significant main effect of focus of 
impact; F (1, 26) = 16.38, MSE =15.25, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .39, such that perceived 
impact was greater for the self than for others.  There was also a significant 
interaction between regret type and focus of impact; F (1, 26) = 4.83, MSE =1.26, p 
<.05, ηp
2
 = .16, which Tukey HSD  tests showed was driven by general regrets, 
which were rated significantly more impactful for the self than for other people; 
t(26) = 4.26, p <.01 r = .64.  A similar comparison for specific regrets was non-
significant; t(26) = .99. p >.05, r = .19. 
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 A simple analysis was carried out to test the assumption that impact can be 
measured by the number of domains affected and consequences produced by a 
regret.  The self/other ratings for perceived impact were combined (M = 4.51, SD = 
.86) and correlated with the means for domain breadth and global impact.  Overall 
ratings of perceived impact were positively correlated with domain breadth, but the 
correlation was only marginally significant; r = .26, p = .06.  Impact ratings were 
significantly correlated with the mean number of consequences however; r = .32, p < 
.03.  
 Importance over time (then/now).  A 2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 
(importance: then/now) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant effect of 
regret type, F = .85, p >.05, and no main effect of importance over time; F = .20, p 
>.05. Although the interaction between regret type and importance over time did not 
reach significance; F = 2.00, p = .097, it was close enough to warrant a comparison 
of the means, which show that general regrets are perceived to be marginally more 
important in the present than are specific regrets; t(26) = 2.00, p = .06, r =.36. 
 Rehearsal (private / shared).  The two measures of rehearsal are frequency of 
thought (private rehearsal) and talking to others (shared rehearsal).  The means 
from these variables were entered into a 2 (regret type: specific/general) by 2 
(rehearsal type: private/shared) repeated measures ANOVA.  There was a marginally 
significant main effect of regret type; F (1, 26) = 3.86, MSE =1.83, p <.06, ηp
2
 = .13, 
such that general regrets were rehearsed on average more than specific regrets.  
There was a significant main effect of rehearsal type, in that both types of regret 
were significantly more likely to be thought about (private rehearsal) than talked 
about (shared rehearsal); F (1, 26) = 66.48, MSE =1.21, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .72. There 
was no significant interaction between these two variables; F = .17, p >.05. 
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 Personal responsibility.  For the final measure, no directional differences 
were predicted, and none were found, as ratings of personal responsibility did not 
differ between regret types; t(26) = .59, p >.05, r =.11.  However, the mean rating 
overall is 5.82, which is close to the top end of the rating scale and suggests a strong 
sense of personal responsibility is associated with the experience of regret. 
 
Analyses by agency 
 All of the analyses carried out for specificity were also carried out for agency, 
thus providing a direct comparison with those variables tested by Rajagopal et al., as 
well as providing interesting contrasts between specificity and agency on variables 
not tested by Rajagopal et al.  In line with the criteria used for the specific-general 
comparisons, only those participants who had at least one regret of action and one 
regret of inaction were included.  Thirty three participants met this criterion. For the 
whole sample (N = 53), 35% were described as actions, 44% as inactions, 17% 
described as involving both an action and inaction, and 4% were described as being 
due to neither action nor inaction.  For the subsample of 33 participants who had at 
least one action and one inaction regret, these frequencies changed to 46% (actions) 
48% (inactions), 5% (both), and 1% (neither).  The summary statistics for all of the 
variables used in the analyses by agency are presented in Table 5.2.  
 Domain breadth (domains affected).   Using the average number of domains 
affected per regret, a t-test showed that on average, the impact of inaction regrets 
was not significantly broader than the impact of action regrets; t(32) = .47, p >.05, r 
=.08.  
 Global impact (total number of consequences).  The means for each type 
were entered into a 2 (agency: action/inaction) by 2 (valence: positive/negative) 
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ANOVA.  The analysis revealed no main effect of agency, F (1, 32) = .56, MSE 
=15.60, p = .46, ηp
2
 = .02, so neither action nor inaction regrets differed significantly 
in the number of consequences they produced.  As might be expected there was a 
significant main effect of consequence valence; F (1, 32) = 28. 81, MSE =19.61, p 
<.001, ηp
2
 = .46, such that significantly more negative consequences were listed than 
were positive consequences.  The interaction between agency and valence of 
consequence did not reach significance; F = .08, p >.05.  
Local impact (consequences per domain).  As would be expected from the two 
previous analyses, there was no significant difference between the number of 
consequences per domain attached to inaction and action regrets; t(32) = .26, p >.05, 
r =.04. 
 Awareness of Consequences (for self and other).  A 2 (agency: 
action/inaction) by 2 (awareness of consequences: for self/other) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of awareness focus; F (1, 32) = 8.19, 
MSE =2.33, p <.01, ηp
2
 = .20, with greater awareness of consequences reported for 
the self than for other people.  There was no main effect of agency; F (1, 32) = .39, 
MSE = 4.15, p >.05, ηp
2 
= .01, and no significant interaction between agency and 
awareness focus; F (1, 32) = .03, MSE = 1.13, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .001. 
 Perceived impact.  Perceived impact on the self and other people was 
measured by means of a 2 (agency: action/inaction) by 2 (impact: self/others) 
repeated measures ANOVA.  The analysis revealed no significant main effect of 
agency; F (1, 32) = .39, MSE = 4.15, p >.05, ηp
2
 = .01, but as with the analysis of 
specificity, there was a significant main effect of focus of impact; F (1, 32) = 37.89, 
MSE = 1.06, p <.001, ηp
2
 = .54, such that perceived impact was greater for the self 
than for others.   
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Table 5.2 Analysis by agency: descriptive statistics for all critical variables, 
including means, standard deviations, and sample sizes (N) for combined, action 
and inaction regrets (N = 33) 
 
No. of regrets 
Combined 
(n = 122) 
Action 
(n = 60) 
Inaction 
(n = 62) 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Domains 5.64 (1.93) 5.52 (2.67) 5.76 (2.16) 
Consequences       
Positive 3.60 (2.26) 3.27 (1.99) 3.92 (3.31) 
Negative 7.60 (4.17) 7.40 (4.69) 7.77 (5.64) 
Total 11.20 (5.05) 10.63 (5.77) 11.45 (7.34) 
Per domain 2.01 (.73) 2.02 (.80) 1.98 (1.02) 
Awareness of 
consequences 
      
For self 3.85 (1.47) 3.69 (1.99) 3.94 (1.66) 
For other 3.01 (1.44) 2.96 (1.66) 3.15 (1.85) 
Impact       
For self 4.97 (1.09) 4.40 (1.46) 5.53 (1.62) 
For other 3.87 (1.31) 3.94 (1.74) 3.79 (1.95) 
Importance       
Then 4.77 (1.30) 4.67 (1.79) 4.87 (1.79) 
Now 4.81 (1.09) 4.37 (1.69) 5.26 (1.21) 
Rehearsal       
Freq of thought 5.28 (.82) 5.10 (1.07) 5.45 (1.07) 
Talking to 
others 
3.68 (1.31) 3.37 (1.76) 3.99 (1.52) 
Responsibility 5.64 (.64) 5.65 (1.05) 5.64 (1.29) 
 
 There was also a significant interaction between agency and focus of impact; 
F (1, 32) = 11.34, MSE = 1.20, p <.003, ηp
2
 = .26, which Tukey HSD post hoc 
comparisons showed to be driven by inaction regrets, which were rated significantly 
more impactful for the self than for other people; t(32) = 6.01, p <.01, r = .72.  A 
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similar comparison for action regrets showed that although the perceived impact was 
greater for the self than for others, the difference did not reach significance after 
applying the Tukey HSD correction; t(32) = .1.98. p = .06, r = .33. 
 Importance over time. A 2 (agency: action/inaction) by 2 (importance: 
then/now) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a marginally significant effect of 
agency, F (1, 32) = 3.39, MSE = 2.46,  p = .06, ηp
2
 = .11 in favour of inaction 
regrets, but there was no main effect of importance over time;. F (1, 32) = .02, MSE 
= 2.79,  p > .05, ηp
2
 = .001, and no significant interaction between agency and 
importance over time; F (1, 32) = 1.58, MSE = 2.51,  p > .05, ηp
2
 = .05 
 Rehearsal (private/shared).  The final analysis involving direct comparison 
with Rajagopal et al. compares the extent to which action and inaction regrets differ 
in terms of rehearsal.  The means for private and shared rehearsal were entered into a 
2 (agency: action/inaction) by 2 (rehearsal: private/shared) repeated measures 
ANOVA.  The analysis revealed that there was a marginally significant effect of 
agency, such that the overall mean rehearsal score for inaction regrets was 
marginally greater than the overall mean rehearsal rating for action regrets; F (1, 32) 
= 4.12, MSE = 1.92, p = .05, ηp
2
 = .11.  There was also a significant effect of 
rehearsal type, with higher means reported for private rehearsal than for shared 
rehearsal; F (1, 32) = 58.84, MSE = 1.43,  p <.001, ηp
2
 = .65.  The interaction 
between agency and rehearsal type was not significant; F (1, 32) = .61, p >.05.  
 Responsibility. Neither action nor inaction regrets differed significantly in 
ratings of responsibility; t(32) = .03, p = .98, r = .01. 
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Temporal factors 
Although no temporal manipulation is used in the present study, a simple 
analysis revealed that of the 106 regrets produced by the subsample of participants 
with one regret of each type, only 13 regrets (5 specific, 8 general) concerned 
experiences from within a year of participation in the study.  This suggests that very 
recent experiences are not highly accessible.   
 An analysis was carried out to examine the time elapsed between the source 
experience and the awareness of its regrettable consequences, although the measures 
used in this study differ from those in Studies 1, 2, and 5 in that the dependent 
variables are categorical.  For specific regrets participants indicated whether the 
experience of regret followed immediately, after days, weeks, months, or years.  For 
general regret participants indicated the time period (days, weeks, months, or years) 
spanned by the regretted experience.   
 
Analysis of specific regrets 
 For specific regrets, 21 were regretted instantly, 7 within days, 2 within 
weeks, 4 within months, and only1 specific regret emerged after a period of years.  
As these frequencies are not independent, a Chi square analysis was not appropriate, 
so they were converted into mean proportions and entered into a single sample t-test 
(see Appendix B).  Only specific events that were instantly regretted (M = .64, SD = 
.48) were significantly different from chance, which was set at 1/5 = .20; t(26) = 
4.88, p <.001, r =.69. 
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Analysis of general regrets 
 Estimates of the time period covering the regrettable experience involved in 
their general regrets confirm the view that such regrets mostly concern experiences 
extending over long periods.  In total, 37 spanned years, 25 spanned months, eight 
spanned weeks, and only one regret spanned days.  As with the analysis of specific 
regrets these frequencies were converted into proportions of the total number of 
general regrets and entered into a single sample t-test, with a critical value set at 1/4  
= .25.  After applying the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison, only the 
proportion of general regrets spanning years (M = .49, SD = .33) was significantly 
greater than would be expected by chance; t(26) = 3.77, p < .005, r =.59.  The 
proportion of general regrets spanning months (M = .37, SD = .32) was greater than 
chance, but failed to reach significance; t(26) = 2.01, p >.05, r =.37. The proportions 
of regrets spanning weeks (M = .12, SD = .23) and days (M = .01, SD = .05) were 
both significantly lower than chance (ts -2.83, - 26.00; both ps <.01).    
 
Analysis of content 
 In Studies 1-5 the analysis of regret content was carried out using 
participants‟ own descriptions, with life domains being derived from the descriptions 
themselves. In the present study, the reverse is the case, as participants were not 
required to describe their regrets or disclose any information about the consequences 
of the regrets.  Consequently, the content of participants‟ regrets is not known and 
the possibilities for analysis are limited.  However, some worthwhile comparisons 
can be made.  Table 5.3 shows the life domains ranked in order of the total number 
of consequences per domain across the whole sample.   
 211 
 The ranking of life domains in Table 5.3  is a balance between the absolute 
frequency of consequences, the average number of consequences each participant 
reported for each domain, and the number of participants who had regrets in each 
domain (N).   What is striking about these frequencies is that the domain of 
character not only produces considerably more consequences than any other 
domain, but it is the only domain in which everyone recorded at least one regret, 
followed by self-development and family, friendships, and intimate relationships 
 The rankings suggest strong differences between regrets concerned with the 
self and those involving other people.  But without descriptions as a guide, 
differentiation along these dimensions would be purely speculative and possibly 
misleading.  First of all, the number of domains affected by each regret ranged from 
3 to 12 (M = 5.9, SD = 1.95), so the domains are not mutually exclusive.  
Furthermore, regrets are often framed in terms of a trade off between domains 
(family versus career for example) and self-development may also involve or 
implicate other people. 
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Table 5.3 Life domains ranked by the total number of consequences per 
domain (Cons), with mean consequences per domain (M), standard deviations, 
and percentage of positive and negative consequences  
Domain Cons M 
 
(SD) N % - 
ive 
%+ 
ive 
Character 420 2.03 (1.20) 53 63 37 
Family 372 2.10 (1.91) 50 74 26 
Self-development 367 1.83 (1.25) 52 60 40 
Intimate relationships 294 1.66 (1.10) 47 73 27 
Friendship 289 1.56 (1.00) 48 64 36 
Work 200 1.19 (.98) 43 66 34 
Education 192 1.10 (.89) 45 62 38 
Health 174 1.17 (1.17) 37 82 18 
Material 169 1.23 (1.47) 38 63 37 
Hobbies 108 .79 (.61) 34 71 29 
Location 93 .91 (.89) 30 62 38 
Travel 87 1.83 (1.25) 38 64 36 
 
 
5.2.3 Summary of the main findings 
 The main predictions of this study were supported by the results.  First of all 
a significant overlap was found between the two distinctions, such that general 
regrets were significantly more likely to concern inactions than actions, while 
specific regrets were significantly more likely to concern actions than inactions.  
Secondly, Rajagopal et al.‟s impact and rehearsal effects were replicated for general 
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and specific regrets: general regrets affected more domains, had more consequences 
overall, and more consequences per domain than did specific regrets.  Comparable 
analyses along the action-inaction distinction failed to replicate these results.  On the 
main measure of rehearsal (frequency of thought) general regrets were only 
marginally more likely to be thought about than were specific regrets, and an almost 
identical pattern was found for inaction and action regrets respectively.  
Ratings of perceived impact correlated positively with the measures of 
breadth and depth and were higher for the self than for other people, particularly in 
the case of general regrets.  Participants were also significantly more aware of the 
consequences for themselves than for other people.  More than a quarter of all 
consequences listed were considered to be positive, suggesting that people are able 
to identify silver linings when required to, as others have also found (Saffrey, 
Summerville & Roese, 2008).  Predictions regarding attributions of importance over 
time were not supported as no significant differences were found for either type of 
regret.  The two measures of rehearsal differed significantly and people were more 
likely to think about their regrets than they were to share them with others, and in 
both cases rehearsal was greater for general than for specific regrets.  Finally, as 
expected, ratings of personal responsibility were high and did not differ between 
types of regret. 
 
5.3 Chapter discussion 
 The principal aim of this study was to show that the patterns of impact found 
by Rajagopal et al. could be explained by the specific-general regret distinction, and 
in this regard the study has fulfilled its aim.  Indeed, differences on the measures of 
breadth and depth of impact were more reliable for the memory-based distinction 
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than they were for agency.  The failure to replicate these effects for agency may 
reflect some sensitivity to different methodologies, or perhaps framing effects.  
Participants in Rajagopal et al.‟s studies were asked to list the consequences 
associated with regrets of action or inaction, and since regret type was a within 
subjects manipulation it is possible that participants adopted a comparative mindset, 
which might favour inactions, because it is easier to imagine or infer consequences 
for inaction than for actions.  Also, since it has been shown that actions are more 
likely to be associated with immoral acts (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & 
Baron, 1991), being asked to think about the consequences of one‟s regrettable 
behaviours, which are likely to include feelings of guilt, shame or remorse, might 
actually inhibit the search for consequences of action regrets relative to inactions.   
In the present study participants simply listed the consequences of each regret 
without explicit reference to either regret type or agency, and this might have 
encouraged a different kind of search.  This is not to say that participants were 
unaware of or uninfluenced by agency or morality, but simply that the tension 
between these variables was not so pronounced or salient.  So the finding that 
general regrets affect more domains and produce more consequences overall than 
specific regrets may better reflect the underlying structures and processes of 
autobiographical memory . A finding that is difficult to explain is the absence of an 
overall inaction effect, which is at odds with the findings of  Studies 1,2 and 3 and 
with the regret literature generally. One possibility is that the face to face interview 
format has some effect on people‟s attributions of agency.  Whereas the moral 
connotations associated with actions may inhibit the search for consequences, as 
suggested above, the opposite may have been the case when participants were asked 
directly whether their regrets were due to something they had done or failed to do. If, 
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as the studies of anticipated regret suggest, there is some sort of cultural expectation 
that favours action, then admitting to regrets of inaction may be perceived as more 
self-implicating.    
Overall, people perceived the impact of their regrets as having been greater 
for themselves than for others, which supports previous research showing regret to 
be associated with self-focussed negative emotion (Mandel, 2003).  Interestingly, 
this bias was only found for general regrets: specific regrets were not significantly 
self-focussed, which leads to the speculation that specific regrets represent a more 
varied mix and involve more other-focussed emotions such  as guilt or remorse.  
Given this self-focus for perceived impact, it is not surprising that people were also 
more aware of regret‟s consequences for themselves than for others, although this 
awareness did not differ according to regret type. 
The self-implicating nature of regret is also reflected in the high ratings of 
responsibility, which confirm previous findings showing regret to score highly on 
measures of „self-agency‟ (Frijda et al. 1989) responsibility (Simonson, 1992; 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead & van der Pligt 1998) and self-blame (Mandel, 
2003).    
Also of interest is the finding that regret was thought about more than it was 
talked about, regardless of regret type.  It is perhaps not surprising that people appear 
reluctant to disclose their regrets to others given the traditionally negative perception 
of regret, its self-implicating character, and the strong associations it was shown to 
have in Study 5 with the moral emotions.  This finding is consistent with the view 
expressed by Berntsen and Rubin (2004) and Rubin and Berntsen (2003) that fear of 
social censure discourages people from discussing negative events.  It also echoes 
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research linking regret with rumination (Lecci et al., 1994, Jokisaari, 2003, 2004; 
Stewart & Vanderwater, 1999).   
One striking finding that is incidental to the main investigation but which has 
implications for arguments about accessibility is the observation that 80% of the 
regrets provided in this study were general in nature, and a significant proportion of 
these (52%) concerned events spanning years. This suggests that long term general 
regrets are highly accessible.  By contrast, eighty percent of specific regrets 
concerned events that were regretted within days, and a significant proportion of 
these (60%) concerned events that were regretted instantly.   
Whether general regrets are also more numerous in absolute terms, it is 
impossible to say, and indeed, Rajagopal et al. concede that their measure of 
availability may in fact be just another measure of accessibility, since only accessible 
regrets are reported.  Many participants in the present study expressed surprise at 
how many consequences they had been able to think of once they had begun to 
unpack them, and for many this was the first time they had thought about their 
regrets in this depth.  Some also described having „discovered‟ new regrets buried 
amid the consequences of the original regret, so the process of unpacking appears to 
be one in which the line between accessibility and availability is being constantly 
redrawn.  It may be that given unlimited time, people could exhaust their list of life 
regrets.  But the definition of availability used by Rajagopal et al. relies on the 
existence of a trace in memory for a given event, which means one could only 
include events that one remembers personally experiencing: this by definition would 
exclude many regrets incurred under the influence of alcohol, or regrets that arise 
when someone reveals to us that a comment we can‟t even remember making had a 
lasting negative impact on their self-confidence. 
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Equally informative is the observation that only 12% of the regrets involved 
in the analysis concerned experiences from within a year of participation in the 
study.  This finding is similar to that observed in Study 5, where equally small 
numbers of very recent regrets were recorded.  It would appear that events from the 
past week do not readily spring to mind when people freely recall their life regrets.  
Finally, in terms of the life domains perceived to have the greatest impact, it 
is revealing that the top five most consequential domains concern aspects of the self 
and relationships with other people. It is particularly noteworthy that the domain of 
character was the most consequential and also the only domain reported by all 
participants; thus supporting the view of regret as something with implications for 
the self.  By contrast the achievement domains such as education and work were 
neither highly ranked, nor highly consequential and people listed approximately 
twice as many consequences for character than they did for education and work, and 
almost twice as many for self-development and family than for education.  These 
results seem to suggest genuine qualitative differences between domains, with those 
involving harm to the self and other people being seen as having greater impact 
overall than those concerned with achievement.  This finding is consistent with the 
results of Study 5, which showed that regrets involving harm to the self or others had 
stronger associations than did achievement regrets with emotions such as guilt, 
remorse and shame.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
6.0 Chapter overview 
This final chapter has three main aims: (1) to summarise the main findings of 
the research reported in the thesis; (2) to contextualise the findings within the wider 
literature and consider their implications; and (3) to consider the limitations of the 
research and outline some future directions.  
 
6.1 Summary of the main research aims and findings 
The research reported in the thesis addressed questions pertaining to the 
temporal pattern of regret by means of a memory-based distinction between regrets 
for specific and general events.  This distinction was proposed as an alternative to 
the agency-based distinction between action and inaction regrets, which has been the 
dominant dimension of contrast in regret research. Throughout the thesis it has been 
argued that the specific-general regret distinction can account for many agency-
based effects observed in regret research. Underlying this argument are four 
assumptions: (1) that the specific-general and action-inaction regret distinctions are 
underpinned by one structural dimension of event specificity; (2) that specific regrets 
can be equated with the specific negative memories studied by autobiographical 
memory researchers; (3) that many general regrets concern positive scripted events 
gone wrong; and (4) that general regrets tend to concern more distant events whereas 
specific regrets tend to concern events from the recent past.   
Studies 1 and 2 looked at the temporal pattern of specific and general 
autobiographical regrets in the context of the life script account of the reminiscence 
bump phenomenon.  In both studies general regrets were more likely to be attributed 
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to inactions than to actions and they were more likely to concern experiences from 
the period of early adulthood than from elsewhere in the lifespan. Overall, regrets for 
distant experiences were more likely to be general than specific. By contrast, the 
experiences associated with specific regrets were more randomly distributed across 
the lifespan, and specific regrets showed patterns of recency similar to those 
typically found in autobiographical memory studies of negative memories.  Regrets 
for specific events were as likely to concern actions as inactions.  The content of 
people‟s regrets reflected patterns found in the wider literature, with regrets for 
experiences concerning family, intimate relationships (including marriage and 
parenting), education, work, character, and self-actualisation being the most 
frequently reported. 
Studies 3 – 4c primarily considered the contribution of the life script to the 
content and temporal distribution of prospective regrets. Based on the assumption 
that the life script would be as important in determining the distribution of future 
regrets as it was in shaping the distributions of retrospective regrets in Studies 1 and 
2, the novel prediction was made that a preminiscence bump in early adulthood 
would be found for the general anticipated regrets of young adults.  In a series of 
four studies predominantly young adults living through the bump period described 
and dated the experiences either they themselves might regret in life (Studies 3 and 
4a) or they described and dated experiences a peer (Study 4b) or an average person 
(Study 4c) might regret in life.  By tapping people‟s intuitions about the regrets of 
others, the latter two studies were a direct attempt to abstract life scripts away from 
personal concerns specific to individual participants.   
The main findings across Studies 4a-4c were that the anticipated regrets 
showed a pronounced preminiscence bump in the third decade, were predominantly 
 220 
general in nature, were overwhelmingly associated with inaction, and were 
consistent in terms of content.  Specific anticipated regrets were considerably fewer 
in number and tended to concern actions.    
In Study 3 participants also described what they already regretted, which 
allowed for a comparison to be made between the regrets from within the bump 
years, and the regrets about the bump years provided by the older adults in Studies 1 
and 2.  This comparison revealed remarkable similarities in content.  Bump age 
adults most frequently regretted experiences concerning education, family, intimate 
relationships, friends and the self, and older adults‟ regrets about the bump period 
concerned experiences in the same domains.  In particular, almost all regrets 
concerning education and the self came from the bump period, along with half of 
work and intimate relationship regrets.   
Study 5 applied the specific-general distinction to Gilovich et al.‟s (1998) 
distinction between “hot”, “wistful”, and “despair-related” regrets, and extended 
their model by the inclusion of a cluster of “moral” emotions.  The affective profiles 
they found for action and inaction regrets were replicated for specific and general 
regrets respectively, whereas analyses by agency provided only weak support for the 
Gilovich et al. findings.  Study 5 also extended Berndsen et al.‟s (2004) distinction 
between intrapersonal regret and interpersonal guilt by showing that within 
intrapersonal regrets a meaningful distinction could be made between two 
statistically independent categories of self-focussed regrets; those concerned with 
achievement and those involving other aspects of self-actualisation.   
Study 6 examined the hypothesis that the impact of general regrets, as 
measured by life domains affected and consequences produced, would be greater 
than the impact of specific regrets because general regrets have a relatively broad, 
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temporally extended structure in the autobiographical memory knowledge base 
(Conway & Rubin, 1993). This hypothesis was contrasted with comparable claims 
made for action and inaction regrets by Rajagopal et al. (2005) using a similar 
operational definition of impact.  The results supported the memory-based 
hypothesis: general regrets affected more domains, produced more consequences, 
and marginally more consequences per domain than did specific regrets. These 
findings were not replicated for agency and so did not support the Rajagopal et al. 
findings.  Other findings were that awareness of the impact of regrettable 
experiences was greater for the self than for others.  People were significantly more 
likely to think about their regrets than they were to share them with others, and regret 
was rated high on a measure of responsibility. 
 
6.2 Implications: narrow and broad  
The studies in the thesis were directly or indirectly motivated by two 
observations from regret research.  The first observation is that people regret their 
actions in the short term but over time it is their missed opportunities and failures to 
act that end up being regretted.  The second observation is that regret surveys 
consistently show that these missed opportunities and failures to act tend to concern 
experiences in the domains of education, career, romance, parenting, the self, and 
leisure.  Gilovich and Medvec (1995) offered the most comprehensive explanation 
for the first observation by providing evidence of cognitive and motivational factors 
that operate over time to dampen the effects of action regrets whilst at the same time 
making inaction regrets more troublesome and memorable. With regard to the 
second observation, Roese and Summerville (2005) suggested that regret is most 
prevalent in those life domains that offer opportunities for future corrective action, 
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whereas Beike et al. (2009) argue the opposite, that regret arises from recognising 
that future opportunities to redeem regrets are no longer possible. The conclusion 
derived from the studies reported in the thesis is that a more integrated account of 
these two findings can be offered by models of autobiographical memory, which 
suggest that both observations might be mediated, at least in part, by the interaction 
between event structure and the life script.    
Although many agency-based interpretations of regret‟s temporal pattern do 
recgonise the role of memory processes, they fail to consider the more fundamental 
ways in which the mnemonic structure of action and inaction regrets influences how 
they are remembered and construed over time.   Agency-based accounts that draw on 
surveys of older adults overlook the way that cultural factors like the life script bias 
retrospection in favour of the distant transitions of early adulthood.  By the same 
token, explanations for why people regret some experiences more than others 
overlook the influence of normative expectations about what is deemed important 
and regret-worthy in life, and while there is much to recommend both the Roese and 
Summerville (2005) and Beike et al. (2009) accounts, a much simpler explanation is 
that people regret what is self-implicating and culturally important.   
In the next section the specificity and agency distinctions will be considered 
more closely: in particular, the relationship between general and inaction regrets and 
between specific and action regrets. It will be considered whether the findings 
described in this thesis mean that the action-inaction distinction is totally subsumed 
by a distinction between general and specific regrets.   
There then follows a discussion of the relationship between regret as an 
autobiographical memory and regret as a decision making phenomenon, and in a 
subsequent section consideration is given to the role of scripts in determining norms 
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for what people regret and thus, the content of their regrets. Finally, the implications 
of the results are considered in the context of the relationship between regret and 
other emotions.  
 
6.2.1  The relationship between the distinctions 
6.2.1.1 Factors that make general inactions 
Regrets for inaction become more frequent in the long run because they tend to 
concern general and therefore distant events.  This simple but novel interpretation is 
consistent with models of autobiographical memory which show that event 
knowledge becomes more general with the passage of time (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) and with theories showing that temporally distant events tend to be 
construed in abstract terms (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  The interpretation is 
supported by the finding that inactions tend to be described in general terms and 
general regrets tend to concern more distant events on the whole.  These findings 
echo findings elsewhere in the literature showing that inaction regrets tend to 
concern distant events (Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002) and they are consistent with 
the observations in Gilovich and Medvec‟s (1994, Study  2) work showing that 
inactions viewed from a “distant retrospective standpoint” (p. 360) were more likely 
to be summaries of multiple instances of inaction.  
As Gilovich et al. speculated, and as was demonstrated empirically in Studies 1 
and 2, another factor that makes general inactions more prevalent in the long term is 
the emergent nature of their consequences, which often take years to be realised. 
Specific regrets on the other hand tend to concern events with instantly apparent 
consequences.  Moreover, as the results of Study 6 show, general regrets have far 
reaching consequences and their impact is experienced in many areas of life. 
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Furthermore, people perceive these general regrets as having had a greater impact on 
themselves than on others, whereas this egocentric bias is not found for specific 
action regrets.  Allied to this is the finding that people are more preoccupied with 
their general regrets, which are more likely than specific regrets to be rehearsed, so 
they are more salient in memory. It may be that that general regrets are easier to 
think and talk about than are specific regrets, as the latter are affectively “hotter” and 
more strongly associated with  self-implicating moral emotions. 
General regrets also appear to be more available to cognition, as is clear from 
the preponderance of general regrets reported across the studies.  Between 59% and 
80% of experienced regrets were general (the asymmetry was even more pronounced 
for prospective regrets, 85% of which were general) and the tendency to produce 
general responses is clearly very strong, as was evident in the two studies where 
regrets had to be recategorised.  Although this tendency may pose practical problems 
for researchers, it is, as Barsalou (1988) discovered, a highly informative bias. Given 
that inaction regrets tend to be general in structure, it becomes easier to appreciate 
the extent of the inaction effect reported in studies of autobiographical regret, 
particularly those involving older adults.  The Hattiangadi et al. (1995) data for 
example show that inactions outnumbered actions by more than four to one, and that 
does not include a category of „indeterminate regrets‟ (those coded as „both‟ or 
„neither‟) which in the studies reported in the thesis were on average three times 
more likely to be general than specific.  It would not be surprising to find similar 
patterns in surveys asking people to say what they would do if they had their lives to 
live over (DeGenoa, 1992; Hattiangadi et al., 1995; Kinnier & Metha, 1989; 
Landman & Manis, 1992; Landman et al., 1995) because as Kahneman (1995) has 
suggested, requests for regrets tend to elicit elaborative counterfactuals about how 
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life might have been better, which are likely to involve big changes of a general 
nature.  In temporal construal terms (Trope & Liberman, 2003) such requests might 
be interpreted as an invitation to consider personal goals at the superordinate level, 
which would necessarily elicit „bigger picture‟ construals of distant events.   
 Indeed, focussing on the „bigger picture‟ and superordinate goals may be an 
automatic response to a request to describe what one regrets in life, because regret is 
evaluative in nature and so as Landman (1993) points out, a request for regrets is a 
request to think, to evaluate, to judge.  As regret is also seen to be a valuable source 
of insight and sense making (Saffrey et al., 2007) it is likely that these broad, general 
level regrets are integral to processes of autobiographical reasoning (Bluck & 
Habermas, 2000).  It is revealing that in Studies 5 and 6 only five to eight percent of 
regrets were reported as having occurred within a year of testing.  This does tend to 
suggest that unless compelled by experimental instructions to do so, people do not 
naturally interpret requests for regret as requests to search memory for recent 
episodes in which they experienced regret. In fact the contrary seems to be the case; 
that regrets more often seem reasoned than recollected. 
 The greater availability of general (inaction) regrets may also partly explain 
why the action effect found in the scenario literature does not easily translate to 
ecological studies of autobiographical regrets: participants making judgements about 
fictitious characters in vignettes do not draw on the same structures and processes of  
autobiographical memory that are involved in the retrieval of their own 
autobiographical regrets.   
From an autobiographical memory perspective the tendency to produce 
general regrets could be explained by factors that favour the retrieval of information 
at the general level.  As a basic level category (Conway, 1992) general events 
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represent the maximum amount of information that can be processed with the 
minimum amount of cognitive effort, and the general event level is the preferred 
point of entry into the autobiographical memory knowledge base, making general 
events highly accessible (Conway & Bekerian, 1987;  Reiser et al., 1985). Moreover, 
as previously stated, general events and lifetime periods are used extensively in 
organising the personal narrative (Barsalou, 1988; Bluck & Habermas, 2000; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).    
But it is possible that this tendency to produce general regrets may have a 
functional purpose. As was described in the introductory chapter, Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggest that inhibitory mechanisms protect the self from the 
disruptive influence of negative memories by preventing their access beyond the 
general level of the autobiographical memory hierarchy. Recalling negative 
experiences by retrieving semantic rather than episodic detail is one way of creating 
psychological distance from emotionally threatening memories and it is assumed to 
occur naturally over time (Robinson & Clore, 2002,a,b). Moreover, people are 
inclined to adopt an objective third person perspective when remembering pasts that 
reflect unfavourably on their current view of themselves (Libby & Eibach, 2002), 
which would likely include many general, trait memories. So the tendency of  regrets 
to become more general over time may decrease the pain of the regrettable events in 
our lives. Summarised experiences become semanticised autobiographical facts 
indexed by other semantic information (Conway, 1987), so someone presented with 
the semantic category cue „regret‟ may bring to mind the autobiographical fact that 
they didn‟t work hard enough at school, which they know without having to 
remember their schooldays or anything negative at all.   
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Byrne (2005) has suggested that natural „fault lines‟ in the imagination 
determine the kinds of counterfactuals that people generate: the findings in this thesis 
suggest that similar fault lines in autobiographical memory determine the structure, 
and to a large extent the content, of the elaborative counterfactuals that make up 
people‟s life regrets, as they are overwhelmingly general in structure and tend to 
concern distant inactions in the domains associated with early adulthood. This 
finding may turn out to be the most informative and theoretically challenging 
contribution of the thesis, as it seems to confirm Alfred North Whitehead‟s 
observation that although we live our lives in detail „we think in generalities‟.  It also 
has implications for what can be inferred from regret surveys about what people 
actually regret, because the evidence suggests that regret surveys provide us with 
only a rather general picture.  
 
6.2.1.2 Factors that make short term specific actions 
Gilovich and Medvec (1995) suggested that action regrets tend to be short-
lived because they prompt behavioural and psychological repair work: following 
regrettable actions people engage in compensatory behaviours, seek out the positive, 
and recruit other dissonance-reducing mechanisms to lessen the sting of negative 
outcomes.    Whilst acknowledging the importance of these factors, there are other, 
more fundamental factors that serve to make regrettable actions short-lived in 
memory, and these are to do with mnemonic structure.  Action regrets are short lived 
because they tend to concern specific events, and several factors contribute to the 
relatively poor retention of specific negative events over long time periods.  
First of all, specific regrets are more likely to concern recent events, as 
demonstrated by the fine-grained recency analysis of Studies 1 and 2, which showed 
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that specific regrets are similar to negative memories in this regard. There were of 
course exceptions to this pattern and some specific events were retained over long 
time periods.  One participant in his sixties for example regretted a decision taken 
fifty years earlier not to return to face exams after a difficult day at school.  Events 
such as this, which turn out to have long term consequences, may be  memorable for 
many years and may turn out to be „self-defining‟ memories (Singer & Salovey, 
1993); but the vast majority of specific regrets concerned events that were much 
more recent.  
Another factor that doubtless contributes to specific actions being short-lived 
is that like other unpleasant events they are more quickly forgotten (Walker et al., 
1997).  Holmes (1970) suggested that the tension created by negative events is 
resolved naturally when their potential consequences fail to materialise, and this 
explanation seems especially likely in the case of action regrets.  For example, 
students awaiting the results of their finals may be tormented for weeks by regrets 
for specific mistakes and poor performance in exams, imagining worse case 
scenarios and living in dread of the results. But when the results turn out not to be 
that bad, the regrets that loomed so ominously simply vanish.   
The transitory nature of the affective experience itself ensures that the 
affective „heat‟ of specific regrettable events diminishes relatively quickly and the 
episode itself will be remembered with less and less detail over very short time 
frames, as there is a greater reliance on abstract semantic knowledge (Robinson & 
Clore, 2002a,b).  And as Taylor (1991) suggests, negative events mobilize 
biological, psychological, and social resources aimed at dampening the long term 
impact of these events, which is consistent with Gilovich and Medvec‟s (1995) 
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suggestion that action regrets are made less painful through dissonance-reducing and 
ameliorating mechanisms. 
Finally, regrets for particularly vivid emotional events may be challenging to 
the view of the self, especially if they involve self-implicating emotions such as 
shame and guilt, so the protective inhibitory mechanisms of the self memory system 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) may ensure that access to such disruptive 
memories is blocked. This may partly explain the relative paucity of specific regrets 
and why they are less likely to be talked about.  
 
6.2.2 One distinction or two?  
A central aim of the research in the thesis has been to examine the 
relationship between the action/inaction and specific/general regret distinctions. The 
findings across the studies suggest some alignment between the distinctions, but also 
evidence suggesting they are not interchangeable. This may reflect genuine 
differences in the distinctions themselves, but it could also reflect different 
methodologies, as was speculated in the previous chapter: studies in which 
participants are required to focus on agency as the primary feature of their regrets 
may elicit the involvement of different reasoning and recollective processes. This 
must be taken into account when considering the findings, as it is important to 
recognise that agency was treated as a within-subjects variable in all of the studies in 
the thesis and so the findings concerning the overlap are correlational. 
Whereas the relationship between inaction and general regrets seems strong, 
the relationship between specific and action regrets is less stable, because although 
specific regrets were as likely to be due to action as inaction, they were not as 
reliably associated with action as general regrets were with inaction. Also, in Study 2 
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agency interacted significantly with age group whereas regret type did not. Older 
participants were significantly more likely than younger participants to regret 
inaction, but the difference due to age in general regrets was non-significant.  
The thesis advanced is that inaction comes to be regretted over time because 
autobiographical memories become more general over time and inaction regrets have 
a more general mnemonic structure. However, it is possible that at least some of the 
factors identified by Gilovich and Medvec (1995) work to make the action/inaction 
distinction more pronounced than the specific/general distinction. As these processes 
operate over extended time periods, the action/inaction distinction should be most 
pronounced in older participants, as was observed in Study 2 where the inaction 
effect was larger in the 60s group.  Older participants, having less time in which to 
accomplish goals and aspirations, are more likely to be aware of things left undone, a 
possibility reflected in the assertion that reminiscence and life review bring “the 
resurgence of unresolved conflicts” (Butler, 1963, p. 66).  Empirical support for this 
assertion is provided by Jokisaari‟s (2003) observation that older people perceive 
their regrets as less likely to change and as being less under their control than do 
younger people.   People in the midlife period still have the opportunity to transform 
their regrets of early adulthood by making behavioural corrections (Stewart & 
Vanderwater, 1999).   
Landman (1987) suggests that while it may be ontologically or logically 
impossible to distinguish actions from inactions, the distinction is psychologically 
valid and Gilovich and Medvec (1995) take a similar view.  Whilst acknowledging 
the psychological reality of the action-inaction distinction and its contribution to our 
understanding of regret, the conclusion here is that a memory-based alternative can 
overcome any problems of definition.  As categories based on frequencies of discrete 
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phenomena, specific and general events are ontologically and logically distinct, and 
though the line between single and multiple instances of an experience may be 
psychologically difficult to distinguish, as Barsalou (1988) discovered and as was 
also found in Studies 1 and 3, a case of mistaken identity doesn‟t alter the identity of 
the mistaken object, or the possibility that it can be established (a single day is 
distinct from two or more days; one argument is a concrete experience distinct from 
the more abstract experience of arguing a lot).  
It could of course be argued that people choose to act or not, whereas they 
don‟t choose to have specific or general memories.  Many regrets do indeed stem 
from conscious decisions, but as has already been argued, many do not, and regret is 
something people can stumble or drift into because they often have no control over 
their circumstances or behaviour (Lowenstein, 1996). For example, an outburst of 
anger can override decision processes to produce a regretted action just as easily as 
years of apathy can paralyze decision processes and lead to regrettable inactions.  
While it may be true that people don‟t consciously choose the structure of the  
autobiographical memory knowledge base, there is evidence that emotional state and 
motivation can bias the type of information they attend to and later retrieve, (see 
Levine & Pizzaro, 2004).  Depressed individuals for example are prone to 
overgeneral memories (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) while even sub-groups of 
anxious individuals may differ reliably in the specificity of the memories they 
retrieve (Wenzel, Pinna & Rubin, 2004).  This is not to say that people consciously 
choose specific or general memories, but simply to caution against the assumption 
that regrets and memories can easily be distinguished on the basis of agency. 
 What we can do with memories which we cannot easily do with attributions 
of action or inaction however, is unpack and verify their contents using objective 
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criteria.  The validity of externally derived memories for real events can be 
established (by someone other than the person doing the remembering or regretting) 
using sophisticated autobiographical memory methodologies such as those used by 
reality monitoring researchers to separate real and imagined events according to 
perceptual, contextual, spatial and temporal characteristics (Johnson et al., 1988).  
Attributions of action or inaction on the other hand rely on internally generated 
memories of thoughts and intentional states, and memory for thoughts is known to 
be less reliable than memory for real events (Conway et al., 1996).  When referring 
to action and inaction regrets we typically mean their external consequences (the 
aftermath of an argument, the mediocre career resulting from a wasted education).  
But the psychological antecedents, insofar as we are aware of them at all, remain 
internal and subjective and are likely to be forgotten over time, making our past 
behaviours inexplicable, particularly our reasons for inaction (Gilovich & Medec, 
1995). Regrettable actions often involve a failure to inhibit some impulse, or to not 
do something, but it is the act and its consequence we remember.  Similarly, time 
wasted not doing X was time spent doing Y instead, but the former dominates our 
awareness.  The interplay of conscious and unconscious processes makes the 
psychological origins of our behaviours difficult or impossible to establish.   
 The same problem of validation applies of course to regret in general, which 
is a subjective experience involving internal judgements and affective responses.  
We cannot validate regret itself but we can validate memories for the antecedent 
circumstances of regret.  This has implications for issues of responsibility and 
learning, as is suggested by Mather, Shafir and Johnson (2000), who observed that 
people misremember past choices in a way that supports the choices they made.    
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6.2.3 Regret, autobiographical memory and decision making 
 The discussion of agency brings to the fore the contrast made in the 
introductory chapter between the traditional decision making approaches to regret, 
and the memory-based approach proposed in the thesis.  Many conceptual points 
could be debated, but at a more practical level, much can be gained by looking at the 
content of people‟s regrets and the language they use to describe them. What comes 
out clearly from the regret descriptions is that contrary to what Zeelenberg and 
Pieters (2007) take as axiomatic, regret is not clearly the product of decisions, at 
least not in the sense of conscious, deliberated choices between options.  In fact 
many regrets refer to dispositions (“Being cautious and timid”; “That I am not 
strident enough”; “Not being more outgoing”) and seem more a lament for lost 
possible selves (King & Hicks, 2007) than for bad choices, because individuals 
expressing such regrets attribute the source of regret not to what they have or haven‟t 
done, but to who and what they are.  For example, parents who regret the behaviour 
of their children (“I regret that my son left his wife to live with a man; what could I 
have done?”) would not meet the criteria of a strictly decision-based view of regret, 
yet they may well feel partly responsible for the behaviour of their offspring and so 
feel they have failed in their role as parents.   
These characterological regrets are frequent in other studies (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1994; Hattiangadi et al., 1995) and this observation supports the argument 
made in the introductory chapter that much of what people end up regretting is the 
product of general patterns of behaviour, the residue of many forgotten instances 
when this or that inclination was followed.  Indeed, Gilovich and Medvec (1995) 
themselves point out that the forgotten reasons for not acting, which make inaction 
inexplicable and unjustifiable in hindsight, become a kind of dispositional regret, as 
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people castigate themselves with accusations that they are  “just too timid” or “too 
indecisive” (p. 388).  In this regard it is revealing that throughout the studies in the 
thesis character was ranked highly as a source of real and anticipated regret, and in 
Study 6 character regrets were more consequential than regrets from any other 
domain.   
Many regrets are of course attributed to specific decisions, but as is clear 
from the relative proportions of specific and general regrets found throughout the 
studies, it is far more common to find regrets for decisions described in general 
terms (“Left the army too early”; “Regret studying medicine”), and such descriptions 
reflect the evaluation of superordinate goals and a focus on the bigger picture.  This 
is perhaps the point at which the decision-making and autobiographical memory 
approaches converge: clearly very many regrets do emanate from choices on some 
level, but with the passage of time the details of those choices are forgotten and what 
remains is the general feeling or the inference that at some point regrettable choices 
were (or must have been) made.  
So the decision making approach, which has relied heavily on scenarios with 
clearly specified choices and outcomes, and which tends to deal with the short term, 
seems best suited to exposing the mechanisms by which regrets are produced, 
whereas the ecologically-orientated autobiographical memory approach seems best 
suited to showing how these outcomes are remembered over time and why some 
regrets are better remembered than others.   
What also comes across from people‟s regret descriptions is that whether 
they describe their regrets in terms of decisions or dispositions, they feel personally 
responsible for them.  This was also clear from the responsibility ratings in Study 6, 
which were at the high end of the scale.  It seems that people blame themselves not 
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only for the things they have done or failed to do, but for what they have become.  
The statement „no choice, no regret‟ is an invitation to explore such matters further, 
because to bind regret so tightly to choice is to conclude that people have chosen 
their regrettable dispositions, in which case it might be time to stop asking people 
what they regret and time to start asking them why they chose to become poor 
husbands, underachievers or inadequate parents.  
 
6.2.4   The question of scripts 
6.2.4.1 Norms for regret 
 In considering whether there might be norms for regret a distinction must be 
made between the stimulus norms described by Kahneman and Miller (1986) and 
norms that represent socially and culturally shared expectations about patterns of 
behaviour, such as the norms that govern the life script.  What is deemed normal or 
exceptional in the former sense is determined by the unique context created by a 
surprising event, whereas socially and culturally prescribed norms are probabilistic 
and so form a basis for predicting behaviour.  That said, even a surprising event such 
as a car crash, whilst unique to that instance, will share features with car crashes in 
general, so in this sense normative information in memory will be used in the 
counterfactual reconstruction. Whether these two types of norms are categorically 
distinct or whether they represent ends of a continuum is an empirical question yet to 
be addressed, but they illustrate the essential difference between specific and general 
regrets, which is that the former are relatively idiosyncratic and unpredictable 
whereas the latter are not.  In general it is possible to say what people will regret in 
life because general regrets, whether experienced or anticipated, involve elaborative 
counterfactuals/prefactuals that draw on schematic, scripted knowledge.   
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Two striking observations from Studies 3 – 4c support this argument; one 
concerning content and the other concerning agency.  With regard to content, young 
people were consistent in their predictions about what they themselves, their peers 
and the average person would regret in life, and they were equally consistent in their 
estimates of when these regrettable experiences might occur in the lifespan. 
Furthermore, their expectations about what experiences would be regretted and 
where they would occur in the lifespan were consistent with what older adults had in 
fact experienced: the experiences of early adulthood were deemed a source of 
potential and actual regret for young and old respectively, and in both age groups 
there was an emphasis on experiences associated with family, education, intimate 
relationships, character, and the self.  This degree of consistency strongly suggests 
the operation of an underlying norm that designates some experiences as more 
regret-worthy than others.   
The second observation, which has implications for the current accounts of 
regret‟s temporal pattern, is that there is an overwhelming tendency to predict regrets 
of inaction: participants in all four studies (3 – 4c) expected themselves and others to 
regret inaction more than action. This implies either that people value action, or that 
they perceive that they should value action, which may indicate that action is morally 
weighted and carries stronger obligations.  This observation is interesting because it 
suggests that action may be a culturally shared norm, and if this is the case then it is 
likely to exert a very strong influence on people‟s retrospective appraisals and may 
indicate that the regrets people supply in surveys say as much about what they feel 
they ought to regret as they say about what they actually do regret. The inaction 
effect in regret surveys may reflect people‟s realisation that they not only could have 
done more, but that they should have done more. Of course it could be that actions 
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and inactions are represented and understood differently and so until these issues are 
addressed empirically the interpretations offered here remain speculative.   
As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, this bias towards action is 
implicit in the framing of questions in many regret surveys, which ask people to 
describe what they would do differently a second time around (DeGenoa, 1992; 
Kinnear and Metha, 1989; Stewart & Vanderwater, 1999), or to describe their missed 
opportunities (Landman et al., 1995) and regrets for things they regret not having 
done (Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002). So far as it is possible to judge, there are no 
regret surveys in which participants are asked to describe what they would not do if 
they could live their lives again. 
An overall inaction effect was only found in Studies 2 and 3 for experienced 
regrets, and so this argument is not strongly supported by the data for experienced 
regrets in this research programme.  But the strength of the inaction effect in the 
studies of prospective regrets, and in the wider literature strongly supports the view 
that people value action more than inaction.   
  
6.2.4.2 Content  
Although the main focus of the thesis has been on regret‟s structural 
properties, regret content has also been central to the interpretation of most of the 
findings.  Indeed, the first two studies of experienced regret were motivated by 
observations about regret content, as were the four studies of anticipated regret.  For 
experienced regrets the ranking of life domains has been broadly consistent with 
Roese and Summerville‟s (2005) meta-analysis, although there has been a greater 
emphasis on regrets concerning family and intimate relationships and much less on 
education.  In Studies 1 and 2 participants in their sixties reported twice as many 
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family regrets as they did education regrets, whereas for people in their forties family 
and education regrets were almost equally frequent. In Study 5 work and family were 
both more than twice as frequently regretted as education, and in Study 6, education 
ranked only about joint sixth with work.  Education regrets were also considerably 
less consequential than were regrets of character, family, intimate relationships and 
self actualisation. These differences may be partly due to the fact that many of the 
studies in Roese and Summerville‟s meta-analysis asked participants to say what 
they would do differently if they could live their lives again, which is not the same as 
asking them what they actually regret. Education is deemed important in most 
societies, for reasons already explained, so it is likely to be one of the first things that 
comes to mind when people are asked to say what they would do differently a 
second time around.  
The rankings found in the present studies, and in the Roese and Summerville 
meta-analysis are consistent with life script accounts of  autobiographical memory in 
that the most commonly regretted domains include many of the transitional and 
consequential experiences of early adulthood. This was also clear in the ranking of 
anticipated regrets (Studies 3 – 4c) which showed family at the top of the list, 
followed by intimate relationships/work jointly, travel, relationships (general), 
education, then character and self-actualisation. These domains are seen as central 
and formative to the period of early adulthood (Elnick et al., 1999) and reflect 
important, culturally timetabled transitions, so it would be fair to say that people 
regret what their culture deems regret-worthy and important. 
Only regrets of character were reported by all participants in Study 6 and 
these regrets were deemed to have had the most impact. The related domain of self-
development was the next most frequently reported source of regret and what is 
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interesting about these two domains is that they had proportionally more positive 
consequences (37% and 40% respectively) than did interpersonal regrets concerning 
family and intimate relationships, which had 26% and 27% of positive consequences 
respectively.  These findings resonate with the notion of regret as a bringer of insight 
(Saffrey et al., 2008) and are entirely consistent with functional models of regret 
(Roese, 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). 
 There were one or two differences between age groups, most notably in the 
domain of travel, which was a frequently anticipated regret of young adults (ranking 
between third and fourth across the studies), whereas for adults over forty it was near 
the bottom of their list of experienced regrets. In Study 5 there were no regrets at all 
concerning travel and in Study 6, travel was the least consequential of all domains.  
It is difficult to know whether these findings mean that travel means different things 
to difference age cohorts, whether it is more important in prospect than in hindsight, 
or whether people look forward to it so much that they make sure they get it out of 
their system before reaching late adulthood.  
 
6.2.4.3 Regret and other emotions  
At the start of this thesis regret was defined as a counterfactual emotion and 
the notion that regret is a cognitive emotion rather than an emotional cognition goes 
more or less unquestioned by regret researchers (see Landman, 1993).  However, it 
was also noted that some emotion researchers (Sabini & Silver, 2005) do not 
consider regret to be a discrete emotion at all but see it as a judgement (that 
something is regrettable) rooted in other emotions.  The research reported in the 
thesis has only partially addressed this issue, but the results of Study 5 do suggest 
that regret is a multifaceted construct with a highly variable affective complexion. 
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The same study also suggests that regrets fall into two broad categories: those related 
to achievement and those associated with the self and other people.   
Achievement  regrets were experienced with less intensity than were self-
actualisation and other-focussed regrets, and achievement regrets were also less 
likely than self-actualisation or other-focussed regrets to be associated with the 
moral emotions.  Achievement regrets have been associated with dissatisfaction, 
whereas self-related regrets have been associated with depression (Jokisaari, 2004), 
so there seems to be a distinction between regrets for lost opportunities to do better 
in the world, and regrets for lost opportunities to be better in the world.  The results 
of Study 6 support this view by showing that the four most consequential domains 
were those concerned with the self (character and self-development) or with others 
(family and intimate relationships), whereas achievement domains such as work and 
education were deemed to be considerably less consequential.  
It is worth noting that in Study 5 sadness was the most highly rated emotion 
across the clusters, and yet statistically it was also the least reliable, suggesting that 
sadness always accompanies regret but is not clearly associated with the other 
emotions that also accompany regret. Recall that Landman (1993) considered regret 
to be “a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry (emphasis 
added), which implies sadness, but also possibly some guilt or shame.  The 
lexicographical definitions also associate regret with distress or longing for 
something lost (OED, 1991) or with “a sense of loss or feeling of having done 
wrong” (Chambers, 1998), which suggests that regret has at least two distinct causes; 
loss and wrongdoing.  This view is consistent with some cognitive approaches to 
emotion which show loss to be a core feature of sadness, and self-blame to be the 
core feature of guilt (Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  It may be then that two broad 
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categories of regret might be those of a pragmatic nature to do with lost 
opportunities, and those that reflect on the character through interpersonal or 
intrapersonal wrongdoing.   
Another revealing finding of Study 6 was that regrets concerning family and 
intimate relationships had higher ratios of negative to positive consequences than did 
self-related or achievement domains.  This may reflect an important qualitative 
difference between regrets that are relatively private versus those of a shared nature, 
which from a memory perspective is quite interesting. Regrets involving other 
people often involve the knowledge that someone else is aware of our transgressions 
and this knowledge is uncomfortable. Indeed, the judgement of others is what 
defines the “self-conscious” emotions of guilt and shame.  People share our 
memories, they embody them, and they can hold us to account, either directly or 
through their influence on memory by way of our conscience. For this reason they 
may be experienced more negatively.  
Landman (1993) acknowledges that regret can be “more a matter of „cool‟ 
cognitive assessment than of „warm‟ emotional reactivity” (p. 37) and many regrets 
appear to be expressed rather matter-of-factly (“I regret not making more of my 
education”; “I shouldn‟t have left the navy”).  Whether such regrets are accompanied 
by emotion or not it is impossible to judge, but it is not difficult to imagine: in fact it 
is very easy to think of things one regrets without feeling. Tulving‟s (1985) 
phenomenological distinction between things we remember and things we know „on 
some other basis‟ certainly supports the possibility that there might be a kind of 
semantic regret.  Although this possibility can only be inferred from descriptions in 
the present research, it is certainly something that could easily be addressed using 
imaging or physiological methodologies and it might help resolve the issue of 
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whether or when regret is an emotion, and what makes it unique among related 
emotions and constructs.   Such an approach would also be applicable to the study of 
anticipated regret, which can be an equally semantic evaluation, or may involve the 
vivid „pre-experiencing‟ of an emotional response.”   
 
6.3 Limitations and future directions 
This final section starts by addressing some of the limitations of the 
conclusions that can be drawn based on the studies in the thesis, then goes on to 
suggest future directions for research emanating from the findings reported in the 
thesis. 
One limitation in the conclusions that can be drawn from the studies 
presented here concerns the relationship between regret and memory. Although the 
findings overall support the view that specific regrets can be equated with specific 
negative memories, the absence of a control group means that this claim is not 
directly tested, even though the idiosyncratic nature of specific regrets and their 
temporal properties do strongly suggest that they are very similar to specific negative 
memories. The same limitation applies to general regrets, which clearly differ from 
general memories.  This issue might be addressed by studies involving direct 
comparisons between regrets and memories of both types.  This could involve using 
the temporal dating paradigm common in word-cue studies and the Remember/Know 
paradigms described in Chapter 1.   Specific regrets would be expected to share 
many of the characteristics of negative memories, such as the non-scripted temporal 
distribution and recency component already demonstrated in the thesis, as well as the 
recollective experience and accompanying imagery, spatiotemporal information and 
so on.  
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General regrets would be expected to differ from general negative memories 
in that the former has a relatively scripted temporal distribution, whereas this would 
not be expected for general negative memories, although both would tend to concern 
relatively distant events and both would be „known‟ more than „remembered‟.   
Another limitation of the studies is that they do not unambiguously suggest a 
mechanism for the preminiscence bump observed in Studies 3-4c. The displacement 
of the bump for general regrets suggested a tension between the life script and 
temporal construal accounts, making it difficult to assess the relative contributions of 
these two mechanisms. The distribution of general anticipated regrets is broadly 
consistent with the life script argument that important culturally timetabled 
transitions occur in early adulthood, but the life script does not accommodate the 
displacement of the bump forwards in time.  Temporal construal on the other hand 
predicts such displacement, but it predicts a more pronounced displacement than was 
actually observed, so it appears that construal mechanisms push general regrets into 
the distance while the life script anchors them to early adulthood.  One way of 
overcoming this problem would be to run studies similar in design to Studies 3 – 4c, 
but instead of describing and dating regrets, participants would simply describe and 
date the negative experiences they themselves, or another person might have 
encountered by the time they reached older age.  Whereas the life script predicts that 
general regrets concern experiences from early adulthood, it would not predict a 
bump for negative experiences of a general nature, which would be expected to 
cluster in the more distant future.   Similarly, to explore whether Studies 3 – 4c are 
uniquely about regret experiences it would be instructive to ask people to anticipate 
and date things that might go wrong in their lives, or things they expect to feel 
disappointed about.  
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A limitation which these studies share with almost all other studies of regret 
is a reliance on somewhat simplistic and limiting definitions, which are either 
created by the researchers themselves or by people‟s own understanding of what 
emotion labels mean.  As Roese, Summerville and Fessel (2007) have pointed out, 
this leads to problems of circularity, in that researchers produce findings that support 
their definitions, but which do not necessarily reflect the reality of the phenomenon 
being studied.   One way around this might be the inclusion of more discriminating 
definitions and measures of regret, such as the psychometric and phenomenological 
instruments used in emotion research.   
A more general limitation concerns the nature of postal surveys and self-
report questionnaires. With return rates of between 21% (Study 1) and 30% (Study 
3) many people clearly chose not to participate in the studies. Whether this reflects 
aversion to the topic, aversion to filling in questionnaires generally, forgetfulness or 
unfulfilled good intentions can only be conjectured. Several people approached 
directly by the researcher claimed either not to have any regrets, or not to „do‟ regret, 
which may or may not be the same thing. The response rates might also reflect the 
findings of Study 6 that people prefer to think about their regrets than to share them 
with others.  Self-report surveys could be criticised for favouring sanitized regrets or 
“pleasantly sad fantasies” (Kahneman, 1995), but it must also be noted that the 
anonymity of the survey method does allow people to divulge regrets of a very 
personal nature, which many did.  
So what of future directions? The absence of temporal manipulations in the 
studies means that some claims made in the literature about the characteristics of 
recent and distant regrets were not directly tested.  It would be particularly 
informative to examine more closely the structure and phenomenological 
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characteristics of regrets from the past week and those from the whole lifespan, as it 
is highly likely that regrets from the past week would be recollectively retrieved 
episodic memories, whereas entire lifespan regrets, as the results of the studies in the 
thesis suggest, are more general and reasoned. 
Another area for future research might concern regret accessibility. The 
greater accessibility/availability of general regrets is inferred from the findings but is 
not assessed directly.  That general events are more readily retrieved is amply 
demonstrated by the predominance of general regrets for both past and future events, 
but as compelling as these findings are, they do not explicitly test accessibility.  This 
could be achieved using autobiographical memory methodologies and reaction time 
studies to examine more closely the differential accessibility of specific and general 
regrets. If general regrets are more accessible than specific regrets, then they should 
produce shorter retrieval latencies.  Such an approach would also make it possible to 
monitor any priming effects to see whether a person who produced a specific or 
general regret first was also then be primed to produce regrets of a similar type. 
Unfortunately because participants in the present studies retrieved and listed regrets 
at their leisure, there is no way of knowing the order in which their regrets came to 
mind. Such effects could be examined in both between and within-subject designs 
using retrieval times or time-constrained listing techniques. 
More generally, the model presented in this thesis lends itself to the study of 
other emotions such as guilt, shame, remorse, joy and relief, all of which might also 
be expected to involve more or less specific events, perhaps with predictable 
temporal characteristics.  
 The same distinction between specific and general representations might also 
be applied to counterfactual thinking more generally, as counterfactuals, like regrets 
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and memories, can be episodic or semantic in nature and this has implications for 
how they will be brought to mind.  When someone one says for example, „If only my 
husband were more handsome‟ what do they have in mind?  Are they comparing two 
images? (how he was once with how he is now) and if so what kind of images? Or 
are they comparing an image and a proposition? The autobiographical memory 
framework supplies many methodologies that might help clarify what in fact the 
natural „fault lines‟ of the counterfactualising imagination are and help us to answer 
such questions as why the action effect found in scenarios is not readily found in 
studies of autobiographical regret, or why action and inaction effects differ between 
scenarios in which the consequences are known, as in Kahneman and Tversky‟s, 
(1982) investment scenario, or unknown as is the case in Gilovich and Medvec‟s 
(1994, Study 4) student scenario.  Existing accounts of these differences (Byrne & 
McEleney, 2000; Feeney & Handley, 2006 ) focus on the explicit versus implicit 
representation of consequences, but an autobiographical memory approach might 
also consider content effects and the extent to which people draw inferences based 
on their own life experiences and normative expectations.  These questions have not 
been asked in the counterfactual thinking literature, but they would be easy enough 
to ask, either by having participants explain how they arrived at their judgements or 
by using „thinking aloud‟ methodologies.  One obvious direction suggested by the 
findings in the thesis is away from generality and towards greater specificity.  This 
approach would require refining the broad distinction between specific and general 
regrets and it might entail unpacking general regrets to see what specific events and 
antecedents they are made of and what emotions they are associated with, or it might 
mean looking at specific regrets themselves in greater detail.  It might also be useful 
to look within individual life domains to see exactly what makes some domains more 
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regrettable and consequential than others. A distinction might also be made between 
major and minor regrets, as it could be argued that regretting an argument with a 
loved one is not the same as regretting booking the 6.15 train.  And while it may 
appear obvious why the former provides someone with information about “who they 
are and who they might have been”, it is less obvious what self knowledge is offered 
in the latter instance.  Such inferences should be made with caution however, as the 
degree  to which a regret is construed as minor or major will be determined by the 
context.  Booking the 6.15 train may be a minor irritating regret at one point in the 
day, but if it results in arriving at the hospital too late to say goodbye to a dying 
relative, then it may become a major regret accompanied by guilt and remorse.  
Similarly, if the booking was made because it was the best option available at the 
time, then it may have no implications for the self, but if it is yet another reminder of 
one‟s incompetence, it will have broader implications. 
The benefit of a taxonomical approach to regret would be the clarification of 
the fuzzy distinctions between different types of regret and the different emotions 
with which regret is associated, but a more fine grained approach might also 
contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between regret, decisions, and 
memory.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This thesis represents an attempt to show how traditional decision making 
approaches to regret research can be complemented by viewing regret as a 
phenomenon of autobiographical memory, as the autobiographical memory 
framework allows for many existing aspects of regret research to be reinterpreted, or 
re-visited with different questions in mind.  The main contribution of the thesis has 
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been to supply a functional distinction with which such questions can be addressed.  
The autobiographical memory framework also opens up many new possibilities for 
regret research, as the methodologies and approaches of the autobiographical 
memory paradigm provide access to aspects of regrettable phenomena that are 
beyond the grasp of traditional approaches.  For example, the notion that there might 
be a kind of semantic regret could be examined within the context of the episodic-
semantic distinction and the remember/know paradigm.  This paradigm, which is 
widely used in clinical studies, would also open up the possibility of brain imaging 
studies (Wheeler et al., 1997) aimed at identifying the neural origins of different 
regret types and their dissociations. 
However, as the discussion above makes clear, regret is not solely a 
phenomenon of autobiographical memory, but is also very clearly about the 
consequences of decision-making. It was suggested at the outset of the thesis that a 
slight shift of conceptual emphasis can yield an entirely novel perspective from 
which to view regret, and in this sense there is something of the Necker Cube 
illusion to the approach suggested in the thesis, as it involves being able to see regret 
as simultaneously an autobiographical memory and decision-making phenomenon.  
A major contribution of the thesis may be to provide a mechanism by which this 
perceptual shift can be realised, and perhaps the most promising synthesis of the two 
perspectives will be the application of autobiographical memory methodologies (and 
the specific-general distinction) to the study of regrettable decision-making itself.  
Finally, this work should also interest autobiographical memory researchers wishing 
to examine regret as a type of negative memory with distinctive temporal 
characteristics. 
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APPENDIX A1 Studies 1, 2 & 3:  Cover sheet.  
 
 
About this study 
 
Most people can think of things in their lives that they wish had or hadn‟t happened. 
These may be things they did or didn‟t do; bad decisions, unfulfilled ambitions, or 
something else. Such experiences often lead us to feel regret. In this study, we are 
interested in what people regret in their lives and when these regrets occur.  
 
(Study 3 modification: In this study, we are interested in what people regret in their 
lives, when these regrets occur, how strongly they feel about them, and how they 
expect to feel about them in the future). 
 
A simple way to think about regret is in terms of those experiences in your life that 
you wish had turned out differently. These may concern very important issues, or 
seem trivial to anyone but yourself: the important thing for the purpose of this study 
is that it should be something that didn‟t turn out as you wanted it to and which 
caused/causes you feelings of regret.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. Any information you provide will be 
completely anonymous and confidential and seen only by the researcher and research 
supervisor.  Your age, gender and level of education are the only personal identity 
details you will be asked to provide and no-one will be able to link these to the 
experiences you describe.  
 
Please read the paragraph below then write down your age, gender, and the highest 
level of education you attained. Please tick the box provided to indicate that you 
consent to take part in this study. 
 
I have read and understood the outline of this study and realise that my participation 
is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any point.  I acknowledge that by completing 
and returning this questionnaire I am consenting to allow the information I supply to 
be used by the researcher in this study. 
 
Age  ……………years 
   
Gender: (please circle as appropriate)  Male / Female 
 
Highest level of education   …………………………… 
 
Consent agreed  (please tick the box)                        
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APPENDIX A2  
 
Study 1: Specific regret questionnaire 
 
 
We would like you to think of up to 5 regrets from your life so far.  Each regret 
should be specific in nature.  This means that the regretted experience happened on 
particular day in a particular place and involved you personally.  It doesn‟t matter 
whether you felt regret immediately after the event or because of things that 
happened later. What matters is that you can say when that regretted experience 
happened.   
 
Using the spaces provided below, describe in one sentence each of the regretted 
experiences.  Don‟t worry if you have fewer than 5 regrets 
 
 
 1……………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
 
Study 1: Specific regret question sheet. 
 
 
 
Now think about the regrets you have described and for each one answer the 
corresponding question.  The questions are the same for all regrets. 
   
 
THANK YOU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGRET  1 
 
How old were you at the time of the regretted experience?        …………yrs old 
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Study 1: General regret materials 
 
 
We would like you to think of up to 5 regrets from your life so far. Each regret 
should be general in nature.  This means that the regretted experience did not happen 
on a particular day in a particular place. It should be something that involved you 
personally. Although you could not put an exact date on such an experience, you 
could say which decade of your life it belonged to.  
 
Using the spaces provided below, describe in one sentence each of the regretted 
experiences.  Don‟t worry if you have fewer than 5 regrets. 
 
1………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
 
Study 1: General regret question sheet 
 
 
 
Now think about the regrets you have described and for each one answer the 
corresponding question.  The questions are the same for all regrets. 
 
 
 
 
o How old were you when you became conscious of starting to regret the 
experience?            ………yrs old 
 
o Which decade of your life does the regretted experience come from?  Please 
circle as appropriate 
        
  1
st
 (0 - 9)    2
nd
 (10-19)    3
rd
 (20-29)    4
th
 (30-39)    5
th
 (40-49)    6
th
 (50-59)   7
th
 
(60-69) 
 
Regret 1 
 
THANK YOU  
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APPENDIX A3 Study 2: Regret sheet 
 
 
 
REGRET SHEET 
 
We would like you to look back on your life so far and think of the things you regret.  
Please use the spaces provided below to describe in one sentence each of the 
regretted experiences. 
 
There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you have fewer than 5 regrets.  
 
It is important that each description corresponds to only one of the numbers on the 
left and doesn‟t run over into the next space.  
 
 1……………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
 
Study 2: Definitions 
 
Definitions 
 
We would like you to think about the regrets you have described and decide whether 
they concern specific or general experiences.  The following definitions should help 
you. 
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Study 2: Answer sheet 
 
REGRET NUMBER 1 
 
Please think about the regret you have described and decide whether it is specific or general, 
then answer either question A or B.  
 
Specific Regret 
 
 
 
General Regret 
 
 
Question B 
 
 
1. How old were you when you became conscious of starting to regret the experience? 
 
………yrs old 
 
 
2. Which decade of your life does the regretted experience come from?  Please circle 
as appropriate 
 
                 
  1st (0 - 9)    2nd (10-19)    3rd (20-29)    4th (30-39)    5th (40-49)    6th (50-59)   7th (60-69) 
 
 
The following questions should be answered regardless of whether your regret is 
specific or general.  Please answer both questions C and D. 
 
Question A 
 
 How old were you at the time of the regretted experience? 
 
……yrs old 
 
 
Question C 
 
 Please use the scale provided to say how likely you think it is that this regret will 
persist to the end of your life   
 
Not at all                         Absolutely         
likely                     certain 
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Question D 
 
 Now think about the feelings caused by the regretted experience. Using the scale 
provided, please circle the number that best describes how intense the regret… 
 
(i) 
…..was at the time                              Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                   mild                                                            intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 
 
(ii) 
….is now.  
                                                                   Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                    mild                                                           intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 
                                                  
(iii) 
….will be when you reach the end of your life  (Circle N/A if you answered „0‟ to question 
C above)                                                           
                    [N/A]                                     Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                    mild                                                           intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                 0     1     2     3     4     5    6     7     8    9   10 
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APPENDIX A4 Study 3: Experienced regret question sheet 
 
QUESTIONS 
 
We would like you to refer to the regrets you have written down and to consider the 
following questions. Please answer the questions that apply to the regret you have 
described. The same questions are repeated for each individual regret.   
REGRET NUMBER 1 
 
 
Question (B) 
 
If the regret concerns a specific experience but was caused indirectly by things that 
happened later, please answer the following questions: 
 
I. How old were you at the time of the (subsequently) regretted experience?   
 
………….yrs old 
 
II. How old were you when subsequent events „triggered‟ the feeling of regret?  
 
..................yrs old 
 
 
 
Question (A) 
   
If the regret was directly caused by a specific experience, please answer the following 
question: 
 
 How old were you at the time of the negative outcome to the experience you 
regret? 
…………..yrs old 
 
Question (C) 
   
If the regret does not concern a specific experience, but something more general, please 
answer the following: 
 
I. How old were you when you were conscious of starting to regret the experience 
described? 
…………..yrs old 
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Question (D) 
 
Please use the scale provided to say how likely you think it is that this regret will 
persist……… 
 
(i) 
10 years into the future Not at all                         Absolutely  
                   likely                           certain 
     
          0     1     2     3     4     5    6     7     8    9   10 
     
(ii)            
 to the end of your life  Not at all                         Absolutely 
                   likely                     certain 
     
          0     1     2     3     4     5    6     7     8    9   10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question (E) 
 
Now think about the feelings caused by the regretted experience. Using the scale provided, please 
circle the number that best describes how intense the regret… 
 
(i) 
…..was at the time                              Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                   mild                                                            intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
(ii) 
….is now.  
                                                                   Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                    mild                                                           intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 
(iii)  
….will be in 10 yrs time    [Circle N/A if you answered „0‟ to question D (i) above] 
                        
                 [N/A]                                            
                                                                   Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                    mild                                                           intense 
                                                                       1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
                                                                  
                                                                              
(iv) 
….will be when you reach the end of your life  [Circle N/A if you answered „0‟ to question  D (ii) 
above]                                                           
                    [N/A]                                     Very                                                                  Very 
                                                                    mild                                                           intense 
                                                                      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
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Study 3: Anticipated regret sheet 
 
Anticipated regret 
 
We would like you to think about the life ahead of you and imagine the choices, 
goals, expectations and experiences you anticipate for the future. We would like you 
to think about how you might feel if the things you anticipate in your life don‟t turn 
out as planned.  Which of these things are you likely to regret and when?  Please try 
to imagine yourself in your 60‟s looking back on your life and use the spaces 
provided to describe the things you are likely to regret. 
 
Please describe in one sentence each of the experiences you anticipate regretting if 
things don‟t go to plan. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you can‟t 
think of 5 experiences. It is important however that each description corresponds to 
only one of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over into the next space.  
 
 
1………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
Study 3: Anticipated regret answer sheet 
 
We would now like you to consider each of the experiences you anticipate regretting 
and to answer the following questions.  Please answer both questions for each 
anticipated regret. 
 
 
 
 
 
Anticipated regret (1) 
 
a)  Please indicate when in the future the experience you anticipate regretting 
is likely to occur by saying how old you will be at that time. 
 
……………yrs old 
 
b)  Please use the scale below and circle the number that best describes how 
likely you think it is that the anticipated regret will persist into old age (your 60‟s) 
 
                                                           Not at all                                                                 
Absolutely                  likely                             
certain 
     
          0     1     2     3     4     5    6     7     8    9   10 
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APPENDIX A5 Studies 4a – 4c: Cover Sheet 
 
About this study 
 
This study is concerned with establishing cultural norms related to certain types of 
experience.  In particular it is concerned with identifying the kinds of experiences 
people expect to regret in life.  Regret is the emotion people feel when things don‟t 
turn out as they wished them to and it may concern things they did or didn‟t do, bad 
decisions, unfulfilled ambitions, or something else.  
 
Study 4a 
You will be asked to imagine what things you are likely to regret when looking back 
at your life from the eve of your 70
th
 birthday. Then you will be asked to estimate 
when in your life those regrettable experiences are likely to have occurred.   
 
Study 4b 
You will be asked to imagine what experiences a person is likely to regret when 
looking back at their life on the eve of their 70
th
 birthday. Then you will be asked to 
estimate when in that person‟s life those regrettable experiences are likely to have 
occurred.   
 
Study 4c (Generate group) 
You will be asked to imagine what experiences a person is likely to regret when 
looking back at their life from the age of 70. Then you will be asked to estimate 
when in that person‟s life those regrettable experiences are likely to have occurred.   
 
Study 4c (Judge group) 
You will be presented with a list of experiences that a person is likely to regret when 
looking back at their life from the age of 70. Then you will be asked to estimate 
when in that person‟s life those regrettable experiences are likely to have occurred.   
 
The study is anonymous and the only personal details you are asked to supply are 
age, sex, and whether English is your native language.  Your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point.   
 
Please supply the following details and then tick the consent box to indicate that 
your agreement to take part in this study. 
 
Age  ……………years 
   
Sex : (please circle as appropriate)  Male / Female 
 
Is English your first language?  Yes / No 
 
Consent agreed  (please tick the box)                        
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Study 4a: Regret sheet 
 
 
Regret sheet 
 
I would like you to think about the life you will have lived by the time you reach the 
eve of your 70
th
 birthday.  Think of all your goals and expectations, all the choices 
you will have made, and all the experiences you wanted out of life.  Imagine yourself 
looking back across your whole life and how you might feel if things haven‟t worked 
out as planned.  What things are you likely to regret?  Please use the spaces provided 
to describe the things you are likely to regret by the time you reach the age of 70. 
 
Please describe in one sentence each of the experiences you can imagine you might 
regret in life. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you can‟t think of 5 
experiences. It is important however that each description corresponds to only one 
of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over into the next space.  
 
 
1………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
Study 4a: Dating sheet 
 
REGRET DATING SHEET 
 
Please consider each of the anticipated experiences you have described.  Imagine 
looking back from the eve of your 70
th
 birthday.  Try to estimate when in your life 
each of the experiences you think you might regret is likely to have occurred (not the 
feeling of regret, which may have occurred later). Circle the appropriate decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGRET  1         
The regretted experience is likely to have occurred... 
 .in decade ..1 (1-9)     2 (10-19)     3 (20-29)    4 (30-39)    5 (40-49)    6 (50-59)    
7
 (60-69)   
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Study 4b: Regret sheet 
 
 
Regret sheet 
 
I would like you to think about the life that an average person who is your age today 
will have lived by the time they reach the eve of their 70
th
 birthday.  Think of all 
their goals and expectations, all the choices they will have made, and all the 
experiences they wanted out of life.  Imagine that person looking back across their 
whole life and how they might feel if things haven‟t worked out as planned.  What 
things are they likely to regret?  Please use the spaces provided to describe the things 
that this person is likely to regret. 
 
Please describe in one sentence each of the experiences you imagine this person 
might regret in life. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you can‟t think 
of 5 experiences. It is important however that each description corresponds to only 
one of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over into the next space.  
 
 
1………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Study 4b: Dating sheet 
 
 
REGRET DATING SHEET 
 
Please consider each of the experiences you have described and try to estimate when 
in the person‟s life the regretted experience is likely to have occurred (not the 
feeling of regret itself, which may have occurred later).  Circle the appropriate 
decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGRET  1         
The experience this person regrets would have happened……… 
 …in decade ………1 (1-9)  2 (10-19)  3 (20-29) 4 (30-39) 5 (40-49) 6 (50-59) 7 
(60-69)   
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Study 4c: Regret sheet (Generate group) 
 
Regret sheet 
 
I would like you to think about the life that an average person who is your age today 
will have lived by the time they reach 70 years of age.  Think of all their goals and 
expectations, all the choices they will have made, and all the experiences they 
wanted out of life.  Imagine that person looking back across their whole life and how 
they might feel if things haven‟t worked out as planned.  What things are they likely 
to regret?  Please use the spaces provided to describe the things that this average 70 
year old is likely to regret. 
 
Please describe in one sentence each of the experiences you imagine this average 70 
year old might regret in life. There are 5 spaces provided, but don‟t worry if you 
can‟t think of 5 experiences. It is important however that each description 
corresponds to only one of the numbers on the left and doesn‟t run over into the next 
space.  
 
 
1………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
Study 4c: Dating sheet (Generate group) 
 
 
REGRET DATING SHEET 
 
Please consider each of the experiences you have described and try to estimate when 
in the person‟s life the regretted experience is likely to have occurred (not the 
feeling of regret itself, which may have occurred later).  Circle the appropriate 
decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGRET  1         
The experience this person regrets would have happened……… 
 …in decade ………1 (1-9)  2 (10-19)  3 (20-29) 4 (30-39) 5 (40-49) 6 (50-59) 7 
(60-69)   
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Study 4c: Dating list (Judge Group) 
 
Below is a list of experiences a person might regret in life.  Your task is to try and 
estimate when in that person‟s life the regretted experience is most likely to have 
occurred (not the feeling of regret, which may have occurred later).  Use the 
following decades as a guide and date the experiences by writing the appropriate 
number in the „Decade‟ column.   
 
Decades 
(age)
:   1 
(1-9)
      2 
(10-19)
      3 
(20-29)   
    4 
(30-39) 
    5 
(40-49)
     6 
(50-59)
      7 
(60-70)
   
 
Regretted Experience Decade 
Not going to University/pursuing their desired career                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Not having enough children                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Not living a healthy lifestyle which has lead to bad health in later life                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Not doing enough for others, i.e. doing little for charity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Not saving much money, resulting in a poor pension                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Having a drunken one-night stand with that really ugly person                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Not living life to the full                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Never going out with that gorgeous bloke                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Arguing constantly with your parents about stupid things                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Getting that tattoo                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Mistakes made in relationships                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Not working hard enough at school                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Not spending as much time with other people they love                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Not travelling enough                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Not pursuing a relationship                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Taking on a promotion without fully considering the negative 
consequences                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
Spending too much time working                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Arguments with someone with whom they are close                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Not putting in enough commitment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Failed relationships                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
A job they don't like                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
They may wish they had married someone else                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
They may wish they had taken more risks and adventures                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
They may wish they had spent more time with family and friends                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
They may wish they had looked after themselves better in their youth, e.g., 
not smoked                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
Worrying too much about what other people think of them, worrying 
about their physical appearance. When you look back at 70 you perhaps 
wish you still looked like that and see photos and wonder what on earth 
you were so worked up about                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Some may stay with their partner in an unhappy relationship so as not to 
disrupt the peace / cause hassle.  Perhaps there was someone else they 
always wondered about but never dared pursue it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
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APPENDIX A6 Study 5: Cover sheet 
 
About this study 
 
This study is concerned with how people think and feel about the experience of 
regret.  Regret is the emotion we experience when we think about things that didn‟t 
turn out as we wanted them to.  It may be experienced in a variety of ways and may 
concern a wide range of experiences.  Regret may focus on a single moment in the 
past, or may concern something spanning days or decades. 
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any point.   
Should you choose to participate you will be asked to describe something that you 
regret and then answer questions related to that regret.  
 
Your responses will be anonymous and your age, sex and level of education are the 
only personal identity details you provide, and no-one will be able to link these to 
the experience(s) you describe. 
 
Please read the paragraph below then write down your age, sex, and the highest level 
of education you have attained. Please tick the box provided to indicate that you 
consent to take part in this study. 
 
I have read and understood the outline of this study and realise that my participation 
is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any point.  I acknowledge that by 
participating in the study I am consenting to allow the information I supply to be 
used by the researcher. 
 
 
Age  ……………years 
   
Sex: (please circle as appropriate)  Male / Female 
 
Highest level of education   …………………………… 
 
Consent agreed  (please tick the box)                        
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Study 5: Specific regret sheet 
 
I would like you to think of something that you regret which concerns a specific 
event that took place within the course of a single day. The experience can come 
from any part of your life and concern anything you did or didn‟t do, anything you 
said (or failed to say), any choices, decisions, or missed opportunities you wish had 
turned out differently.  
 
Please use the space below to describe the thing you regret in one sentence, then 
answer the questions that follow. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
 
 
Study 5: Specific regret question sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question A  
Does the regret you have described concern something you 
did, something you didn’t do, both, or neither?  Please tick. 
 
                                                                                                             
  Something I did                  Something I didn‟t do  Both        Neither 
 
Question B  
 To establish the history of this regret, please indicate 
which part of your life it stems from by saying how old you were at the time 
of the experience you regret. 
 
       I was approximately……….…yrs old 
 
Question C  
 Please indicate approximately how old you were when you 
realised that this was something you regretted. 
   
 I was approximately………...years old   
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Study 5: General regret sheet 
I would like you to think of something that you regret which is general, something 
that spans any period longer than a single day.  The experience can come from any 
part of your life and concern anything you did or didn‟t do, anything you said (or 
failed to say), any choices, decisions, or missed opportunities you wish had turned 
out differently. 
Please use the space below to describe the thing you regret in one sentence, then 
answer the questions that follow. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………… 
 
 
Study 5: General regret question sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question A  
Does the regret you have described concern something you 
did, something you didn’t do, both, or neither?  Please tick. 
 
                                                                                                             
  Something I did                  Something I didn‟t do  Both        Neither 
 
Question B  
To establish the history of this regret, please indicate 
which part of your life it stems from by saying how old were you at the time 
of the experience you regret.  If the experience spans more than one year of 
your life, say how old you were when you first had the opportunity to avoid 
the regret. 
 
I was approximately…………..yrs old (use an age range if necessary) 
 
Question C  
Please indicate approximately how old you were when you 
realised that this was something you regretted. 
   
            I was approximately………...years old 
 307 
Study 5: Emotion checklist (same for both types of regret) 
 
 
I am interested in how you feel whenever you think of this regret.  Below is a list of 
adjectives describing emotional states.  Please consider each one and think about 
how much it applies to your feelings when recalling the regret you have described. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question D  
 
Emotional 
state 
Not at all 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
A lot 
5 
Nostalgic                               
Resentful      
Disillusioned      
Contemplative      
Angry           
Sentimental      
Guilty      
Empty      
Irritated      
Embarrassed      
Bored      
Ashamed      
Helpless      
Remorseful      
Wistful      
Confused      
Disgusted      
Unfulfilled      
Sad      
Please indicate, by ticking the relevant column, how much this regret makes you feel; 
 
 
 
Thank You For Participating! 
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APPENDIX A7 Study 6: Cover sheet 
 
About this study 
 
This is a study about regret and memory.  In particular, it is about how people 
remember their regrettable life experiences.   
 
You will be asked to think of experiences that you regret, but you will not be asked 
to disclose the content of your regrets.  You will answer questions related to the 
experiences, but you won‟t have to disclose the experiences themselves. 
 
The study takes the form of a semi-structured interview in which you will fill out a 
questionnaire and answer some questions.  Nothing you say will be recorded and 
your age, gender and level of education are the only personal details you will be 
asked to disclose.  Your participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to 
withdraw at any point. 
 
Please read the paragraph below then write down your age, gender, and the highest 
level of education you attained. Please tick the box provided to indicate that you 
consent to take part in this study. 
 
I have read and understood the outline of this study and realise that my participation 
is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any point.  I acknowledge that by 
participating in the study I am consenting to allow the information I supply to be 
used by the researcher. 
 
 
Age  ……………years 
   
Gender: (please circle as appropriate)  Male / Female 
 
Highest level of education   …………………………… 
 
Consent agreed  (please tick the box)                        
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Study 6: Initial instructions 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
I would like you to take some time to think about your life and to think of anything 
that you regret or have regretted in life.  It can be something you did or didn‟t do, a 
missed opportunity, a bad decision, or an unfulfilled dream.  It doesn‟t matter 
whether it seems trivial or important, so long as it is something that concerns you 
personally and which caused/causes you to feel regret. 
 
Use the paper provided to write your regrets down.  This is to help you remember the 
experiences and you can keep or destroy it when the session is over.   
 
 
You will be given a questionnaire to fill in.  There are no right or wrong answers to 
the questions, but it‟s very important that you answer them as accurately and 
truthfully as you can.  I will go through the questionnaire with you to explain certain 
things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study 6: Initial answer slip (used by the Researcher) 
 
 
Participant:  
  Specific General 
 Spec / Gen 
    0   /    1 
Inst/Del 
0   /   1 
Ageat I  A  B  N 
0  1   2   9 
Ageat Dec I  A  B  N 
0  1   2   9 
Reg 1        
Reg 2        
Reg 3        
Reg 4        
Reg 5        
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Study 6: Question sheet 
 
 
QUESTION SHEET 
 
Question 1 
 
 
Question 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) How important to your life at the time  was the thing that you regret? 
   
Not at all important                   Very 
important 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
b) How important to your life now is the thing that you regret?   
 
Not at all important                   Very 
important 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
 
c) How much impact has the thing that you regret had on your life? 
No impact at all             Moderate impact            Huge impact 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
d) As far as you can judge, how much impact has the thing that you regret had on the 
lives of other people? 
No impact at all             Moderate impact            Huge impact 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
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Question 3 
 
 
 
Question 4 
 
 
 
Question 5 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c) I have thought about this regret 
Never before now    Occasionally           
Frequently 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
d) I have talked about this regret to other people 
            Never                  Occasionally            Frequently 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
 
c) At the time of the thing that you regret, how aware were you of the consequences for 
you personally?  
Not at all aware             Somewhat aware           Very aware 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
d) At the time of the thing that you regret, how aware were you of the consequences for 
other people?  
Not at all aware             Somewhat aware           Very aware 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
 
 
How personally responsible do you feel for the thing that you regret?  
 
 Not at all responsible          Somewhat responsible                                    
Totally responsible 
 1       2  3       4  5       6  7 
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Study 6: Consequences sheet 
 
I would like you to choose from the list below those areas of your life which have been 
affected by the thing that you regret.   
 
You can tick as many as necessary. 
 
For each area of your life that has been affected, please try to estimate the number of 
positive and negative consequences that have resulted from the thing that you regret.  
    
 
Use the scrap paper provided to list all the consequences and then add them up to give a total 
for each separate area.  
 
 
 
Area of life 
 
 
Affected  
( ) 
Number of consequences 
 
Positive              Negative 
Family    
 
Intimate relationships (marriage, 
lovers etc) 
   
Friendships    
 
Education    
 
Work    
 
Hobbies    
 
Travel    
 
Character / Personality    
 
Location (where you live/work)    
 
Material well-being (money, 
property, possessions etc) 
   
Health    
 
Self-development    
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APPENDIX A8 CODING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Studies 1 & 2: Specificity (experienced regrets) 
 
 
 
Definitions and Criteria 
 
Your job is to read each description and decide whether it concerns a specific or 
general event.  Below are the criteria for inclusion in either category. 
 
Specific 
 
 Any discrete event, or any experience that could have happened  on a specific 
day in a specific location.    
 
 Any experience that might involve a choice or decision made at a specific 
moment in time. 
 
 
General 
 
 Anything that is not specific according to the criteria above: something that 
could not happen on a specific day in a specific location.  
 
 Any regret that explicitly refers to repeated events, or summarised 
experiences. 
 
 
 Any regret that necessarily implies repeated or extended events and could 
only happen over time. 
 
 
 
You should not try to second guess what the person is thinking.  You should try to 
establish beyond reasonable doubt what is possible given the description.  If you 
are unsure, it might help to think of some of your own experiences, as there is often a 
big gap between how we think about something and how we describe it in words to 
others. 
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Studies 3 – 4c: Specificity (imagined regrets) 
 
 
 
DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA 
 
 
The experiences described were produced by undergraduates and they concern 
imagined regrets. 
 
Your job is to read each description and decide whether it concerns a specific or 
general event.  Below are the criteria for inclusion in either category. 
 
Specific 
 
 Any discrete event, or any experience that could be expected to happen on a 
specific day in a specific location.    
 
 Any experience that might involve a choice or decision made at a specific 
moment in time. 
 
 
General 
 
 Anything that is not specific according to the criteria above: something that 
could not happen on a specific day in a specific location.  
 
 Any regret that explicitly refers to repeated events, or summarised 
experiences. 
 
 Any regret that necessarily implies repeated or extended events and could 
only happen over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
You should not try to second guess what the person is thinking.  You should try to 
establish beyond reasonable doubt what is possible given the description.  If you 
are unsure, it might help to think of some of your own experiences, as there is often a 
big gap between how we think about something and how we describe it in words to 
others. 
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Studies 1, 2 & 3: Agency (experienced regrets) 
 
 
 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Read each description and decide whether the regret described concerns something 
that the person feels was the result of something they did (an action), something they 
didn‟t do (an inaction), both something they did and didn‟t do, or neither an action 
nor inaction.   Below are the codes you should enter into the appropriate column, 
along with some definitions to help you decide:  
 
Inaction    = 0 Any regret that stems from something a person hasn‟t done or 
said.  It can be explicitly stated or implied in the description. 
 
Action      = 1 Any regret that stems from something the person has done or 
said.  Again, it can be explicit or implied. 
 
Both        = 2 Where the description includes explicit reference to both 
action and inaction (e.g. “Doing/Not doing X instead of Y”) or 
where both action and inaction are implied (If I hadn‟t gone to 
X, I could have gone to Y etc) 
 
Neither   = 9 Regret attributed to something another person has done, or to 
something that is beyond human agency.  
Regrets of character („being X or Y‟); 
Any regrets where the description is vague, or  where none of 
the other criteria apply 
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Studies 3 – 4c: Agency (imagined regrets) 
 
 
CODING INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The experiences described were produced by undergraduates and they concern 
imagined regrets that people are likely to have experienced in the course of their 
lives by the time they reach old age. 
 
Read each description and decide whether it refers to something that the person is 
expected to have done (an action), something they are expected not to have done (an 
inaction), both an action and an inaction, or neither an action nor inaction.   Below 
are the codes you should enter into the appropriate column, along with some 
definitions to help you decide:  
 
Inaction    = 0 Any regret that stems from something a person hasn‟t done or 
said.  It can be explicitly stated or implied in the description. 
 
Action      = 1 Any regret that stems from something the person has done or 
said.  Again, it can be explicit or implied. 
 
Both        = 2 Where the description includes explicit reference to both 
action and inaction (e.g. “Doing/Not doing X instead of Y”) or 
where both action and inaction are implied (If I hadn‟t gone to 
X, I could have gone to Y etc) 
 
Neither   = 9 Regret attributed to something another person has done, or to 
something that is beyond human agency.  
Regrets of character („being X or Y‟); 
Any regrets where the description is vague, or  where none of 
the other criteria apply 
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APPENDIX  B1  Study 1 
 
Table 1   Descriptive statistics for the original and recategorised responses 
for specific and general regrets, with frequencies, mean proportions and 
standard deviations 
 Original responses Recategorised responses 
 Specific  
(N = 36) 
General  
(N = 39) 
 Specific  
(N = 30) 
General  
(N = 38) 
Decade f M SD f M SD  f M SD f M    SD 
0 – 9 3 .01 .06 0 --- ---  2 .02 .07 0 -- -- 
10 – 19 14 .11 .15 38 .27 .23  7 .10 .22 35 .30 .23 
20 – 29 25 .23 .24 38 .27 .27  11 .21 .31 33 .28 .27 
30 – 39 16 .13 .16 20 .15 .19  7 .09 .21 16 .14 .23 
40 – 49 12 .11 .19 10 .07 .12  6 .08 .20 9 .08 .18 
50 – 59 24 .21 .24 17 .13 .20  10 .19 .32 12 .11 .21 
60 - 69 21 .19 .24 15 .11 .12  14 .31 .36 12 .09 .13 
 115   138    57   117   
  
 
Table 2    Original responses: specific regrets single sample t test  
Decade M SD M diff t df p 
2 .11 .15 -.05 -2.24 35 .03 
3 .23 .24 .07 1.63 35 .11 
4 .13 .16 -.03 -1.33 35 .19 
5 .11 .19 -.05 -1.79 35 .08 
6 .21 .24 .04 .97 35 .34 
7 .19 .24 .04 .84 35 .41 
Test value = .0166 
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Table 3    Original responses: general regrets single sample t test  
Decade M SD M diff t df p 
2 .27 .23 .11 2.76 38 .01 
3 .27 .27 .12 2.72 38 .01 
4 .15 .19 -.01 -.62 38 .54 
5 .07 .12 -.09 -5.33 38 .00 
6 .13 .20 -.03 -1.20 38 .24 
7 .11 .12 -.05 -2.91 38 .01 
Test value = .0166 
 
Table 4 Recategorised responses: specific regrets single sample t test 
Decade M SD M diff t df p 
2 .10 .22 -.06 -1.65 29 .11 
3 .21 .31 .05 .81 29 .42 
4 .09 .21 -.07 -1.97 29 .06 
5 .08 .20 -.08 -2.26 29 .03 
6 .19 .32 .03 .44 29 .66 
7 .31 .36 .14 2.10 29 .04 
Test value = .0166 
 
Table 5          Recategorised responses: general regrets single sample t test 
Decade M SD M diff t df p 
2 .29 .28 .11 2.85 37 .01 
3 .27 .23 .13 2.82 37 .01 
4 .14 .23 -.02 -.58 37 .56 
5 .08 .18 -.08 -2.86 37 .01 
6 .10 .21 -.06 -1.77 37 .09 
7 .09 .13 -.06 -3.18 37 .01 
Test value = .0166 
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APPENDIX B2 Study 2  
 
Table 6 60s Group: descriptive statistics for the distribution of combined, 
specific and general regrets, with frequencies, mean proportions and standard 
deviations (N = 30) 
 Combined Specific General 
Decade f M SD f M SD f M SD 
 0- 9 3 .02 .09 0 -- -- 3 .02 .09 
10-19 17 .16 .19 1 .01 .08 16 .15 .18 
20-29 27 .29 .28 8 .10 .21 19 .19 .26 
30-39 10 .10 .15 3 .03 .10 7 .07 .13 
40-49 14 .15 .24 6 .06 .17 8 .09 .19 
50-59 12 .11 .21 3 .04 .15 9 .07 .15 
60-69 16 .17 .12 10 .11 .11 6 .06 .07 
Total 99   31   68   
 
 
 
 
Table 7  40s Group: descriptive statistics for the distribution of combined, 
specific, and general regrets, with frequencies, mean proportions and standard 
deviations (N = 41) 
 Combined Specific General 
Decade f M SD f M SD f M SD 
 0- 9 2 .01 .06 1 .01 .05 1 .01 .04 
10-19 34 .24 .25 11 .07 .15 23 .17 .22 
20-29 52 .38 .32 13 .09 .15 39 .28 .30 
30-39 23 .15 .21 13 .08 .14 10 .07 .14 
40-49 32 .21 .17 21 .13 .21 11 .08 .11 
Total 143   59   84   
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APPENDIX B3 Studies 3 – 4c 
 
Table 8 Study 3: descriptive statistics for the distribution of participants’ 
own anticipated regrets, with frequencies, mean proportions and standard 
deviations (N = 50)   
 Combined  Specific  General  
Decade f M     SD f M SD f M    SD 
10-19 0 - - - - - - - - 
20-29 55 .31 .26 22 .12 .17 33 .19 .20 
30-39 55 .29 .26 3 .02 .07 52 27 .26 
40-49 39 .225 .26 1 .005 .04 38 .22 .26 
50-59 17 .10 .17 2 .01 .05 15 .09 .15 
60-69 9 .055 .21 1 .005 .03 8 .05 .21 
Total 175   29   146   
 
 
Table 9 Study 4a: descriptive statistics for the distribution of 
participants’ own anticipated regrets, with frequencies, mean proportions and 
standard deviations (N = 65)   
 Combined  Specific  General  
Decade f M     SD f M SD f M    SD 
0-9 4 .01 .09 1 .004 .02 3 .01 .07 
10-19 41 .15 .24 12 .04 .12 29 .11 .22 
20-29 99 .37 .27 17 .06 .12 82 .31 .25 
30-39 58 .22 .18 6 .02 .06 52 .20 .18 
40-49 36 .14 .17 0 -- -- 36 .14 .18 
50-59 14 .05 .11 1 .004 .02 13 .05 .11 
60-69 11 .05 .13 0 -- -- 11 .05 .13 
Total 263   37   226   
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Table 10 Study 4b: descriptive statistics for the distribution of regrets 
predicted for a peer, with frequencies, mean proportions and standard 
deviations (N = 81)   
 Combined  Specific  General  
Decade f M     SD f M SD f M    SD 
0-9 2 .01 .03 0 -- -- 2 .01 .03 
10-19 50 .14 .19 10 .03 .09 40 .11 .17 
20-29 138 .37 .21 20 .05 .13 118 .32 .20 
30-39 82 .23 .18 5 .01 .06 77 .22 .17 
40-49 39 .11 .14 6 .02 .05 33 .09 .13 
50-59 26 .08 .13 1 .003 .02 25 .07 .12 
60-69 20 .06 .15 1 .003 .02 19 .06 .15 
Total 357   43   314   
 
Table 11 Study 4c: descriptive statistics for the distribution of regrets 
predicted for an average person, with frequencies, mean proportions and 
standard deviations (N = 73) 
 Combined  Specific  General  
Decade f M     SD f M SD f M    SD 
0-9 0 -- -- 0 -- -- 0 -- -- 
10-19 33 .11 .16 10 .03 .08 23 .08 .13 
20-29 140 .46 .25 29 .09 .15 111 .37 .25 
30-39 90 .29 .24 11 .03 .08 79 .26 .24 
40-49 32 .11 .16 2 .01 .04 30 .10 .15 
50-59 9 .03 .11 0 -- -- 9 .03 .11 
60-69 0 
--  0 -- -- 0 -- -- 
Total 304   52   252   
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APPENDIX B4 Study 5 
 
Table 12 Reliability statistics for the filler cluster, with alpha (α) and 
Pearson correlation.    
Cluster and Alpha (α) Item-total correlation α  if item deleted 
Fillers (α = .59)   
          Bored .25 .62 
          Confused .40 .49 
          Disillusioned .46 .43 
          Resentful .45 .46 
 
 
 
Table 13 Correlations between the filler cluster and the four target clusters 
 Moral Hot Wistful Despair 
Filler -.27 .39** .04 .49** 
** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 325 
APPENDIX B5 Study 6 
 
Table 14  Time elapsed for specific regrets: single sample t test 
Timelapse M SD M diff t df p 
Instant .65 .48 .45 4.89 26 .00 
Days .18 .37 -.02 -.30 26 .77 
Weeks .04 .19 -.16 - 4.40 26 .00 
Months .12 .32 -.08 - 1.23 26 .23 
Years .01 .06 -.19 - 15.20 26 .00 
Test value = .20 
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APPENDIX C: FORMULAE 
 
 
C1 Partial decade adjustment                                                                             327 
Studies 1 & 2   (experienced regrets) 
Study 3   (anticipated regrets) 
 
 
C2 Studies 1 – 6   Formulae for calculating effect sizes (r)                  329 
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APPENDIX C1 Partial decade adjustment 
 
 
Studies 1 & 2: Experienced regrets 
 
 
Calculation used for the adjustment in Decade 7, based on a formula used by 
Berntsen & Rubin (2002). 
 
In Study 1 this adjustment was calculated within each group using the group n.  In 
Study 2 it was calculated using the sample N 
 
1. Calculate the average age past the decade boundary to give a measure of how 
much the average person had lived through that decade 
2. Add to this 6 months (0.5 yrs) because a person who gives their age at X is 
on average X.5yrs old. 
3. Divide the number of regrets in decade seven by the number of years lived 
through that decade to give an average number of regrets per year in that 
decade 
4. Multiply the regrets per year by the years remaining in decade 7 to give an 
estimate of how many regrets would have been produced had all participants 
completed the questionnaire on the last  day of the decade. 
5. Divide the product of Step 4 by the number of participants in the group to 
give a proportion of the extra regrets that would be allocated to each 
participant. 
 
Study 1 recategorised regrets:  example.  
Specific regrets:  
 
Average age = 65 yrs.   
Years lived past the decade boundary (59)  = 6 + 0.5 = 6.5 yrs 
Decade 7 regret total =  9 
Regrets per year = 9/6.5 = 1.4 
Years remaining in decade = 3.5 yrs 
Adjustment = 3.5 yrs X 1.4 = 5 extra regrets 
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Study 3: Anticipated regrets 
 
 
The formula for calculating the adjustment is essentially the same as that used in 
Studies 1 and 2 except that it adjusts for the fact that not all participants have the 
same amount of future ahead of them as defined by the parameters of the study. 
 
Average age = 21.6 yrs 
Average age past the decade boundary (19) = 2.6 yrs + 0.5yrs = 3.1yrs of the decade 
have been used 
Years remaining in the decade = 6.9 yrs. 
Regret total in decade 3 = 38 
Regrets per year = 38/6.9, = 5.5  
Regrets that could have been generated = 5.5 x 3.1 
Adjustment =  17 regrets 
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APPENDIX C2 Formulae for calculating effect size r  
 
 
Studies 1 - 6 
 
 
 
 
 
For t-tests:      
 
 
 
 
 
For Wilcoxon tests:    
(N = the number of observations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
